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REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE

A REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



JANUARY 1, 1985

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

JANUARY 1, 1985.

HON. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: By the time of President Reagan's inauguration in January 1981, it had become clear that NATO's dual-track decision of December 1979—to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) while seeking negotiated East-West limits on such weaponry—had become a subject of major controversy within the Atlantic Alliance. Although NATO's history is replete with instances of internal dispute, debate over INF appeared to be expanding into the realm of citizen discussion far more than had previous issues. Because this growth in "grass roots" concern had obvious implications for the solidarity of an alliance that depends upon political consensus, the North Atlantic Assembly—NATO's interparliamentary arm—determined early in 1981 to establish a Special Committee to study the political and military aspects of INF modernization and arms control. The guiding premise was that a group of parliamentarians representing a cross-section of views from NATO's 15 (now 16) member-nations could contribute to both governmental and public understanding of the complexities surrounding the INF issue.

Since its creation, the Special Committee has conducted extensive interviews in Washington, Bonn, London, Brussels, the Hague, Rome, Paris, and SHAPE headquarters in Belgium. Those interviewed include officials from current and past governments involved in the NATO decision, groups of parliamentarians, experts on strategic issues, and leaders of European and American citizen groups opposing new nuclear deployments. Resulting from these efforts was a series of three interim reports, presented to the Assembly at its annual sessions in Munich in 1981, in London in 1982, and in The Hague in 1983.

This year, at the Assembly's plenary session in Brussels, the Special Committee presented a fourth report on nuclear weapons in Europe, which is enclosed. This report is in one sense final. With INF negotiations having been suspended, and with NATO INF deployments proceeding apace, a chapter in NATO's nuclear history has clearly come to a close. The Special Committee's work, however, is by no means complete. The issue of nuclear weapons obviously remains, and will continue to pose serious problems for the member-nations of the Alliance. Because it is likely and probably desirable that INF will no longer be dealt with as a separate category of weaponry in future negotiations, and because the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is viewed by all NATO nations as having relevance to their security, it

was agreed in Brussels that the study mandate of the Special Committee should be broadened to include an analysis of the issues arising from all nuclear or anti-ballistic-missile systems in the Alliance. Accordingly the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe has now been renamed the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in the Atlantic Alliance.

For some 5 years, the INF issue, in both its deployment and arms control aspects, has dominated deliberations within the North Atlantic Alliance—and, accordingly, among parliamentarians of the North Atlantic Assembly. I am pleased that during this period the Special Committee's products—its reports and its proposed resolutions—have won widespread endorsement from NATO parliamentarians. I trust that as the Special Committee continues its work, with a new and broader mandate, it will continue to render comparable service.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
*Chairman, Special Committee on
Nuclear Weapons in the Atlantic Alliance,
North Atlantic Assembly.*

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INTRODUCTION

The events of the past five years have shown the determination of most NATO Governments to carry through the 1979 December decision to modernise intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe while simultaneously seeking to reduce the numbers of such systems through arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Despite vocal and well organised internal opposition in Western Europe, NATO Governments continue to believe that the deployments of U.S. Cruise and Pershing II missiles guarantee improved deterrence, "couple" the United States in the defence of Western Europe and open a route to serious arms control negotiations.

Events have shown NATO is capable of taking a difficult and controversial decision in the face of sustained and powerful Soviet opposition. The implementation of the 1979 decision has thus demonstrated the continuing strength and cohesion of the Alliance in the most testing circumstances.

But this success has not been achieved without cost. The controversy surrounding the Cruise and Pershing II deployments has helped to destroy the traditional post-war consensus on defence issues in both Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. The main opposition party in each nation is now firmly committed against the missiles. The election of either to Government could, therefore, threaten the whole thrust of NATO's current nuclear strategy.

Given the intensity of the public debate throughout Western Europe on INF modernisation, it is hard to believe that further updating and replacement of nuclear weapons of any kind could easily be undertaken for some years to come. Having survived the recent controversy, few political leaders are anxious to repeat the experience. This may indeed be of vital importance to NATO strategy in view of the 1983 "Montebello decision", which calls for both the reduction and modernisation of short-range nuclear forces.

The process of public persuasion might have been easier if there had been fewer differences about objectives. The linking of modernisation with arms control was necessary to balance the military and political requirements of NATO's policy of defence and detente. But there were differing views about which was to be given priority. Most Europeans regarded modernisation as the price to be paid for arms control whilst U.S. officials tended to regard arms control as the price needed to achieve modernisation.

This central ambiguity was reflected in the decision to make the "zero option" not just an opening bid but NATO's main negotiating position. This may have succeeded in placing responsibility for the high level of INF deployments in the Soviet Union. However, it contradicted the overriding military argument for modernisation -- the need to replace ageing manned aircraft with a more credible capacity to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike

at the Soviet Union with forces based in Europe. On this basis modernisation was essential irrespective of the Soviet SS-20 deployment. Had the Soviets accepted the "zero option", Cruise and Pershing II would not have been deployed and NATO's deterrent capability would have been undermined.

The Geneva negotiations would never have been easy but they were not assisted by the exaggerated language in which East-West relations were conducted after 1980. Bellicose statements by Western leaders merely produced a predictably virulent playback from the Soviet propaganda "bank". The net effect did more to alarm than to stiffen the resolve of European public opinion, and served to encourage support for the "Peace Movement".

The Soviet walk-out from the Geneva talks undermined the often heard suggestion that they would only negotiate seriously once they were convinced of NATO's determination to deploy its own missiles. Throughout 1984 the Soviet Union stated categorically that it would not return to negotiations until NATO had withdrawn the missiles deployed since December 1983. While some observers had suggested a freeze of NATO deployments or a merger of START and INF as an inducement to bring the Soviets back to Geneva, the Alliance position has been that it should not "reward a walk-out with a concession".

Beginning in the summer of 1984, the Soviet Union indicated its wish to conclude an agreement banning weapons in space. Negotiations on this issue might result in a resumption of talks both on START and INF, either separately or in a combined set of negotiations. Now that NATO deployment is going ahead, the Soviets may be more interested in serious bargaining than in propaganda exercises aimed at influencing European public opinion. More importantly, recommencement of negotiations would signify a de facto Soviet acceptance of NATO deployments, thereby lifting a major impediment to progress in the 1981-83 talks : the Soviet refusal to "legitimise" NATO LRINF deployments.

Whatever the forum, there will undoubtedly be slow progress if both sides attempt to construct a wholly new approach to negotiations. Before entering any new or resumed talks NATO should develop a negotiating position which would command a wide measure of support from European public opinion and have a reasonable prospect for early agreement. The 1982 "walk in the woods" formula offers the most likely basis for such an approach.

A negotiated result in which the Soviet Union actually dismantled SS-20s aimed at Europe while NATO limited overall LRINF deployment to well below 572 would be a major arms control achievement. It would reaffirm the original objectives of the 1979 decision by providing a reasonable level of deterrence as well as "coupling" the United States firmly to the defence of Western Europe. It would also demonstrate the Alliance commitment to security at the lowest possible level of armaments.

PART I : THE ISSUES

CHAPTER I - THE EVOLUTION OF NATO'S INF DOCTRINE AND CAPABILITIES

NATO's nuclear doctrine has evolved through a number of distinct phases. Following World War II, acute economic difficulties in Western Europe and U.S. nuclear superiority led to an almost total dependence on nuclear weapons and the adoption of the doctrine of massive retaliation. The realisation that the conventional force goals established by the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in 1952 * were beyond Europe's means led to the adoption of what became known as a "tripwire" strategy, referred to by its NATO Military Committee designation MC 14/2. Under MC 14/2, conventional forces would provide a defensive shield to establish the fact of aggression following which the United States Strategic Air Command would deliver a counter blow of massive nuclear retaliation. However, the inherent inflexibility of this strategy and its unsuitability as a response to deter lower level aggression, and the growth in Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear forces combined to erode its credibility.

The deployment by the Soviet Union of a long-range bomber force, though limited in size and capability, and rapid advances in missile technology, dramatically illustrated by the launching of Sputnik in 1957, challenged the assumptions on which massive retaliation was based. In particular, its credibility as a strategy to protect Europe or to "extend deterrence" became doubtful. Inevitably, the question came to be asked -- if the Soviet Union possessed the means to cause unacceptable damage to the United States, how realistic was it to expect the United States to use its strategic nuclear forces in the event of Soviet aggression against Europe?

Beginning in the late 1950s, the United States sought to reassure Europeans of the credibility of the nuclear umbrella in two specific ways: first, by developing a wide range of strategic choices (both in terms of capabilities and doctrine) in order to give the President more than an "all or nothing" response, and secondly, by deploying nuclear systems in Europe or "offshore" capable of striking Soviet territory that would "couple" the defence of Europe more closely to the American strategic nuclear guarantee.

The nuclear systems deployed in Europe have traditionally been divided into two categories : first, those systems capable of striking the Soviet Union which have been known variously as theatre, long-range, medium-range, "grey area" and now intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF); and those systems which would be used in the proximity of any conventional conflict and known variously as tactical, battlefield or short-range nuclear forces (SNF). These categories are somewhat artificial since certain systems, such as aircraft, obviously overlap both. Both categories of nuclear weapons were first introduced into Europe in the 1950s but for different reasons.

European concern over the credibility of the American guarantee increased in the late 1950s when the Soviet Union began to deploy substantial numbers of intermediate range ballistic missiles - SS-4s and SS-5s - targeted on Europe. In 1957, the NATO Council decided to deploy American ballistic

* At Lisbon, Ministers adopted force goals calling for a total of 50 divisions, and 4,000 aircraft to provide for the conventional defence of Europe.

missiles in Europe: Thors in England and Jupiters in Italy and Turkey.* These systems were deployed in the spring of 1959 under dual-operation and SACEUR command, but the warheads remained in U.S. custody. There were several reasons for these deployments : to bolster American deterrent forces; to restore the diminishing confidence of European governments in the credibility of the nuclear guarantee; and to respond to military pressure, mainly from SACEUR, General Norstad, that NATO needed a nuclear missile force based in Europe capable of striking the Soviet Union. The vulnerability of these missiles, however, limited their political and military value. They were phased out in 1963 as new technologies (land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles) facilitated the adoption of more distant and survivable basing strategies.

The idea that the Alliance required a European land-based force capable of striking the Soviet Union remained alive. In 1959, General Norstad advocated a force of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in addition to the Thors and Jupiters then being placed in Europe and began to speak of the need to extend the nuclear authority of NATO. This military pressure for the deployment of a separate European-based nuclear force, in which the Europeans would have a greater say, coincided with pressure from other areas. In addition to their diminishing confidence in the American strategic commitment, some Europeans were growing increasingly restive at their lack of participation in Alliance nuclear planning and were eager to find a formula that would remedy this situation. The Americans, for their part, were becoming concerned at the trend toward independent national deterrent forces in the United Kingdom and France.

The result was the emergence of a variety of schemes between 1959 and 1963 for the creation of some form of NATO nuclear force. These culminated in the idea for a multilaterally owned and controlled seaborne force, the so-called multilateral force (MLF). The MLF proposal was aimed at preserving American operational control over nuclear weapons while simultaneously enabling the European allies to participate in the management of a Western nuclear deterrent assigned to NATO. However, as a compromise formula trying to satisfy highly ambiguous and frequently divergent aims, its chances of success were always limited and it collapsed in 1964.

In parallel to the MLF discussions, and for many of the same reasons, France and Great Britain began to consider the creation of truly independent nuclear deterrent forces. While Great Britain deployed nuclear-capable aircraft in the 1950s, it was not until the early 1960s that a truly independent deterrent force began to emerge. Similar developments took place in France, although initially at a somewhat slower technological pace as the French government depended almost wholly on its own technology. Moreover, France set out to develop what was effectively a "mini-triad" comprising air, sea and land-based nuclear forces.

Following the failure of the MLF, the Alliance adopted a number of measures which, with varying degrees of success, addressed the dual problem of

* Deployment of these systems in West Germany was considered, but was rejected by Chancellor Adenauer because it would have generated political controversy and would have had an uncertain impact on the country's relations with the East.

creating more credible coupling and of facilitating greater European participation in Alliance nuclear affairs. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was established in 1967 to provide a forum in which Alliance members could participate in the evolution of NATO's nuclear policy. The NPG was originally composed of four permanent members (The United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy) and three members rotated at 18 month intervals. Since 1979 it has comprised all Alliance members in the Defence Planning Committee (i.e., all NATO members except France and Iceland).

The NPG was initially concerned with the theory and doctrine of tactical nuclear weapons and concentrated on developing provisional political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons. A series of analytical studies was made examining the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used, the criteria Ministers would take into account in their consultations concerning such use, and the results of theatre nuclear weapon (TNW) use. By the mid-1970s, the NPG moved to procurement considerations as system replacement became necessary.

In addition to the creation of a consultation mechanism in the form of the NPG, control of some United States and United Kingdom nuclear forces was passed to SACEUR in 1963 in order to provide a NATO -- as distinct from a United States -- deterrent. 60 U.S. Polaris SLBMs and the United Kingdom's nuclear V-bomber force and Polaris force * were assigned to SACEUR, in a sense replacing the obsolescent Thor and Jupiter MRBMs, all of which were withdrawn from Europe in that year. In 1967 the United States began to deploy F-111 medium-range, all-weather nuclear strike aircraft to the United Kingdom to be likewise responsive to SACEUR's requirements. Finally, and most significantly, in 1967 NATO formally adopted the strategy of flexible response.

Flexible Response

The adoption of the strategy of flexible response in 1967 represented the culmination of a series of efforts within the Alliance to accommodate highly divergent interests and attitudes about the role of nuclear weapons. Under this doctrine, known as MC 14/3, the Alliance showed its determination to resist Soviet aggression at any level and its willingness to escalate the conflict to whatever degree necessary to bring it to an end. A "ladder of escalation" options would subsequently exist from conventional to strategic forces, via the nuclear forces deployed in Europe, including both those for battlefield use and those longer range systems assigned to SACEUR.

The adoption of flexible response represented an uneasy compromise between differing transatlantic perspectives on the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy. While considered theoretically sound, it left considerable latitude for differences over the levels of forces necessary at each stage to

* These arrangements were in accordance with the Nassau agreement of December 1962 under which it had been agreed that the British Polaris force would be assigned to NATO subject to withdrawal when "supreme national interests are at stake".

ensure credible deterrence. Varying Alliance roles and perspectives imposed different requirements. There was general agreement that deterrence be made as credible as possible, but disagreement over how this could be best achieved.

As the nuclear "provider" for the Alliance, the United States has been required to consider what would happen if deterrence failed. This has led to the development of a range of options that make the threatened use of nuclear weapons believable and that provide possibilities other than the unthinkable, and therefore incredible, option of an all-out nuclear response. Credibility and usability have become inseparable elements of nuclear deterrence. Thus, developments and policies that make the threatened use of nuclear weapons more credible have the parallel effect of making their actual use appear more possible. This dilemma has encouraged a continuing debate as American strategy and capabilities have moved towards greater flexibility.

As the "protected", the Europeans have not always felt the same urge to look beyond deterrence to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war. They have been concerned more with absolute deterrence -- the threatened use of nuclear weapons -- than with what could happen if deterrence were to fail. Their major preoccupation has been to ensure the closest possible link between the defence of Europe and the American strategic nuclear deterrent. Concerned that no "gaps" should appear in the flexible response ladder, they have been equally anxious that the forces at each level should not be so strong as to encourage a nuclear war limited to European territory.

There is, then, an inherent tension built into the concept of deterrence which is exacerbated by transatlantic differences. While NATO and American officials argue that flexible response strengthens deterrence by ensuring a continuum of capabilities which effectively "couple" Europe to the strategic guarantee, some Europeans still assert that the consequence of flexible response will be precisely the opposite, i.e., the containment of any future conflict to European territory. The fact that flexible response has not reconciled these differences was again demonstrated by the recent debates over the proposed deployment of the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW) and the decision on NATO INF modernisation. For many Europeans the deployment of new missiles reinforced the coupling of Europe to the United States strategic deterrent; for others it achieved the opposite effect, i.e. giving the United States the opportunity to limit a nuclear war to Europe.

There is another fundamental problem in assessing NATO nuclear strategy for which there can be no definitive answer: "How much is enough?" Credible deterrence depends not only on the different perspectives of guarantor and guaranteed, but also on judgements and perceptions which are highly subjective. It is impossible to be certain what level of capability is necessary to deter the Soviet leadership. That judgement rests finally on assumptions concerning the nature of the Soviet Union, its objectives and its willingness to take risks. For this reason, there will always be disagreement over the levels of capabilities the Alliance requires for credible deterrence.

However, the acceptability of a strategy of deterrence depends not only on the perceived effect on an adversary but also on the effect it has on the people it is meant to defend. In this respect, the relationship between deterrence and reassurance has become a critical factor in the current debate on nuclear strategy. People must be convinced that the benefits of nuclear

strategy outweigh the potential risks. For many years, the risks involved in the strategy of nuclear deterrence have been conveniently ignored. Today the need to modernise nuclear forces and the consequent growth of public interest in nuclear weapons has obliged NATO to explain and justify the ambiguities of its nuclear strategy.

Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF)

The North Atlantic Council decided in 1954 to introduce tactical nuclear weapons into Europe in order to compensate for Soviet conventional superiority and to signal the intention to fight any war with tactical nuclear weapons from the outset. Any initial advantage that was gained by this decision, however, was soon negated by Soviet acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. During this period a substantial number of warheads of various sizes designed for a wide range of delivery vehicles accumulated in Europe, including nuclear artillery, short-and medium-range rockets, aircraft, atomic demolition mines, and anti-aircraft missiles.

Traditionally, NATO military doctrine and planners have assigned three roles to SNF: to deter against a nuclear and conventional attack; to defend against a conventional and/or nuclear attack should conventional defence fail; and, lastly, to provide a link between conventional forces and INF. Military planners argue that the presence of short-range nuclear weapons play a crucial role in forcing the adversary to disperse his forces, as massed armoured formations provide an ideal target for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, these weapons form an essential stage in the "escalation-ladder" and constitute an important deterrent to the use by the Warsaw Pact of their own tactical nuclear weapons or chemical weapons.

As Soviet strategic nuclear forces grew, NATO came to rely increasingly upon short-range nuclear weapons to deter aggression in Europe. Between 1963 and 1966, the United States stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons doubled from 3500 to approximately 7000. Throughout this period, the presence of United States short-range nuclear weapons in Europe was seen as extending the deterrent umbrella of United States nuclear protection, although the precise role these weapons would play if deterrence should fail was not clear.

In the early 1970's, United States Defence Secretary Schlesinger embarked upon a programme of modernisation of short range nuclear weapons. Debate over the credibility of tactical nuclear weapons employment led to a concerted effort to make these weapons more discriminating in their destructive capacity, thereby making their use more credible. Deterrence was to be strengthened through the provision of more and more precise targeting options for nuclear weapons, both strategic and theatre. On the strategic level, the so-called "Schlesinger Doctrine" provided for a myriad of regional and limited nuclear targeting options; on the theatre level, modernisation centred around lower-yield, increased accuracy and tailored effects (such as reduced blast, enhanced radiation) -- so-called "mini-nukes".

The United States modernisation programme sparked considerable political controversy in 1973 over the mini-nuke issue. While the United

States had deployed tactical nuclear weapons of very small yield in the 1960s (e.g. the Davy Crockett), the programme proposed by Schlesinger was designed to provide:

more accurate systems and more lethal effects from lower yields to improve military effectiveness and decrease unwanted damage. Such improvements could increase the credibility of our tactical nuclear stockpile through better warfighting capability, thereby enhancing deterrence. *

The controversy over mini-nukes in 1973 was reflected in a much more publicised debate over enhanced radiation weapons ("neutron bomb") in 1977-1978. Opponents of new, smaller and more effective tactical nuclear weapons argued that they would: blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons; make their use in a conflict more feasible and therefore more likely; and provide discriminatory options that could encourage the perception of a nuclear conflict limited to Europe. In this sense, opponents saw mini-nukes as undermining the continuum of deterrence represented by theatre and strategic nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy.

Proponents claimed that making nuclear weapons more usable strengthened deterrence and reduced the risk of war. Because the employment of mini-nukes would involve less collateral damage, the West would not be self deterred, as at present, from nuclear escalation. The perception of usability would strengthen the credibility of the first rung on the ladder of escalation and thus strengthen the American nuclear guarantee.

* Nuclear Weapons & Foreign Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, 93rd Congress, 1974. p. 209.

CHAPTER II - THE MODERNISATION OF NATO'S LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

On 12 December 1979, NATO Ministers * agreed to modernise NATO's LRINF through the deployment of 572 single warhead nuclear missiles in five European countries : 108 Pershing II missiles and 96 GLCMs in the Federal Republic, 160 GLCMs in the United Kingdom, 112 in Italy, and 48 in both Belgium and the Netherlands. All systems would be deployed with American forces only and would be under American command and control. The cost of development and production of these systems would be borne by the United States, while its allies would contribute to the infrastructure and support of the systems through their contribution to the NATO Infrastructure Fund. At the same time, NATO expressed its willingness to negotiate limits on its deployment in exchange for reciprocal Soviet limitations. The linking of modernisation with arms control in the 1979 NATO Ministerial communique became known subsequently as the "double track decision".

The Rationale for LRINF Modernisation

The adoption of the strategy of flexible response in 1967 put to rest, at least temporarily, many of the doubts that had dominated Alliance discussions in the 1960s. However, in the mid-1970s, public attention was again drawn to the adequacy of Alliance nuclear strategy as a result of a speech by Chancellor Schmidt.

Speaking to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in October 1977, Chancellor Schmidt made several general observations concerning Alliance security and trends in the strategic nuclear balance. In this speech, the Chancellor argued that strategic parity, as codified by SALT, "neutralised" the strategic nuclear capabilities of the two superpowers, and that this development magnified the disparities between East and West in tactical nuclear and conventional weapons. In his view, a SALT process confined to the superpowers would impair the security of Western Europe unless the disparities of power in Europe were removed in parallel with the SALT negotiations. Behind these remarks lay the concern that SALT II excluded Soviet systems aimed at Europe (the SS-20 and Backfire bomber) but included American systems that could be of help to Europe (cruise missiles). At the time of the Chancellor's speech, the precise details of the emerging SALT II Treaty (following the rejection by the Soviet Union of President Carter's "heavy cuts" proposal of March 1977) were not known. However, European officials were concerned that the new treaty would include restrictions on cruise missiles that would effectively deny their utilisation in Europe.

The speech did not make clear how the disparities to which the Chancellor referred were to be removed. He commented that if they remained, then the Alliance "must maintain the full balance of deterrence strategy ... and must therefore be ready to make available the means to support its current strategy". But referring to the Vienna MBFR negotiations, he suggested that

* See NATO Communiqué in Appendix. Despite the official consensus for the decision, Belgium and the Netherlands reserved their positions concerning deployment -- Belgium initially for six months, and the Netherlands until December 1981 pending progress in arms control negotiations. Both nations subsequently extended their reservations.

there were two ways of establishing a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact -- for NATO to undertake a build-up or for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce their force strength and achieve an overall balance at a lower level. The Chancellor stated that he preferred the latter approach.

Chancellor Schmidt's speech gave political momentum to a process that was already underway. In May 1977 NATO had decided to review its nuclear forces in Europe as part of the Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP) which concentrated largely on improving Alliance conventional forces. The NPG was given responsibility for this task at its October 1977 meeting in Bari, Italy. The NPG established the High Level Group (HLG) as a subordinate body directed to examine NATO's INF and the need for modernisation. The HLG was made up of officials from national capitals of all NATO countries except France, Iceland, Luxembourg and Portugal and was chaired by the United States.

During its first meeting, the HLG decided, at the urging of the European representatives, that the long-range component of NATO's nuclear forces needed attention. They agreed fairly rapidly that new deployments would be necessary and the United States was asked to provide "hardware" options. By early 1979, a consensus was obtained on the need for a mix of Pershing ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. The precise number of 572 systems was decided in the summer of 1979.

Alliance officials have presented the rationale for LRINF modernisation as resulting from the coincidence of three separate but related developments: strategic parity; existing NATO LRINF obsolescence; and Soviet LRINF modernisation. It was argued that the development of strategic parity, as codified by the SALT process, had raised questions concerning the credibility of the American strategic nuclear forces to defend Europe. The credibility of the American nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis Europe had been further diminished by the declining effectiveness of existing NATO long-range nuclear assets in Europe, notably American F-111 and British Vulcan aircraft, whose penetration capability has been put in doubt by improvements in Soviet air defences and by their own obsolescence. It was also argued that because the 400 Poseidon warheads allocated to NATO were part of America's strategic forces, they were not sufficiently identified with, or linked to, the defence of Europe. Neither did their characteristics facilitate their use for the selective response that NATO strategy required. These deficiencies in NATO's forces contrasted with the very substantial improvements in Soviet LRINF capabilities targeted on Europe, notably the introduction of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber.

As a result of these related developments, Alliance officials argued that NATO's strategy of flexible response had become deficient. A gap existed in the area of long-range theatre nuclear systems which the Soviet Union could exploit. During a crisis, Soviet LRINF could provide the Soviet Union with the means to escalate to a level at which NATO had no credible response, because both NATO's existing LRINF and the threat of American strategic retaliation lacked credibility.

The HLG's deliberations initially concerned the deficiencies of NATO's own armament. However, in the public discussion, attention increasingly focussed on the SS-20. A number of observers argued that the SS-20 posed a qualitatively different threat to Europe in the sense that it

could threaten European military targets with greater accuracy and reduced collateral damage. It afforded the Soviet Union more selective and thus more credible options against Europe. Moreover, because of its mobility, it was no longer targetable by American strategic systems as were the SS-4s and SS-5s in their fixed silos. Accordingly, the SS-20 gave the Soviet Union the potential to initiate nuclear strikes against NATO's nuclear and military forces which it previously had lacked. The SS-20 represented a military threat which could be used in a time of crisis for political intimidation.

However, other observers have disputed that the SS-20 altered the military balance in any practical way. They point out that because of the size of the warhead (150 KT), an SS-20 "selective strike" against Europe would cause appalling damage and would inevitably initiate a more general nuclear conflict. In this sense it has been argued that this development would not give the Soviet Union a usable weapon, either in a military or political sense. Furthermore, it was argued by some that mobility actually contributed to stability when compared to the fixed and vulnerable SS-4s and SS-5s.

The public debate emphasised the SS-20 to the exclusion of other arguments and weapons systems. The over-emphasis on the SS-20 was perhaps inevitable because it is easier to discuss publicly the need for LRINF modernisation by pointing to visible Soviet capabilities than by explaining somewhat esoteric NATO doctrine. However, while understandable, this emphasis has contributed to some of the current ambiguity concerning the precise objectives of the NATO decision.

While the reasons advanced to justify the need for LRINF modernisation involved military criteria, the evolution of the NATO decision was also influenced heavily by political considerations, notably, that deployments should be land-based and visible to ensure coupling between the United States and Europe *; that the numbers should be high enough to ensure the credibility of flexible response, but not so high as to suggest a self-contained theatre nuclear capability; that the Federal Republic should not be the only non-nuclear continental member to accept deployments; and that a deployment proposal must be accompanied by an offer to begin arms control negotiations.

The 1979 "double-track" decision represented an attempt to accommodate the requirements of NATO's policy of defence and détente. This attempt to balance military and political considerations pervaded the entire LRINF debate, particularly concerning the role of arms control and the relative priority to be accorded to modernisation and arms control.

In his speech to the IISS, Chancellor Schmidt referred to modernisation and arms control as alternative methods for removing the disparities of power. In the evolution of the LRINF decision, NATO adopted

* There were also technical and military reasons for preferring land-based deployments, but the political coupling argument predominated.

both approaches as parallel and complementary. The NATO Communiqué stated that:

A modernisation decision including commitments to deployments is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet deployments and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on INF.... NATO's INF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

The double track decision therefore linked the two approaches : modernisation provided the foundation for arms control, but arms control could modify the magnitude of modernisation.

While theoretically clear, the precise relationship between arms control and modernisation has remained ambiguous and this has consequently given rise to uncertainties concerning the precise objectives of the NATO decision. To be precise, what degree of modernisation is necessary and to what extent should this be influenced by SS-20 deployments ? This uncertainty reflects different perceptions of the cause of the problem and hence its solution. Put simply, if the main cause of the gap is a deficiency in NATO's own capabilities, then modernisation is necessary irrespective of Soviet developments, but if the principal cause is SS-20 deployments, then, in theory, arms control could provide the solution through reductions. Because of differences concerning the perceived cause of the problem, variations came to exist in national capitals concerning the appropriate emphasis to be placed on the respective components of the dual decision.

During meetings with the Special Committee in Bonn in 1981, German officials tended to stress the need for LRINF as a response to the SS-20. In the words of one official: "If it is true that the NATO decision was a reaction to Soviet build-up, then if that build-up were to disappear, you would not need to follow through." German officials stressed the importance of making Soviet modernisation the prime reason for the NATO decision: "It is important to make it known to the Russians that they are the source of the problem that we have and we would not need a two-track decision had it not been for their build-up." If the Soviet Union had no LRINF, they argued, then there would be no need for Allied LRINF: "If we achieved zero SS-20, zero SS-4 and zero SS-5, existing NATO forces, carrier-based aircraft, for instance, would be sufficient again. We could live with zero deployments under these conditions." This same official acknowledged that this would leave the problem of improved Soviet air defences, but said this problem could be solved by modernising existing aircraft.

British officials, on the other hand, emphasised in 1981 the need for modernisation as a function of the deficiencies of flexible response: NATO doctrine requires the ability to strike the Soviet Union with systems based in Europe. Existing nuclear systems, all based in the United Kingdom, were aging and were in need of replacement. Modernisation was required irrespective of developments in Soviet capabilities. The SS-20 was not essential to this argument though its deployment made the case stronger.

American officials in 1981 stressed the doctrinal requirement for LRINF, but the views of some officials indicated a more demanding role for LRINF than the one required by their European counterparts. These officials argued that NATO should have nuclear capabilities for a wider range of contingencies than that of a selective response. In their opinion, LRINF represented military assets which must have a demonstrative military use to be credible, rather than political signalling assets as many Europeans tend to perceive them.

Some American officials also emphasised the relationship of LRINF to the SS-20, but for rather different reasons. They stressed that the extent and rate of SS-20 deployments were well beyond the original projections made in 1979. For that reason, a new threat assessment was being carried out. The implication was that NATO could possibly do with more than 572, but certainly no less.

These variations, at the official level, are of interest mainly for the light they throw on the different perceptions of the need for LRINF modernisation and on the objectives of the NATO decision. They do not reflect any divergence from the general principles of the dual-track decision, but they could lead to differences over the precise number of LRINF NATO actually requires in the light of Soviet deployments and arms control negotiations.

At the public level, the ambiguity of the precise objectives of the NATO decision has led to a degree of misunderstanding. The integral relationship between modernisation and arms control has not been clearly understood. In some countries, the emphasis on arms control may have created the impression that negotiations could solve the problem of deployments.

The Choice of 572

Because a convincing explanation had never been publicised concerning how the Alliance arrived at the number 572, it was a matter of some concern for the Special Committee. While it is difficult to justify any precise figure, the number was not as arbitrary as some have suggested. In their deliberations, the High Level Group considered a range of options and decided that 200-600 offered the most appropriate possibilities. According to officials, the precise number of 572 was derived from a series of military-political requirements including the following considerations :

- The new systems were chosen to enhance deterrence by providing NATO with the means to respond to a nuclear attack short of a general strategic exchange, and by replacing the ageing systems -- F-111s and Vulcans -- which currently fulfill these requirements.
- To meet the requirements for deterrence and for flexible response, there had to be a sufficient number of systems capable of surviving a possible pre-emptive attack, particularly in view of improving Soviet capabilities.
- For the same reason, the number had to be large enough to penetrate Soviet air defences.

- There had to be a wide geographical spread of the systems, that is, the systems had to be spread from north to south throughout the countries of the Alliance to complicate Soviet military planning. An equally important consideration was the concept of sharing the nuclear risk among Alliance members.
- The number had to be large enough to constitute a political response by NATO. This would also encourage the Soviet Union to enter seriously into arms control negotiations.
- The number was large enough to provide a margin for reductions through arms control negotiations.
- However, the number could not be too large, or it would appear to constitute a separate theatre nuclear capability.
- The size of the Soviet modernisation programme also implied the need for a high number on the 200-600 scale. However, it was emphatically stressed that the number 572 was not considered as countering the SS-20 weapon for weapon.
- Concerning the mix of the two systems, their characteristics offer flexibility to NATO and maximise the difficulties for Soviet planners. It was a political-military decision that Pershing II would be as similar as possible to Pershing IA and would only be installed where Pershing IAs * are currently deployed. Pershing II is thus considered a replacement and modernisation. At present, the Soviet Union has no effective defence against the cruise missiles, and while the Soviets could feasibly build an adequate air defence in the future, American officials estimate it would cost in the range of \$50 billion.

However, differences also emerged concerning the precise number of LRINF NATO required to satisfy flexible response. German officials noted that on at least two counts, the number could have been smaller: firstly, as replacements for existing systems, fewer than 572 would have accomplished presently assigned tasks; secondly, NATO's requirement of deliberate escalation would not require as many as 572. According to one German official: "I can envisage no situation to release 572 warheads of this type and call this act a deliberate and selective escalation. To my understanding, for deliberate escalation we can live with a much smaller number than 572."

By way of contrast, a number of American officials saw the number of 572 as a base rather than a ceiling. Their views rested on the assumption that NATO needed credible theatre nuclear capabilities and that requirements should be decided on military rather than political grounds. A SHAPE staff study completed after the 1979 decision indicated a military rationale for more than 572 LRINF. This position was also articulated by Congressman William Whitehurst during a presentation to the North Atlantic Assembly Military

* Only the Pershing IAs with American forces will be replaced by the extended range Pershing II. The shorter range Pershing IA under dual control with U.S. and German forces will remain.

Committee in Venice in May 1981. Congressman Whitehurst commented that it was clear that no allowance for actual theatre exchange and resultant system casualties entered into the LRINF calculations. He argued that the quantity of 572 was insufficient to accept pre-launch attrition and still carry out counter-force missions. The militarily appropriate quantities would be two or three times higher than the 572 agreed to by the ministers. The appropriate number of GLCMs and Pershing IIs could really be determined only by an operational warfighting rationale and doctrine that NATO, according to this argument, lacks.

As a result of the accelerated pace of Soviet SS-20 deployments, the HLG was mandated at the Rome Ministerial Meeting in May 1981 to produce two studies, a new threat assessment of LRINF and NATO's LRINF functional requirements. At the time, these studies raised the question whether this would mean a re-evaluation of the number 572. However, this possibility was subsequently ruled out by American and European officials alike.

The Sea-based Option

At the time the NATO long-range nuclear force modernisation decision was under consideration, the High Level Group gave serious thought to the so-called sea-basing option, that is, modernisation through the use of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) rather than ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM). According to German officials, Chancellor Schmidt pressed the HLG to study the possibility of sea-basing as a means of increasing national participation. The sea-based option was analysed as part of a possible LRINF package and was rejected for several reasons. The HLG concluded that there were military and political advantages to the GLCM unavailable in the SLCM.

The most significant reason for preferring land to sea-basing combined both military and political factors, namely, the perception that the deterrent effect of land-based missiles would be higher. Missiles based on European territory would be physically and unambiguously identified with European defence; they "couple" Europe and the United States in an unmistakable fashion. A Soviet leader would be left in no doubt that a nuclear attack on Europe would be met by a nuclear response by the Alliance; Soviet territory would not be a sanctuary.

Among the other arguments against the SLCM were the following :

- It did not satisfy NATO's military requirements as effectively as land-based systems. Land-based missiles would permit deliberate escalation and selective use, while sea-based missiles would not facilitate the same flexibility or responsiveness.
- Sea basing would have raised problems of command and control and a range of problems concerning participation. With GLCMs, the battery commander is an American, but with the SLCM the situation would be more complex. If the force were comprised of United States ships only, they would be seen as an extension of American strategic forces. If they were Allied ships with United States control units, problems similar to those that emerged and were unresolved during the Multilateral Force (MLF) discussions in the 1960s would likely re-emerge.

- Deployment of missiles on existing platforms would have led to operational complications. Moreover, the primary roles of the ships and submarines in Alliance navies would be changed and diminished with the introduction of the SLCM, creating new problems for the Western navies. On the other hand, the building of new ships for this purpose would have increased the cost of the modernisation programme.
- Range deficiencies would have prohibited the deployment of Pershings at sea, which, under the selected mix of systems, would have left the Federal Republic in a singular position -- the only country to have land-based missiles.
- Sea-basing would have also caused political problems in the sense that missile-carrying ships could be the cause of political protest. The need for continual port calls was seen to carry the risk of recurring political protests, while it was assumed that protests over land-based missiles would dissipate after deployment.
- Sea basing was perceived by some officials as a way of avoiding risk-sharing, whereas land-based systems clearly involved risk-sharing.
- Sea-basing would have greatly complicated arms control negotiations.

As public opposition to INF deployments grew, the very factor which had argued for ground basing -- 'visibility' -- was seen by some as a political liability. Interest in Europe in reviving the sea-based option in 1982 and 1983 was based on the premise that this would allow NATO's modernisation programme to continue without precipitating a political crisis over basing on the territories of the five host countries. Renewed interest in the SLCM as opposed to GLCM did not result in any organised support in Europe, due in part to the fact that the objections to sea-basing outlined in 1979 were still seen to apply, but also and more importantly, due to the unwelcome political implications of re-examining an already controversial decision.*

Dual Control

Since the 1950s, the United States has entered into various arrangements with its European Allies concerning consultation and control over the use of nuclear weapons. The basic reference for the control of nuclear weapons owned and operated by the United States and deployed in Europe is the 1962 Athens Guidelines document, which stipulated that consultation between the United States and the host government shall take place "time and circumstances permitting". Bilateral understandings over consultation have

* The United States Navy is proceeding with procurement of 3,994 nuclear and conventional cruise missiles to be launched from surface ships and submarines; 758 of these will be nuclear-armed and dedicated to land-attack missions.

also been established, such as the still unpublished 1948 Atlee-Truman and the 1952 Truman-Churchill agreements.

NATO mechanisms for multilateral consultation on nuclear weapons' use exist side by side with bilateral understandings between the United States and European NATO member countries. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) provides a continuing forum in peacetime for consultation and elaboration of procedures concerning possible Alliance use of nuclear weapons. "Provisional Political Guidelines" for the use of nuclear weapons as well as consultative procedures have been worked out in the NPG. An example of the latter is the NPG decision taken in The Hague in 1968 to refine further the Athens Guidelines by stipulating that "special weight" in consultation should be given to the country on or from whose territory nuclear weapons might be used.

Mechanisms also exist for NATO consultation on nuclear weapons' use during wartime conditions. Should a major NATO commander or NATO member government request the use of nuclear weapons, such a request would be passed immediately to NATO member governments through the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or the Defence Planning Committee (DPC). National views expressed in the NAC or DPC would then be communicated to the nuclear powers concerned (United Kingdom, United States) who would in turn inform NATO of the decision taken at a national level. Consultative procedures are to be set in motion at the earliest possible stage of a crisis. Nonetheless, the caveat expressed in the Athens Guidelines ("time and circumstances permitting") implies that consultation on nuclear weapons' use is not mandatory, nor does the chain of command require NATO consultation in order to release nuclear weapons.

In addition to the consultative procedures noted above, several Alliance nuclear systems have been the subject of physical dual control. Dual control in most instances refers to host nation control of the actual launcher with U.S. control over the arming of the nuclear device. Thus, dual control for European NATO members represents not so much a 'finger on the trigger' as a 'finger on the safety catch'. The first system to be deployed in Europe under a dual control arrangement was the Thor missile in 1958. Other systems under dual control include Lance, Pershing 1A, air-delivered nuclear weapons and artillery.

Public concern over deployment of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom resulted in the emergence of dual control of GLCMs as an issue in early 1983 and re-surfaced following the United States action in Grenada in October of 1983. Opinion polls indicated that while a significant portion of the British public opposed cruise missile deployments in the United Kingdom, the overwhelming majority of those polled supported dual control. U.K. Defence Secretary, Michael Heseltine has stated that no American missiles would be launched from the United Kingdom without the agreement of the Prime Minister. In this context, he noted that firing of cruise missiles would take place from designated firing areas outside the base, thereby giving Britain an effective potential veto.

Former Italian Minister of Defence Lelio Lagorio has also stated that "Italy claims for itself the right to have the last word on the use of arms installed". No arrangement for dual control has been contemplated, although Italian defence experts told the Special Committee that dispersal of cruise missiles from Comiso in a time of crisis would require the co-operation of

Italian armed forces, which would presumably provide an element of Italian control. Although Defence Ministers Lagorio and Heseltine have suggested that dispersal of GLCMs in time of crisis would provide a mechanism of host-country control, there is no technical reason, as far as the Special Committee is aware, that would prevent a cruise missile from being launched from within a base.

In a July 1983 interview with Stern magazine, Bavarian Minister-President Franz-Josef Strauss suggested the possibility of a dual-key arrangement for the Federal Republic. The Schmidt government had rejected shared control of the proposed INF early in the deliberation leading to the 1979 decision. The concern at that time was to avoid any semblance of German control over nuclear weapons' use, both to enhance deterrence and to avoid any provocative reaction from the East. Commenting later on the suggestion of Mr. Strauss, Chancellor Kohl stated that current procedures were satisfactory.

The original discussions within the High Level Group addressed the issue of command and control of Pershing II and GLCMs, and the Alliance group decided that the systems should be under exclusive U.S. control, largely to strengthen visibly their credibility as an extended deterrent. The option of dual-control was therefore available to prospective basing countries for LRINF. U.S. State Department officials have stated that the United States would be willing to re-open the issue of dual control should European basing countries so desire *, although that view was not supported by certain U.S. Defence Department officials with whom the Special Committee met.

Dual control would make a possible NATO nuclear response in the event of conflict less certain in the eyes of a Soviet military planner, and thereby serve to weaken deterrence, according to one high-level U.S. Defence Department official. At the same time, the Special Committee was told that current agreements assured that the use of nuclear weapons against the wish of the basing country would be "inconceivable". It would appear to be inconsistent however, to suggest that sole U.S. control provides greater deterrence than shared control, while at the same time suggesting that consultative procedures provide U.S. Allies with an effective veto right.

The Status of NATO Modernisation

The 1979 dual-track decision called for a total deployment of 572 nuclear weapons in five countries over a period of five years. The first of these deployments was completed in December 1983 with the stationing of 16 GLCMs at Greenham Common RAF base in Britain and 9 Pershing IIs at Mutlangen, Federal Republic of Germany. 16 cruise missiles were also to be deployed at Comiso, Italy in December. The site at Comiso was not operational until April, 1984, due to delays in construction. Deployment has proceeded throughout 1984.

* Host countries would be required to make a significant investment for procurement of the launchers as well as carry the cost of expensive operation and maintenance over the life-cycle of the system. The cost to Britain for ownership, maintenance and operation of its complement of GLCMs was estimated by Defence Secretary Heseltine at 1000 million pounds over a 10 year period.

The Integrated Decision Document upon which the 1979 NATO decision was made stated that for every new warhead deployed in Europe as part of the LRINF decision one warhead would be withdrawn. Furthermore, the Pershing II would replace on a one for one basis the Pershing IA. Following initial deployment of nine Pershing II and 16 cruise missiles in December, nine Pershing IAs and 16 Nike-Hercules air defence weapons were withdrawn from Europe. NATO did not, however, announce these withdrawals nor attempt to publicise them in any way.

Nine sites have been selected for the full 572 LRINF deployments over the next five years. Britain is scheduled to receive 160 cruise missiles in total by 1988 if negotiations fail. 96 GLCMs are to be deployed at RAF Greenham Common; the second United Kingdom base -- RAF Molesworth -- is to receive 64 cruise missiles by 1988. 36 Pershings are to be deployed at three sites in the FRG -- Mutlangen, Heilbronn and Neu-Ulm. In addition to receiving 108 Pershing IIs, the Federal Republic of Germany will receive 96 cruise missiles at Bitburg beginning in 1986. Comiso, Italy is scheduled to receive a total of 112 cruise missiles.

Preliminary preparations are underway in the Netherlands and Belgium, although actual deployment is not scheduled to take place until 1985-6. Belgium and the Netherlands officially announced in June 1983 the possible sites for the 48 cruise missiles assigned to each country. The Belgian government announced that the air base at Florennes would be the site for cruise missile deployment. Following a parliamentary vote in favour of deployment on 9 November, the Belgian government announced in late December that deployment in Belgium would proceed in March 1985 unless an arms control agreement obviated the need for such deployment.

The Dutch parliament voted on 14 June 1984 to accept conditionally deployment of 48 cruise missiles at Woensdrecht. The compromise government proposal, adopted by 79-71, delayed the decision to deploy until 1 November 1985. Decision at that time is to be based on whether the Soviets have deployed additional SS-20s between June 1984 and November 1985, and whether progress in arms control would alter the need for cruise deployment in Holland. The base at Woensdrecht was to be operational in late 1986; the postponement of the decision until November 1985 will delay initial deployment at Woensdrecht until 1988.

Soviet Modernisation

The Soviet Union has deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable of striking Western Europe since 1959 when the first 2000 km range SS-4 missiles were deployed. A missile of twice that range, the SS-5, was later deployed in 1961. These single warhead, liquid-fuelled missiles, numbering some 575, constituted the only intermediate-range ballistic missile forces of the Soviet Union until the introduction of the SS-20 in 1977. The SS-20 was derived from the discontinued SS-16 strategic ICBM (comprising the first two stages of the SS-16 three stage rocket), is solid-fueled, mobile and carries three warheads. Since the introduction of the SS-20 in 1977, the SS-4s and SS-5s have been gradually withdrawn. Currently, almost all SS-5s have been withdrawn from service leaving a little over 200 SS-4s still deployed.

Soviet LRINF Missile Deployments, 1977-1984

<u>SS-20 launcher deployments</u>		<u>SS-4/SS-5 deployments *</u>	
1977	10	1977	575
1978	70	1978	-
1979	140	1979	-
1980	200	1980	-
1981	270	1981	-
1982	324	1982	-
1983	369	1983	-
mid-1984	378	mid-1984	224 (all SS-4s)

As of December 1983, the Soviet Union had deployed 378 SS-20 launchers with a total of 1134 warheads. Most of the recent SS-20 deployments have taken place in Soviet Asia, where 135 of the currently deployed 378 SS-20s are stationed. 243 SS-20s are deployed within striking range of Western Europe, although many of these are deployed in a "swing" zone from which targets in Asia as well as Europe can be hit. The Soviet Union has retired approximately one SS-4/SS-5 launcher for every new SS-20 launcher deployed.

The official NATO estimate of the total number of deployed SS-20s as of October 1984 remained at 378. SCG Chairman Richard Burt in March 1984 noted that three additional SS-20 bases were under construction. At the NPG meeting in Stresa, Italy on 12 October 1984, United States Secretary of Defense Weinberger stated that the number of SS-20s had increased, but did not provide any indication of how many more SS-20s had been deployed. The Dutch Minister of Defence, Jacob de Ruiter, stated that he had not seen any evidence to support the supposition that additional SS-20s had been deployed.

Given Soviet threats of "countermeasures" in response to NATO LRINF deployment, it is somewhat surprising that the level of SS-20 missiles would have remained constant at 378 for at least ten months. One explanation offered is that the Brezhnev moratorium on construction of new sites created a time lag in SS-20 missile deployments. Following NATO deployments in December 1983, the Soviet Union apparently began new site construction which is now nearing completion.

Since late 1982, the Soviet Union has threatened a range of possible responses to Western INF deployments. These threats serve the double purpose of characterising the United States as the cause of the arms race, while simultaneously raising the spectre of further escalation. Soviet statements have included threats to revert to a launch-on-warning policy; to place the United States in an "analogous position"; to cancel the Brezhnev "moratorium"

* Yearly deployment levels of SS-4s and SS-5s are not available for 1978-1983.

and deploy additional SS-20s; and to deploy nuclear weapons to "provide a counter balance in arrangement with other Warsaw Pact countries". The threat to place the U.S. in an analogous position resulted in increased Soviet SSBN deployments in the Atlantic, as well as the threatened future deployment of large numbers of long-range cruise missiles on Soviet submarines and aircraft capable of attacking the U.S.

Soviet "counter deployments" in Eastern Europe have included deployment of the SS-21 in East Germany, and the SS-12/-22 in East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The SS-21 with a range of 120 km is to replace the older Frog surface-to-surface missiles. Frog SSMs had previously been deployed with Soviet forces in East Germany. Of greater significance is the deployment of SS-12/-22 in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The older SS-12 with a range of 900 km had never been deployed outside the Soviet Union. The SS-12 and the follow-on SS-22 have both been deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe following initial INF deployment.

CHAPTER III - ARMS CONTROL

In the autumn of 1978, several governments expressed concern that NATO was concentrating on a "hardware" solution to the LRINF problem and ignoring arms control considerations, without which public support for modernisation would be difficult to obtain. Accordingly, in April 1979 NATO established a Special Group (SG) to examine the arms control implications of an LRINF decision in parallel with the work of the HLG. The SG, like the HLG, was staffed from national capitals and chaired by the United States.

The Special Group established a number of guidelines, the most important being these : the work of the HLG constituted the basic point of reference for the Special Group; arms control negotiations would be neither realistic nor possible without an agreed modernisation plan and a decision to implement it; LRINF negotiations should be conducted within a SALT III framework; and the negotiations should ensure de jure equality in ceilings and in rights.

The Work of the Special Group *

By the autumn of 1979, the Special Group had established a general negotiating framework. The central feature of this position was that negotiations should focus on the Soviet land-based missile force as the most immediate threat and attempt to reduce this force by limiting SS-20 deployment and ensuring the retirement of the SS-4s and SS-5s.

The decision taken by the Ministers in December combined an agreement to modernise with the recommendation that arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should begin as soon as possible. However, a variety of factors (the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the shelving of SALT II, and the hostile Soviet reaction to the NATO decision) prevented any progress being made in the arms control field. A speech by President Brezhnev on 6 October, 1979 contained an offer to reduce Soviet medium-range systems in Eastern Europe on the condition that NATO did not implement its decision to modernise. NATO rejected this as a propaganda effort aimed at halting the modernisation decision and at ensuring division within the Alliance. Soviet officials then stated that the 12 December decision cancelled the basis for negotiations and for six months the Soviet Union refused to consider negotiations on INF.

Following Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in June 1980, the Soviet Union dropped their precondition that NATO rescind its decision of December 1979, and, despite the non-ratification of SALT II, agreed that preliminary discussions on limiting medium-range systems could begin. However, the Soviets took the position that American forward-based systems

* Following the NATO dual track decision in 1979, the Special Group became known as the Special Consultative Group (SCG).

(FBS) should be included in the negotiations and stated that no agreement or treaty could be implemented before the ratification of SALT II.*

Preparatory talks between the United States and Soviet Union on the limitation of LRINF began in Geneva in October 1980. While preliminary discussions in Geneva in October 1980 were short-lived, these permitted American negotiators to learn some details of the Soviet approach. The Soviet position was that when all principal nuclear arms in Europe were taken into account, a general balance already existed. Their objective appeared to be to freeze this balance at existing levels. Consistent with President Brezhnev's precondition that American FBS be taken into account, Soviet negotiators at the October 1980 Geneva talks proposed that all medium-range carriers be included; that the counting formula be launchers; and that either side have the freedom to mix. Concerning the geographic scope, Soviet statements have been careful to refer only to the European part of the Soviet Union. These preliminary talks under the Carter Administration were discontinued shortly before the election of President Reagan, and were not resumed under the new Administration until November 1981.

The Reagan Administration

For a substantial period, considerable uncertainty existed concerning the attitude of the Reagan Administration towards the arms control component of the double-track decision. European officials welcomed the statement by Secretary of State Haig in May 1981 on commencing LRINF negotiations. But they expressed some disquiet at the prevailing sentiment in Washington during the early Reagan Administration on the utility of arms control. Commenting on the disenchantment with arms control in the United States, one German official told the Special Committee:

This development has not taken place in Europe because in Europe we have never regarded arms control as an alternative to deterrence. Our less Quixotic view of arms control has enabled us to maintain continuity in that view. It is in our interest to continue arms control as a realistic and practical process.

Similarly, a British official commented that arms control should not be a search for unilateral advantage but for greater stability.

European officials generally agreed that too close a linkage between arms control efforts and Soviet international behaviour was unproductive and unwise and were thus hesitant about the approach of the early Reagan Administration in this regard. The European view was generally that arms control negotiations and treaties must serve security. They were not a substitute for defence, but an integral part of security. For these reasons, as one United Kingdom official said, they should not be considered "the donkey

* Forward based systems (FBS) refer to U.S. nuclear weapons deployed outside the United States with sufficient range to strike targets within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had insisted at various times throughout SALT I and SALT II that FBS (land and carrier-based nuclear strike aircraft) be counted in the strategic arms negotiations. The United States rejected inclusion of FBS in SALT claiming that these systems were not 'central' strategic systems and that their primary role was to counter Soviet medium and intermediate range missiles targetted on Western Europe.

to carry the full burden of East-West relations". At the same time, it was widely recognised that an extreme action by either party, for instance, Soviet intervention in Poland, would have an immediate impact on any negotiations. However, according to most European officials, such extreme actions should be distinguished from other international behaviour. As an essential component of security, arms control efforts leave little room for rewarding the good and punishing the bad.

European observers and officials alike expressed almost unanimously the view that the non-ratification of SALT II had had a profound effect on public opinion in Europe. Non-ratification had been a major factor in the growth of opposition to the NATO decision and in the rise of the anti-nuclear movements. European public opinion had found it difficult to understand that a treaty that had evolved over seven years under four administrations could suddenly be dismissed as fatally flawed and contrary to the interests of the Alliance. American interest and willingness to negotiate arms control was considered essential to Alliance security and specifically to the implementation of the NATO LRINF decision.*

Reagan Administration officials emphasised that in proceeding with LRINF negotiations, they would seek the closest possible solution with their Allies. A senior American official told the Special Committee that "these negotiations intimately affect you and we need to hear your views... we will not enter into negotiations without hearing what you think". Noting that in the final analysis LRINF negotiations were a United States/Soviet Union bilateral affair and that, therefore, there may be Allied points of view the United States cannot accept, he nevertheless added "my instructions are to take them into account".

During the course of 1981, there was growing interest in the Federal Republic of Germany in the so-called "zero option" -- no deployments by NATO in exchange for elimination of Soviet land-based missile deployments in Europe. Some officials with whom the Special Committee met expressed the view that the zero option was attractive for political reasons, but unsound on strategic grounds. Politically, it was seen as placing the responsibility for NATO modernisation on the Soviet Union, as well as holding out the prospect that an arms control agreement would make NATO deployments unnecessary. On strategic and doctrinal grounds, however, it was noted by several officials with whom the Special Committee met in 1981 that such an option was contrary to the fundamental rationale for LRINF modernisation which existed irrespective of Soviet SS-20 deployments.

The Geneva Negotiations

The initial negotiating approach adopted by the Reagan Administration for the INF negotiations in Geneva followed the framework established by the Special Group under the Carter Administration and put forward during the

* The negative effect on European opinion of the Senate's non-ratification of SALT II was predicted in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report, "SALT and the NATO Allies", published in June 1979.

preliminary discussions held in Geneva in October 1980. The essentials of this position were that the negotiations should adopt a step-by-step approach focussing first on the most threatening element of Soviet INF, namely the land-based missile component (SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s); the object would be global limitations with a European regional subceiling; the counting would be warheads on launchers; and aircraft would be considered at a later stage.

On November 18, 1981 President Reagan announced that the United States would table a "zero-zero" proposal at the resumption of the INF Geneva negotiations on 30 November 1981 : non-deployment of the 572 Pershing II and GLCMs in exchange for Soviet dismantlement of its intermediate-range land-based missiles wherever deployed. The proposals submitted by the Reagan Administration in the form of a draft treaty in February 1982 differed in several important respects from the framework established in 1979-1980:

- the ceilings would be global; the idea of European regional sub-ceilings had been dropped as unnecessary in light of the zero option proposal;
- counting would focus on warheads on missiles in order to account for reload missiles;
- provision was made for the inclusion of shorter range missiles in order to ensure that an agreement on longer range missiles would not be circumvented through deployment of shorter range missiles; the United States INF Treaty included a freeze on SS-12/-22s/-23s at levels existing on 1 January 1982.

The Soviet Union rejected the zero option as unfair, claiming that it violated the principal of equal security by including Soviet Asian deployments, while excluding French and British nuclear weapons as well as U.S. forward-based systems. On 3 February 1982 Brezhnev outlined the Soviet counter-proposal in a speech to representatives of the Socialist International. The Soviet proposal was tabled in draft treaty form in Geneva in May 1982 and called for a phased reduction of European INF to 600 for each side by 1985 and to 300 by 1990.

Ambassador Rostow, then ACDA Director, outlined American objections to the Soviet February proposal in a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.

Whereas the U.S. draft treaty would ban them (land-based LRINF missiles) on both sides, the Soviet treaty would eliminate them only on the U.S. side; the Soviet side would be permitted to have up to 300 launchers for such missiles in the European portion of the Soviet Union, and an unlimited number in the Far Eastern portion of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet proposal to include British and French nuclear-capable systems was, in the United States view, both technically flawed and inequitable in principle. Ambassador Rostow outlined these objections:

- First, most of the United Kingdom and French forces are not in fact intermediate range; they are SLBM forces identical with Soviet and United States SLBM forces. Most of the remainder are nuclear capable aircraft. The Soviet predominance in intermediate-range nuclear capable systems in Europe is so great that there would be no justification for compensation to the Soviet Union for British and French nuclear forces even if they were under NATO command.
- Second, the claim of the Soviet Union for nuclear forces equal to or superior to those of all other nations combined would be unjustified. It is a demand for absolute security for one country which is tantamount to absolute insecurity for all other countries. In short, it is a Soviet demand for hegemony. This will never be acceptable to the United States.
- Third, the INF negotiations are bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and both the United Kingdom and France have stated their refusal to have their forces limited or compensated in negotiations between the two superpowers.
- Fourth, the Soviet proposal would have the effect of forcing the almost total withdrawal from Europe of United States dual-capable aircraft while not affecting most Soviet dual-capable aircraft. *

The initial negotiating positions of the two sides also differed on the scope of negotiations. The United States' proposal reflected a narrow approach on weapons and a broad approach on geographic scope, while the Soviet Union's proposal reflected a geographic scope restricted to the European theatre, and a broad approach on the weapons to be included. The very different perspectives of either side on what forces should be counted can be seen from the official estimates put forward of forces relevant to the European theatre in 1981-1982.

The following table reproduces American and Soviet views in 1981-82 of the INF balance. The Soviet estimate viewed the balance as nearly equal : 986 U.S. and NATO weapons to 975 for the Soviet Union. American estimates gave a 7 to 1 advantage to the Soviets : 3825 Soviet weapons to 560 for the U.S.

* "The Future of Soviet-American Relations : Where Are We Going in the Nuclear Arms Talks". Eugene V. Rostow, Director, U.S. ACDA, address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 10th September, 1982.

U.S. VIEW OF INF BALANCE

<u>NATO</u>		<u>USSR</u>	
		<u>IRBMs</u>	
IRBMs	= 0	SS-20	= 250
		SS-4/-5	= 350
		SS-12/-22	= 100
		SSN-5	= 30
		<u>Aircraft In Europe</u>	
F-111	= 164	Backfire	= 45
F-4	= 265	Badger/Blinder	= 350
A-6/-7	= 68	Fencer, Flogger, Fitter	= 2700
	<u>497</u>		
FB-111 based in U.S.	= 63		
<u>TOTAL</u>	= <u>560</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	= <u>3825</u>

SOVIET VIEW OF INF BALANCE

<u>UNITED STATES AND NATO</u>		<u>USSR</u>	
		<u>IRBMs</u>	
French IRBM	= 18	SS-20	= 243
French SLBM	= 80	SS-6 and -5	= 253
United Kingdom Polaris	= 64	SS-N-5	= 18
		<u>Aircraft</u>	
U.S. FB-111	= 65	Backfire)	
F-111	= 172	Badger)	= 461
F-4	= 246	Blinder)	
Carriers A-6/-7	= 240		
French Mirage IV	= 46		
United Kingdom Vulcan	= 55		
<u>TOTAL</u>	= <u>986</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	= <u>975</u>

The United States figures were provided by the then Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Richard Burt, in support of President Reagan's claim that the Soviets enjoyed a 6:1 advantage over the United States in INF. The Soviet figures are based on statements by Brezhnev, with the detailed breakdown provided by Soviet experts at the Pugwash Conference in December 1981.

The essential disagreements in these estimates are these : Soviet figures for the West include French and British nuclear forces; and 240 A-6/-7 (by calculating the availability for six aircraft carriers -- two in the Mediterranean and four in the North Atlantic). Soviet figures for their own forces do not include SS-12s nor the 2700 Fencers, Floggers, and Fitters on the basis that their range is too short (beneath 1000 kms).

Since the announcement of President Reagan's zero option proposal in November 1981 and the Soviet counter-proposal in February 1982 for phased reductions to 300 systems by 1990, several significant developments have taken place regarding the Geneva negotiations :

- The outline of a broad agreement was broached between U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze and Soviet negotiator Yuli Kvitsinskiy during a "walk in the woods" in July 1982 (made public in December 1982).
- On 21 December 1982, Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov proposed reductions of land-based INF missiles in Europe to the level of U.K. and French nuclear systems claimed by the Soviets -- 162.
- On 29 March 1983, the United States tabled a "build-up/build-down" interim proposal in Geneva, based on the principle of equal numbers of warheads on land-based LRINF missiles.
- On 3 May 1983, Mr. Andropov offered to negotiate equal warhead limits for missiles and aircraft in Europe.
- On 28 August 1983, the Soviet Union offered to "liquidate" SS-20s as part of an INF agreement.
- In a speech at the United Nations on 26 September 1983, President Reagan indicated greater United States flexibility on three key issues : the geographic area of deployments; the mix of Pershing II and GLCM; and the inclusion of aircraft.
- On 26 October 1983, Soviet President Andropov, in a Tass interview, offered Soviet European-based SS-20 reductions to 140, a figure based on the Soviet count of total British and French warheads currently deployed.
- Soviet negotiator Yuli Kvitsinskiy suggested in mid-November 1983 that the Soviet Union would be interested in an "equal reduction" formula which would include zero United States deployments and Soviet renunciation of inclusion of British and French forces.
- On 23 November 1983, the Soviet Union refused to set a resumption date for negotiations following the Bundestag vote in favour of deployment.

The Nitze-Kvitsinskiy Understanding : "The Walk in the Woods"

U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze and Soviet negotiator Yuli Kvitsinskiy reached a compromise package for consideration by their two governments in mid-July 1982. The outline agreement arrived at during a Nitze-Kvitsinskiy "walk in the woods", included the following points :

- a common limit of 75 launchers, in which one SS-20 with 3 warheads and one cruise missile launchers (4 single warhead missiles) would each count as a single launcher; the U.S. would be allowed a total of 300 GLCM warheads and the Soviet Union the total of 225 SS-20 warheads;
- a ban on deployment of Pershing II in Europe;
- a freeze on the number of SS-20s designated for Asian targets at 90;
- a limit of 150 medium-range nuclear-capable aircraft, including Badger, Blinder and Backfire on the Soviet side, and U.S. F-111 and FB-111s;
- exclusion of British and French nuclear systems.

This tentative compromise was the subject of controversy in Washington, where the exclusion of Pershing II created particularly strong objections, especially within the Department of Defence. Exclusion of Pershing would have meant that the Federal Republic of Germany would receive no deployments until the installation of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in 1985-86, thus upsetting the principle of risk-sharing and simultaneous deployment. In addition, the original military rationale for a mix of ballistic and cruise missiles was still considered valid.

The U.S. intra-governmental process led to a decision to put the Pershing II back into the package, but before this could even be discussed in Geneva when the talks resumed in September, Soviet negotiator Yuli Kvitsinskiy reportedly informed the U.S. delegation that Soviet authorities had rejected the earlier package as an unacceptable basis for negotiations.

Two aspects of this episode remain uncertain: at what stage and to what extent the European allies were informed of the initiative; and whether the Soviet Union knew of the U.S. decision on Pershing II before they rejected the package. A senior U.S. Pentagon official told the Special Committee that a primary reason for U.S. rejection of the walk in the woods understanding was because the Allies, in particular the F.R.G., had not been consulted. Although the walk in the woods was not publicly known until December 1982, Ambassador Rostow reportedly informed Alliance governments of the broad outline on 14 September. Concerning the second uncertainty, it has been suggested that Soviet officials were aware of the American change of position on Pershing before Moscow's formal rejection. Others, however, maintain that this was not so and that Moscow's rejection stemmed from its unwillingness to legitimise NATO deployments of any sort.

The handling of the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy walk in the woods contributed to the resignation of Eugene Rostow, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), who was seen as having exceeded his authority in

allowing Mr. Nitze to carry out such exploratory talks with his Soviet counterpart. The impression that the U.S. Administration was either in disarray over arms control policy, or not fully committed to it, led to an increase in public concern in Europe over INF issues. European anxiety was compounded by the nomination of a relatively young, and in terms of arms control issues, inexperienced successor, Kenneth Adleman, to replace Eugene Rostow as head of ACDA. Vice-President George Bush's trip to Europe in early February for consultations was an attempt to allay these fears and to reinforce confidence that while the zero option held the high moral ground, the United States was flexible and the U.S. proposal was not a "take it or leave it" offer.

Though rejected by the Soviet Union, the walk in the woods formula continued to be seen by some as a viable negotiating framework. During July 1983, West German Foreign Minister Genscher and then Chancellor Kohl publicly expressed interest in reviving the walk in the woods approach.* However, official Bonn government statements later reiterated support for the weapons mix of GLCM and Pershing II. For its part, the Social Democratic Party also expressed firm interest in reviving the walk in the woods formula, including the offer to forego Pershing II. Former Chancellor Schmidt stated that although he was not consulted about the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy understanding at the time, he would have supported it. The renewed interest in the Federal Republic in the walk in the woods framework during the summer of 1983 reflected a desire to pursue what was seen as a reasonable basis for negotiations and a demonstration of the flexibility and good faith of the U.S. in the Geneva negotiations. It was further argued that if the Soviet Union formally rejected the walk in the woods as a basis for negotiations, the onus of rejection would lie with Moscow and not with the Washington. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff study completed in early 1984 noted that the walk in the woods formula

is seen by most Western officials as the most equitable basis for an agreement ... (it) appears to be the overwhelming view in all West European capitals and of key officials in the U.S. Senior Interagency Group for arms control that the walk in the woods formula is acceptable as a final agreement.**

The Soviet Proposal of December 1982

In a speech on 21 December 1982, Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov offered to reduce Soviet medium-range missiles in the European theatre to the level the Soviets attributed to British and French nuclear missiles then currently deployed (162), provided that deployment of NATO's 464 GLCM and 108 P IIs were cancelled. The Soviet proposal was broached earlier

* "Whether there is a chance of finding a new impetus here, I am not able to judge, but it must be examined further". Interview with Chancellor Kohl in the Washington Post, 24 July 1983

** Post-Deployment Nuclear Arms Control in Europe, Staff Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, February 1984.

during Round III of the negotiations (30 September to 30 November 1982) and was based on the Soviet claim that British and French nuclear forces must be included in any equitable agreement. By including a separate sub-ceiling for missiles, the December offer represented a variation of the Soviet proposal of February 1982 that the Soviet Union and NATO reduce total European-based medium-range launchers (missiles and aircraft) to an aggregate level of 300 on each side by 1990.

Mr. Andropov did not specify in his speech whether the new Soviet proposal would entail destruction of Soviet missiles then deployed in the European theatre, or simply removal to bases East of the Urals from which they could still strike NATO territory. Soviet sources have not been consistent on this point. Yuli Kvitsinskiy, chief Soviet negotiator at Geneva, told a U.S. Congressional delegation in Moscow on 11 January 1983 that the Soviet Union "would consider destruction of the missiles". Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko also said during his January 1983 visit to Bonn that some SS-20s would be dismantled, and some redeployed so that they could no longer target Western Europe. Yet in discussion with West German SPD leader Hans Joachim Vogel in January, the Soviets reportedly offered to remove all SS-20s to 80° longitude, arguing that this would in theory prevent them from being able to strike Western Europe. The United States and Soviet Union disagree, however, on the exact range of the SS-20; the United States claims 5000 km while the Soviet Union claims 4000 km. *

NATO member countries immediately rejected the Andropov proposal on the grounds that it would compensate the Soviet Union for British and French independent nuclear forces and still allow the Soviet Union to maintain INF superiority in Europe. The Andropov proposal was noteworthy, however, for its mention of actual reductions of deployed systems (suggested by Kvitsinskiy and Gromyko) and for the offer of a sub-ceiling for INF missiles.

The U.S. Build-up/Build-down Interim Proposal: March 1983

Willingness to move beyond the zero-option proposal at Geneva was urged both in Western Europe and within the United States during the early months of 1983. Following intensive consultations within the Special Consultative Group, the United States tabled an interim solution in Geneva just prior to the Easter recess of the negotiations. The United States proposed a "build-up/build-down" formula, without indicating numbers, under which the United States would be entitled to deploy GLCMs and Pershing IIs while the Soviet Union would "build-down" or dismantle SS-20s, -4s, and -5s until equal warhead limits were reached. The long-term objective of this interim proposal was achievement of no deployments of intermediate-range nuclear missiles by either side. The "build-up/build-down" proposal still required global limits on U.S. and Soviet warheads deployed on land-based LRINF missiles.

* Even with a 4000 km range, SS-20s deployed east of 80° would be capable of striking parts of Norway and Turkey.

Other interim proposals had been under consideration within the U.S. Administration, including an offer of an intermediate option of 300 warheads on both sides. The lack of specific numbers in the United States proposal of 29 March 1983 was seen to reflect flexibility in the U.S. position while putting the onus on the Soviet Union to "name a number", thereby legitimising NATO deployment. Reagan Administration officials admitted that there were levels below which it would make little sense economically or militarily for the United States to deploy, but acknowledged that there was little likelihood that the Soviets would propose an unacceptably low number.

Following the March announcement of the build-up/build-down concept, the United States proposed various specific missile levels ranging from 50 to 450. All the U.S. proposals included a mix of GLCMs and Pershing IIs. According to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt, "The Soviets were unprepared to engage in serious discussion along these lines".

Two problems were seen by Alliance observers with regard to the proposal of March 1983. First, it would not have provided an incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate: given the level of Soviet SS-20 deployments at that time (1080 warheads on 360 launchers), the build-up/build-down proposal would imply that the Soviet Union would have to dismantle approximately half of the SS-20s and most SS-4s and SS-5s, while NATO would still be able to deploy the full 572 INF.

Second, the build-up/build-down proposal had also been criticised in the West on the grounds that its focus on numerical equality would be difficult to negotiate on a global basis, and that it would run counter to the original 1979 decision, which explicitly rejected the concept of a "Eurostrategic" balance. The intent to achieve parity in long-range theatre nuclear forces was not part of the 1979 decision document, which stipulated that arms control efforts should seek equal "rights and ceilings", not necessarily equality in numbers.

There was also concern that an interim arms control solution short of full deployment would raise the issue of redistribution of INF deployments among the five basing countries. It was suggested to the Committee that 48 GLCMs (3 flights of four launchers each, each launcher containing four missiles) would represent the minimum cost-effective deployment of GLCMs. Assuming that all five host nations agreed to deploy and that 48 GLCMs represented a minimum, reduced numbers of GLCM deployments would have to be agreed for the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.

Any interim solution is certain to raise verification problems, as it would require rigorous monitoring to ensure that neither side would be able to circumvent the treaty, for example, by adding additional missiles at launch sites. In the course of the Geneva talks the United States proposed several times that preliminary work begin on the problems of verification. The Soviet Union has rejected these suggestions, arguing that agreement on the substance of the treaty must precede discussion of verification. Nonetheless, the Special Committee was informed that a U.S. government working group was developing specific INF verification proposals for presentation to the Soviet Union. Reportedly, some degree of on-site inspection was to be included in the U.S. proposal.

The Soviet Proposal of May 1983

The Soviet offer of 3 May 1983 to count total warheads on missiles and aircraft in Europe was acknowledged in most capitals as an encouraging and useful step towards progress in Geneva by moving towards agreement on warheads as the unit of account. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko reportedly suggested the possibility of a warhead count during his visit to Bonn in February 1983, although he made it conditional on no new U.S. deployments.

The adoption of warheads as the primary counting unit at Geneva could theoretically have meant a greater reduction in European-based Soviet INF than the December 1982 proposal would have entailed. President Andropov acknowledged this in making the proposal: "This new proposal would bring about a situation where in the European part of the Soviet Union we would have fewer medium-range missiles and warheads on them than before 1976 when we did not have SS-20 missiles". Most of the British and French nuclear forces carry single warheads, while the SS-20 has three MIRVs; a greater cut in SS-20s would be required to match the smaller numbers of warheads per launcher deployed by the United Kingdom and France.*

As the Soviet Union's position was still based on compensation for British and French systems and zero NATO deployment, the May 3 offer would have resulted in an SS-20 force in Europe equal to the combined warhead total the Soviets ascribed to the French and British forces at the time -- 420. Thus, the May offer would have allowed 140 SS-20s to offset 420 European warheads, as opposed to 162 SS-20s to offset 162 European launchers as proposed by President Andropov in December 1982. The specific offer of 140 SS-20s to match British and French warheads was not tabled until October 1983.

The acceptance of a warhead count by the Soviet Union could be interpreted in several ways: greater flexibility and therefore willingness to reach an agreement; concern over British and French modernisation programmes and a desire to get an agreement that would imply a "freeze" in programmes; a recognition that because of this modernisation a warhead count made more sense

* France now deploys 18 land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles and five SSBNs each carrying 16 single-warhead M-20 SLBMs. Britain currently deploys four strategic submarines each carrying 16 Polaris SLBMs. The Polaris SLBM has recently been modernised with the "Chevaline" warhead which carries multiple -- but not independently-targettable -- warheads. The combined warhead total of French and British long-range nuclear missiles equals 162 if the U.K. Polaris counts as one warhead (because it can effectively hit only one target area), or 292 if each Polaris missile is figured to carry three warheads. It is not clear how the Soviets derive a combined figure of 420. Currently planned modernisation of British and French nuclear forces will result in a combined warhead total of 1200 or more for the two countries by the 1990s. The planned deployment of four Trident SSBN with 16 SLBMs will yield between 512 and 896 warheads, depending on the number of RVs to be placed on the British D-5 Trident missiles. Similarly, France intends to modernise and MIRV its submarine-launch ballistic missile capacity with the expansion of its strategic fleet to six SSBNs, each carrying 16 SLBMs with an estimated 6 MIRVs per missile.

for the Soviet Union as it would permit a higher level of SS-20s. However, irrespective of the motivation for the Soviet charge Soviet insistence on compensation for U.K. and French independent nuclear forces remains wholly unacceptable to the Alliance, as has been made clear in numerous SCG communiqués.

The Soviet Proposal of August 1983

In an interview in Pravda in late August 1983, Mr. Andropov offered to destroy Soviet SS-20s over and above the combined total of French and U.K. missiles, if NATO in turn deployed no new missiles. This August proposal was basically a reiteration of earlier Soviet proposals, with the clarification that the Soviet missiles above 162 would not be redeployed to Soviet Asia.

While the new Andropov proposal removed earlier Western objections to possible redeployment of the SS-20s, Western appraisals were extremely cautious because the August offer left in place fundamental obstacles. The British and French nuclear missiles again served as the very basis of the Soviet proposal -- an inclusion NATO consistently rejected -- and while the offer to destroy the SS-20s was admittedly a step forward, it did not address the question of total missile numbers for Soviet Asia, where new construction sites were under preparation. Some commentators even found in the new proposal tacit Soviet admission of current superiority in INF systems.

President Reagan's Speech at the United Nations in September 1983

The United States tabled a new proposal with three new elements in September, all of which addressed major Soviet concerns in the Geneva negotiations: the geographic area of deployments; the mix of Pershing II and GLCM; and limits on nuclear-capable aircraft. The new U.S. proposal was publicly outlined by President Reagan in an address to the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September and was put forward in Geneva on 22 September 1983.

The most significant element of the U.S. proposal in September 1983 was the offer to accommodate U.S. insistence on global limits and the Soviet position that the Geneva talks should address only those systems based in and around Europe. The 1979 decision stipulated that NATO would seek "equal rights and ceilings" on LRINF on a global basis. The possibility of sub-limits had been discussed in the Carter Administration and was subsequently rejected by the Reagan Administration. The new U.S. offer included de jure equal rights on a global basis, but the United States would be prepared to accept de facto unequal global ceilings by promising not to offset total Soviet world-wide deployments with U.S. LRINF deployments in Europe. Thus, the United States and Soviet Union would agree to equal ceilings in Europe, but the U.S. would enter into a commitment not to offset that portion of Soviet deployments outside the European theatre. In essence this would amount to a freeze of Soviet Asian SS-20 deployments as discussed in the walk in the woods.

The U.S. offer to negotiate equal and verifiable limits on certain types of U.S. and Soviet land-based aircraft was also significant as it represented the first time the U.S. had responded positively to the long-standing Soviet insistence that forward deployed nuclear-capable aircraft be included in the INF negotiations, as they had previously in SALT I and SALT II negotiations. The U.S. proposal specifically excluded carrier-based nuclear-capable aircraft, and stipulated that only specific types of aircraft would be subject to negotiation. A key negotiating criterion for NATO has been that any discussion of aircraft limitations must not result in a lessened U.S. conventional contribution to NATO's defence. Negotiation on dual-capable aircraft would be particularly difficult in this regard.

The third element of the September proposal represented more of a U.S. statement of intent than a negotiating offer: that the U.S. would, in the event of a negotiated outcome involving a level of U.S. deployment under 572, reduce Pershing II and GLCMs proportionately, presumably maintaining an equivalent warhead ratio.

The Soviet Proposal of October 1983

An interview in Tass with Yuri Andropov on 26 October 1983 revealed a modification in the Soviet position that was later introduced by Soviet negotiators in Geneva. Essentially, the proposal was an elaboration of that made in December 1982 calling for Soviet parity with French and British systems and the May offer to count warheads on launchers. Specifically, the Soviet Union proposed that it would reduce its European-based SS-20s to 140, which would equal the 420 warheads they ascribed to the British and French forces. The Soviet Union also suggested its willingness to freeze Asian SS-20 deployments as part of an agreement if there were no change in the "strategic situation" in Asia. Finally, the October Soviet offer included a less ambitious proposal for aircraft limitations at 300-400 for each side, adding that some types of aircraft previously included by the Soviet side would no longer be included.

The Soviet Union stated that the 140 offer was contingent on no increase in British and French forces. Given currently planned modernisation of those forces, however, the Soviet Union would be entitled to significantly higher levels of European based SS-20s, than are currently deployed.

On the Asian freeze offer, it should be noted that changes in the "strategic situation" could include current Chinese nuclear weapons programmes or planned U.S. deployment of nuclear-armed cruise missiles on naval vessels in the Pacific. While the Soviet aircraft offer reduced U.S. concern over dramatic reduction, which would impinge on the conventional assets of the Alliance, the Soviet offer reportedly insisted on inclusion of U.S. carrier-based aircraft as well as the French Mirage IV.

Following Alliance consultations on the advisability and nature of a further Western proposal, the U.S. tabled on 15 November 1983 a proposal for an interim agreement based on the specific level of 420 warheads. Various options had been discussed - from 270 to 600 - but it was decided to respond to the Soviet October proposal by suggesting a global, not European, limit of 420 LRINF warheads, not taking into account British and French forces.

Kvitsinskiy's November 1983 Initiative

In private discussion in mid-November 1983 with Ambassador Nitze, the Soviet negotiator Yuli Kvitsinskiy suggested that the Soviet Union would be receptive to a proposal based on equal reductions on both sides. More specifically, Mr. Kvitsinskiy stated that warhead reductions of 572 be made, leaving the Soviet Union with 120 SS-20s in Europe and while the U.S. would not deploy the J/2 LRINF decided upon by NATO Ministers in 1979. In addition, Kvitsinskiy noted that the Soviet Union would not insist on inclusion of French and British forces, which would be pursued "in an appropriate negotiating forum". The Soviet position on Asian deployments, i.e., a freeze conditioned on no change in the strategic situation, remained the same.

Subsequently, the Soviet Union publicly misrepresented Mr. Kvitsinskiy's November suggestion as a U.S. proposal. Ambassador Nitze rejected the Soviet contingent offer on the grounds that it would entail a Soviet monopoly on LRINF and termed as "unacceptable" the Soviet presentation of Mr. Kvitsinskiy's suggestion of 13 November.

Suspension of Negotiations

Following the vote in the Bundestag endorsing initial deployments of Pershing II in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Union stated on 23 November 1983 that it was breaking off negotiations without setting a date for resumption. In a TASS article on 24 November, President Andropov affirmed that the Soviet Union would carry out the threats previously made - abrogation of the SS-20 moratorium, nuclear deployments in Eastern Europe and additional Soviet sea-based deployments capable of striking the United States. Mr. Andropov further stated that "should the United States and the other NATO countries display readiness to return to the situation that existed before the commencement of deployment... the Soviet Union will also be prepared to do this."

While there is general agreement in the West that it is desirable to restart the INF negotiations, there have been differing views on what the Alliance should or should not do to encourage such a development. Some had suggested that NATO should offer to freeze deployments in order to induce the Soviets to return to Geneva; others had proposed a mutual freeze. Yet these suggestions have not been taken up, nor seriously discussed. The Alliance position has been that it makes little sense "to reward a walk-out with a concession" and that genuine progress can only be made when the Soviets determine that it is in their own interest to return to Geneva to negotiate limits on additional NATO LRINF deployments.

It has been suggested that one possible face-saving solution for the Soviet Union would be to resume the START negotiations, which could then be broadened to include INF. Such a merger of strategic and theatre nuclear arms control negotiations would have several potential advantages as well as several potential drawbacks. Among the advantages would be the coupling of

strategic and theatre nuclear forces in one negotiation; * greater negotiating flexibility, specifically with regard to the Soviet demand that British and French nuclear forces be counted; a more comprehensive scope of negotiations which would prevent the emergence of future grey area problems; and a formula politically acceptable to the Soviet Union by which negotiations could proceed on INF. The disadvantages of such a merged set of negotiations would include a vastly more complex negotiation, which would not likely result in an early accord; possible U.S. reluctance to consult as fully with its European allies on matters relating to U.S. strategic systems; and European fears that the U.S. and Soviet Union would strike a deal at Europe's expense.

A senior West German defence official whom the Special Committee met supported a merger of INF and START if it proved the only way to get the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table, but expressed concern that the J.S. and Soviet Union may "seek a compromise at our expense". Conversely, a defence consultant to the Reagan Administration has expressed concern that a merger would "import European weaknesses" into deliberations on U.S. strategic forces.

Even with the drawbacks of a comprehensive negotiation, it would be preferable to no negotiations at all. To date, however, the Soviets have refused to discuss a merger of START and INF negotiating fora. Progress in the START negotiations will almost certainly be held hostage to the INF impasse unless some kind of broadened negotiation is achieved. Given the Soviet insistence throughout SALT I and SALT II that forward-based systems be included, it is most unlikely that an agreement on strategic systems could be achieved without some sort of collateral constraints on INF.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

The 1979 dual-track decision stated that arms control negotiations on long-range theatre nuclear forces would take place "in the context of SALT III". While the Special Committee is concerned specifically with nuclear weapons in Europe, the close relationship between the INF negotiations and START requires a discussion of START negotiations in this Report.

Following the non-ratification of the SALT II Treaty in 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union reopened negotiations on strategic arms reduction in Geneva in June 1982. The United States opening proposal, made public in a May 1982 speech by President Reagan at Eureka College, called for an equal strategic warhead ceiling of 5000 on each side to be deployed on no more than 850 ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition, the U.S. proposal of May 1982 stipulated that no more than half of the permitted warheads (2500) could be deployed on land-based missiles. American concern for the vulnerability of

* The 1979 NATO INF decision stated that arms control negotiations on INF should take place "in the context of SALT III". Various proposals have been made since 1979 for a comprehensive negotiation on LRINF and strategic nuclear weapons with a common ceiling and freedom to mix categories of weapons within that ceiling.

its land-based missile force was reflected in the proposal, with its suggested limits on land-based warheads, a category in which the Soviet Union enjoys a large numerical superiority.

In January 1983, the Soviet Union made known its negotiating position. Based on the SALT II framework, the Soviet proposal called for phased reductions of strategic launchers (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) to a ceiling of 1800 on each side with equal warhead limits to be negotiated. The Soviet proposal also called for a ban on further deployment of U.S. FBS and a prohibition on all cruise missiles with a range in excess of 370 miles (the 600 km cruise missile range limit established in the SALT II Protocol).

The Soviet's proposal reflected their attempt during SALT I and SALT II negotiations to include FBS and cruise missile constraints in strategic negotiations. The United States was certain to resist attempts to include restrictions on FBS in the START talks, on the grounds that they belonged in the framework of the INF talks. Reflecting this position, the Soviets threatened prior to December 1983 to cease START negotiations should the U.S. proceed with GLCM and Pershing II deployments in Europe.

In mid-February 1983 the United States tabled a further offer, which included proposed limitations on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) as well as strategic bombers. The proposed ALCM restriction was reported to be similar to that of the SALT II treaty, which limited ALCMs to no more than twenty per aircraft. The U.S. offer on heavy bombers provided for an aggregate limit of 400 on each side, presumably including Backfire as a heavy bomber on the Soviet side.

In due course, both the United States and the Soviet Union presented elaborations of their respective positions in draft treaty form. The Soviet proposal contained three further sub-ceilings within the 1800 overall limit on strategic launchers: a sublimit of 1200 MIRVed launchers and heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs; a sublimit of 1100 for MIRVed launchers, and within that a sub-limit of 700 MIRVed land-based launchers.

The original U.S. proposal was modified in July 1983 in two important respects. First, the aggregate warhead limit of 5000 with a sub-ceiling of 2500 on land-based missiles was retained, and the 850 sublimit on ICBMs and SLBMs was increased to 1200 in order to make the U.S. position consistent with the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations. Secondly, the United States proposed throw-weight limitations in conjunction with warhead limits as part of the first phase of START. The United States had in 1982 proposed a ceiling of 210 heavy missiles of which no more than 110 could be SS-18s. In July 1983 the United States proposed an alternative: an equal aggregate throw-weight limit somewhere between the current Soviet level of 8 million kiloton (kt) and the U.S. level of 5.7 million kt.

Following Congressional pressure to pursue a guaranteed build-down concept in strategic arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union, President Reagan on 4 October 1983 announced that U.S. START negotiators in Geneva would be instructed to table a build down offer. The Reagan offer would include a variable ratio of destruction of old warheads for new warheads deployed: two warheads would have to be eliminated for every new ICBM warhead deployed, while three warheads would be destroyed for every two new SLBM

warheads deployed. The proposal would allow deployment of a single-warhead ICBM as proposed by the Scowcroft Commission,* as well as MX - although at a significant penalty. A second part of the United States proposal called for a guaranteed annual reduction in total nuclear warheads of 5%, thereby assuring that reductions would take place even without modernisation. Offers on build-down for bombers and air-launched cruise missiles were also included in the application of build-down to the previous United States START proposal.

The Soviet Union ended Round 5 of the negotiations in Geneva on 8 December 1983 without setting a date for resumption. The Soviets had long argued that the Pershing II was a strategic weapon and a circumvention of SALT II and had long threatened to withdraw from the strategic negotiations should NATO deployments take place. Should negotiations begin again, it is unlikely that an early agreement could be reached as the negotiating position of the two sides remain far apart. Nor is it likely that a START accord could be reached without parallel progress in INF negotiations as the linkage between these two sets of nuclear negotiations was barely containable in SALT II. The U.S. position would require a radical restructuring of Soviet strategic forces away from traditional reliance on land-based ICBMs, an outcome already flatly rejected by the Soviet Union. The latest Soviet position, on the other hand, is unacceptable to the United States precisely because it does nothing to reduce what is seen as the Soviets' destabilising preponderance in heavy land-based missiles and warheads.

* The "Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces", chaired by General Brent Scowcroft, recommended in April 1983 that the U.S. place 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos; deploy a small, single-warhead land-mobile ICBM by the early 1980's (Midgetman); and pursue arms control agreements based on equal levels of warheads rather than launchers.

CHAPTER IV - TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

Ambiguity in NATO doctrine about the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons has been a constant source of debate in academic and other specialized circles. From the outset of deployment in the mid-1950s, views about the use of tactical nuclear weapons were never very clear, and NATO doctrine has remained deliberately obscure. The most general approach has been that NATO would use its tactical nuclear weapons "as soon as necessary and as late as possible". Strategists have consistently argued over how, when and with what consequences tactical nuclear weapons could conceivably be used, and disagreement has not been confined to outside experts. Despite the fact that discussions have been going on for years, a former member of the High Level Group recently commented that NATO has not yet managed to agree on guidelines for the follow-on use of nuclear weapons if a first attempt to communicate NATO's intentions through a controlled demonstrative use did not succeed in persuading the adversary to halt hostilities. *

The principal criticisms concerning the utility of NATO's short-range nuclear weapons are as follows: many of the systems lack accuracy and the warhead yields are too large for battlefield use; most have extremely short ranges which would mean use on or near "own territory"; many systems and the warhead storage sites are vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. As a result of these characteristics, one of the most thoughtful critics of these systems, Senator Sam Nunn, has argued that in "the early stages of war in Central Europe, NATO would be placed in an unacceptable position of 'using or losing' its short range battlefield systems". **

Given the awesome nature of the decision to use nuclear weapons, few experts believe that the NATO political consultation process could possibly function effectively in time of crisis. In this sense the close proximity of short-range nuclear weapons to the potential combat zone increases the urgency of the decision-making process and places unnecessary and undesirable pressures on the Alliance political leadership. Finally, because many of the systems are dual-capable, the assignment of certain systems to a nuclear role deprives the conventional forces of much-needed conventional assets, particularly in the case of aircraft. As a result of these deficiencies, many observers have come to question the utility and the deterrent value of short-range nuclear weapons.

These concerns about the military rationale and political utility of tactical nuclear weapons have recently found expression in the wider public debate on nuclear weapons issues. Advocates of change have adopted two different but closely related approaches: modification of existing declaratory policy of "first use"; and reduction in the numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons through the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone. Both approaches have as their objective a higher nuclear threshold, both imply the need for stronger conventional forces and both question the *raison d'être* of short range nuclear forces in the Alliance force structure.

* Johan Holst, former Norwegian State Secretary for Defence. Statement to the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, June, 1983.

** "NATO: Can the Alliance be Saved?", Report to the U.S. Senate by Senator Sam Nunn. Washington, D.C., April, 1982.

No First Use

The issue of NATO first use of nuclear weapons gained widespread attention in Spring 1982 with the publication of an article by four former U.S. officials arguing for a Western renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons. * NATO has traditionally reserved the right to respond to overwhelming conventional aggression with nuclear weapons. The four American authors argue that the "deterrent credibility" of the threat of first use has declined, while its "cost to the coherence of the Alliance" has risen. Renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons should be accompanied, in their view, by a level of conventional strength sufficient to make the option of nuclear first use unnecessary. They claimed that "the nations of the Alliance together can provide whatever forces are needed, and within realistic budget constraints, but it is quite a different question whether they can summon the necessary political will".

Reaction to the no first use proposal in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Alliance country most affected by such a shift in policy, was largely negative in both major parties. Four distinguished German authors outlined this criticisms of the Americans' no first use proposal in an article published in Winter 1982. ** The German response emphasized the essential role nuclear weapons have played in deterrence. Renunciation of the option of first use would, they argued, make the risks of war calculable for the Soviet Union, and thus more likely. They viewed the Americans' proposal as a withdrawal from current United States commitments, and suggested that the proposed policy would "destroy the confidence of European-American Alliance as a community of risk and would endanger the strategic unity of the Alliance".

Senator Sam Nunn has proposed that a no first use pledge be coupled with a mutual commitment not to mass armoured forces in Central Europe. The primary military role for short-range nuclear weapons is to threaten armoured concentrations without which military commanders could not be certain of achieving a breakthrough on the battlefield. There would be no need, therefore, to resort to the initial use of nuclear weapons if the Warsaw Pact were unable to mass forces. Should they so do, the NATO no first use pledge would be rendered null and void.

The debate on first use has evolved into a debate on reducing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. Numerous Alliance officials and independent experts have suggested that NATO is currently so weak conventionally that it would be forced to an early first use of nuclear weapons in the face of a massive Warsaw Pact conventional offensive. Enhanced conventional forces and improved tactics are therefore seen as necessary if NATO is to avoid the choice between surrender and nuclear escalation.

* McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennon, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1982

** Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1981-1982

Battlefield Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

The publication of the Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues * in June 1982 created renewed interest in the West in the notion of a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in Central Europe, a notion first suggested by Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki in 1957. The report recommended the establishment of a "battlefield nuclear weapon free zone" in Europe, suggesting a 300 kilometre wide zone dividing East and West and including parts of West Germany, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Proponents of a negotiated battlefield nuclear-free zone of 150 km on either side of the inter-German border argue that it would reduce the risk of precipitous, accidental or pre-emptive use of short-range nuclear weapons deployed in forward positions, while retaining the right to base nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany. In this sense, the Palme recommendation is similar in intent to other recommendations put forward by those who advocate no early first use and reduced reliance on NATO tactical stockpiles.

Western objection to previous and current proposals for the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in Central Europe stems from two basic considerations: the geopolitical asymmetry of the two alliance structures, and the deterrent role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy and force structure. Weapons removed from a specified zone in Central Europe could readily be reintroduced by the Soviet Union, given the direct line of communication which exists across Eastern Europe, while the United States would be at a serious disadvantage. In addition, removal of nuclear weapons from Central Europe would undermine the U.S. nuclear guarantee to the defence of Western Europe, while increasing the significance of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority in Central Europe. Another criticism of nuclear free zones is that rather than enhancing mutual security, such measures merely create the illusion of greater security. A zone in which nuclear weapons are prohibited may still be attacked by nuclear weapons launched from outside the prescribed zone.

The Montebello Decision

It was against this background of public debate that the High Level Group (HLG) prepared its study on the rationalisation of NATO's short and medium-range nuclear stockpile. This effort began following the 1979 decision when it was recognised that the one-for-one withdrawal of existing nuclear weapons to accompany LRINF deployment "implied a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges". Consequently, it was decided to undertake an "examination of the precise

* Common Security : A Programme for Survival Chaired by Olaf Palme, the 17 member commission included Georgi Arbatov, Cyrus Vance, David Owen, Egon Bahr, Gro Bruntland, Jean-Marie Daillet, and Joop den Uyl.

nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRINF deployment and the possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole." * The so-called "shift-study" set out to assess the requirements for short-range and medium-range systems compatible with NATO's strategy of deterrence.

Clearly, a major consideration throughout the HLG review was the belief that a net unilateral reduction in deployed nuclear warheads would yield political gains for the Alliance. This political assessment coupled with the findings of the HLG review resulted in the Ministerial decision at Montebello to reduce by 1400 the current stockpile of Alliance tactical nuclear warheads. This reduction will be in addition to the 1000 nuclear warheads unilaterally withdrawn by NATO as part of the 1979 dual-track decision. The Alliance stock-pile level by 1988 is to be 4600, the lowest level in twenty years.

Several factors were reportedly taken into account in the HLG's analysis of NATO's short-range nuclear stockpile, including : the types of weapons systems currently deployed; the roles and missions of those systems; the geographic distribution of their deployment; the vulnerability of those systems to pre-emption; safety and security considerations; the relationship between nuclear and conventional roles in the case of dual-capable systems; and the useful life-cycle of currently deployed systems.

Sceptics have pointed out that the Alliance received little or no public recognition when 1000 warheads were withdrawn in 1980. This was due in part to the fact that it was thought inadvisable to advertise a unilateral reduction of NATO nuclear warheads in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Public reaction to the Ministers' decision at Montebello was also muted, however, and raised questions about the calculation that rationalisation of NATO's short-range stockpile would serve to strengthen public confidence in Alliance nuclear strategy.

General Rogers, SACEUR, is to recommend to Ministers the precise types and location of the 1400 weapons to be withdrawn based upon military considerations. This recommendation is to be presented in Spring 1985. General Rogers has already publicly stated that nuclear Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles will be withdrawn as the conventionally armed Patriot is deployed. It has also been stated that the atomic demolition mines currently deployed in Europe will not be replaced when they reach the end of their service life.

The Montebello decision related net reductions to a smaller but more modern short-range nuclear arsenal. Thus, although the Alliance stockpile will total 4600 by 1988, many of those 4600 warheads may be modernised in order to provide greater range, accuracy, survivability, safety and security. Systems which are possible candidates for modernisation include nuclear artillery shells, air-delivered nuclear weapons and surface-to-surface missiles.

* Citations are from the Communique of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers, 12 December 1979. The full text of the Communique appears in the Appendix.

The Special Committee was told by SHAPE officials that the Montebello decision to reduce NATO's tactical nuclear weapon stockpile by 1400 represented a "high risk" proposition. It was noted that at the very same time that NATO has committed itself to a reduction in short-range nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union is moving in precisely the opposite direction. The Alliance will have removed unilaterally 2400 warheads between 1980 and 1988, while the Warsaw Pact will have increased its stockpile by approximately the same number in that time. Nuclear artillery had been the one area in which the Alliance historically enjoyed a quantitative edge, and this has now been reversed as a result of Soviet introduction of nuclear 152mm artillery, according to SHAPE officials. The precise number of 152mm artillery designated for nuclear use is not known, nor are there high confidence intelligence estimates of the number of Soviet nuclear shells deployed.

The number of nuclear weapons deployed with Warsaw Pact forces is not the sole criterion, however, for the military assessment of NATO's nuclear force requirements. The Montebello decision reaffirmed the role of tactical nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy in holding Warsaw Pact forces at risk; providing a capacity to contain a tactical breakthrough; and providing a NATO response to Soviet first use of nuclear weapons. These roles are seen to be uniquely filled by short-range nuclear forces in that they form an integral part of the battlefield, are quite accurate, have low collateral damage, and are mobile and survivable. These qualities are viewed as an essential component of NATO's spectrum of nuclear deterrence.

The military rationale for nuclear war-fighting capacity is based on the proposition that deterrence rests upon militarily credible options for the use of nuclear weapons. One senior Alliance military official stressed to the Special Committee that those who suggest that nuclear weapons have only a purely political deterrent function fail to appreciate that the potential limited use of nuclear weapons is both feasible and necessary to assure deterrence :

If one accepts (that the use of nuclear weapons would lead inevitably to all-out nuclear war) then I suppose one must also logically accept the assumption that there would be no utility - either political or military - in either side ever using any nuclear weapon. But only by denying the possibility of escalation control or restraint can one deny the military utility of these weapons.... Our whole NATO strategy is built on the premise that there would be utility - certainly political utility, and I believe also military utility - in the use of nuclear weapons.

A diametrically opposed opinion was recently put forward in a British Atlantic Committee study :

There is no security requirement for weapons to include every rung of the nuclear ladder. The concept of controlled, step-by-step escalation is impractical nonsense in an unpredictable and largely uncontrollable

and chaotic situation. The world would, in fact, be a safer place if some of these rungs were removed now. They merely encourage theories of nuclear war-fighting.*

Military planning and political perceptions concerning the role of short-range nuclear weapons have often been at odds in Alliance nuclear planning. The "Nuclear Weapons Requirement Study" prepared annually by SACEUR is based upon many considerations such as the number of priority targets and the pertinent planning factors, e.g. geographical distribution; systems reliability; survivability and penetrability; weapon yield and accuracy. These considerations are applied to the military use to which nuclear weapons would be put in war, comprising some 18,500 targets designated by SHAPE, of which 10% are considered "priority" targets. There is apparently little agreement among Alliance political authorities, however, as to how nuclear weapons would be employed if, for example, an initial "demonstrative use" were not successful in halting aggression. Differing perspectives on the military and political roles of nuclear weapons and the relative emphasis to be placed on these considerations in Alliance nuclear defence planning was evidently a source of some dispute in the HLG review and may explain why SHAPE considers the Montebello Ministerial decision to be a "high-risk" proposition.

Modernisation

The Montebello decision has been characterised as another dual track decision in that it involves modernisation as well as reductions. Yet, as the Rapporteurs have noted above, increased public sensitivity to Alliance nuclear weapons issues may make further modernisation of NATO's nuclear systems politically difficult in the foreseeable future. Current public concern over nuclear weapons may in fact be traced to the divisive debate in 1977 - 78 over the modernisation of NATO nuclear systems through the introduction of enhanced radiation warheads (ERW) or neutron bombs. Reconciliation of the military case for future modernisation of short- and medium- range systems and the political realities of the post-deployment environment will undoubtedly be a subject in need of further attention by the Special Committee.

NATO Forces

Several improvements to the current stockpile were suggested to the Special Committee at SHAPE, of which greater survivability seemed to have the highest priority. Moreover, it was decided at the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in April 1984 to extend the HLG mandate with the express purpose of examining the survivability of theatre nuclear weapons, as well as the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces. Several further improvements in tactical nuclear systems are also considered by the military to be desirable, e.g. increased range and accuracy.

Modernisation of U.S. nuclear artillery had been a contentious issue in Washington for over a decade. In the mid-1970s, the Department of Defence proposed a modernisation plan for 3,000 new artillery shells, including fission and enhanced radiation yield types for both the 155 mm and 203 mm projectiles.

* Diminishing the Nuclear Threat : NATO's Defence and New Technology, British Atlantic Committee, London, 1984.

Following the cancellation of the neutron bomb by the Carter Administration in 1978, Secretary of Defence Weinberger in August 1981 announced that the Reagan Administration would produce and stockpile enhanced radiation weapons in the U.S. which could be moved to Europe in event of conflict. Over one hundred enhanced radiation warheads for the 203 mm artillery shell have already been produced in the United States. The Reagan Administration had also requested development funds for 1000 enhanced radiation-capable 155 mm artillery shells. The high cost of this programme, combined with doubts in the United States Congress over the continuing desirability of nuclear artillery in general, resulted in Congressional denial of funds in 1983. Lack of European willingness to deploy enhanced radiation warheads was also a significant factor in the debate.

In 1984, the U.S. Congress authorised production of non-ERW 203 mm and 155 mm artillery shells. The FY 85 legislation set an overall limit of 925 modern nuclear artillery shells, and called upon the Pentagon to indicate what mix of 203 mm and 155 mm would be produced within the overall limit of 925 and within a budget of \$1.1 billion. The one hundred new 203 mm ERW rounds stockpiled in the U.S. are to be counted within the 925 limit. Non-ERW 155 mm round with a range of 30 kilometers are likely to be produced. As the 155 mm artillery tube is widely deployed with European NATO armed forces, production of the 155 mm nuclear artillery shell will allow dual-control deployment of new nuclear shells in Europe.

With regard to surface-to-surface missiles, some older Honest Johns remain in the active inventory, but they are to be deactivated when they reach the end of their useful service life. * The Lance system, first deployed in 1972, is to remain in service for some time. The systems deployed in Europe have a standard fission warhead; an enhanced radiation warhead is now being stockpiled in the United States. Production of a modernised Pershing variant, the Pershing Ib, is currently under discussion, as is the possibility of a new medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 200-600 km. The United States "Joint Tactical Missile System" in particular has been considered for that role, although the U.S. Congress has stipulated that it not be made nuclear capable.

Seven members of the Atlantic Alliance now possess aircraft capable of delivering U.S. atomic munitions. A major replacement programme is underway, with F-16 and Tornado dual-capable aircraft replacing the aging F-104 and F-111 aircraft beginning in 1986. The United States Air Force is currently undertaking a modernisation programme for its air-delivered nuclear weapons.

Soviet Forces

The Soviet Union currently maintains approximately 4000 nuclear warheads in Eastern Europe for employment with nuclear artillery, aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles. Nuclear-capable artillery deployed in Warsaw Pact countries includes 203 mm and 240 mm guns; more recently the Soviet Union has made the 152 mm artillery tube nuclear capable. A new nuclear warhead for

* The majority of the 1000 warheads withdrawn by NATO in 1980 were Honest Johns.

the 203 mm and 240 mm artillery is thought to be under development. Approximately 1600 nuclear-capable aircraft are deployed in Eastern Europe, the capability of which has been enhanced with the continuing development of the new and very capable Flogger, Fitter and Fencer aircraft.

The Soviet Union is now replacing their 250 Frog surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) in East Germany with SS-21s, some 100 of which are already in place. The SS-23, which will replace the 280 SCUD SSMs deployed in Eastern Europe, has completed its flight test programme although no deployments have yet taken place. The SS-22 successor to the Scaleboard SSM has been deployed in the the Soviet Union since 1977-78. Recently the SS-12/22 has been forward deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The SS-21/-23 modernisation of Frog/Scuds has been long underway, and the Soviet Union had stockpiled nuclear warheads in Eastern Europe well before the decision taken by NATO in December 1979.

CHAPTER V - PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Initial deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe has been characterised as a victory for the Alliance. Indeed, NATO has demonstrated its ability to implement a difficult and politically sensitive decision, while Soviet efforts to play upon public opinion to reverse that decision were thwarted. Deterrence has been strengthened as has the coupling of the United States strategic nuclear guarantee to Western Europe. The Alliance has weathered a divisive and highly emotional debate intact.

Yet deployment of INF may not represent an unmitigated victory for the Alliance. While it is too early to assess the full political impact on the Alliance of INF deployment, certain costs are already clear. The security consensus in two key European states, West Germany and the United Kingdom, has been undermined largely as a result of the INF debate. West Germany has enjoyed a broad-based bi-partisan consensus on security issues since the late 1950's. This consensus has now been disrupted by INF, the SPD having voted against deployment at its party conference in November 1983. Similarly, the post-war security consensus in the United Kingdom has been undermined as a result of the highly divisive INF debate. Current Labour Party policy calls for total denuclearisation of Britain. At the official level, the impact of the INF debate on Alliance cohesion is reflected in the reservations and footnotes attached by Denmark and Greece to Alliance policy statements on nuclear weapons.

A further cost of the INF debate has been is increased public sensitivity to nuclear issues generally and nuclear force modernisation in particular. Given the political sensitivity surrounding Alliance nuclear weapons issues, it is difficult to imagine that any nuclear system currently deployed in Europe could be significantly modernised or replaced by a new system in the foreseeable future. Modest and incremental improvements such as increased survivability may be possible in the short term, but little else. This has important implications for implementation of the Ministerial decision taken last October in Montebello to reduce and modernise tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Reconciling military demands and political acceptability concerning the future role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO strategy will likely pose a serious Alliance challenge in the future.

While basic differences remained between the positions of the two sides at the time that the Geneva INF talks were suspended, considerable progress on several issues had been made in three years of negotiations. These include: the Soviet acceptance of the use of warheads on launchers as the unit of account; U.S. willingness to consider dual-capable aircraft; Soviet acceptance of the destruction rather than re-deployment of banned SS-20s; and U.S. flexibility on the regional vs. global limitation problem. The United States had begun the negotiations in 1981 with the zero-option proposal, while the Soviet Union initially had proposed a reduction to 300 INF missiles and aircraft on both sides. By November 1983, the Soviet Union was urging a European warhead limit of 420 while the United States proposed a global INF warhead limit of 420 for each side.

Arms control negotiations remain at an impasse. In effect both sides miscalculated the other's determination. The Soviet Union's hope that dissent

within the Alliance would yield for them what they could not achieve at the negotiating table was proved wrong. Similarly the Alliance calculation that the Soviet Union would begin negotiating seriously only when convinced at Western determination to deploy has also proved wrong, at least in the short term. The question now is whether there is room for compromise. The Alliance has stressed its willingness to "reverse, halt or modify deployments if and when an equitable and verifiable agreement is achieved in Geneva". Yet Soviet insistence on the removal of INF as a precondition for recommencing negotiations has made compromise impossible in the year following initial NATO deployments.

Soviet interest in preventing an arms race in space may provide a vehicle by which negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe could resume. Several statements by Soviet leaders in the latter half of 1984 suggested a possible linkage between U.S. willingness to negotiate on "the militarisation of space" and Soviet preparedness to take up negotiations on nuclear weapons again. The time and forum in which negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe may begin again is obviously uncertain. But it is certain that early progress will not be possible if both sides attempt to construct wholly new negotiating approaches.

The most equitable and reasonable prospect for achieving early agreement would involve something along the lines of the walk in the woods understanding. Both sides would perhaps find such a formula more attractive now than when it was first raised in the summer of 1982. By virtue of returning to negotiate on INF, the Soviet Union would have accepted de facto what had previously been the major obstacle to an agreement: their refusal to "legitimise" NATO deployments of any sort. The Alliance, now over the political and psychological hurdle of initial deployment, may well be prepared to embrace negotiating options which in 1981-83 were seen as possibly undermining Alliance political resolve.

NATO should be prepared to propose a new offer based on the walk in the woods as soon as negotiations recommence. This proposal could entail the halting or reversal of Pershing deployments in exchange for dismantlement of some Soviet SS-20s aimed at Western Europe. Such an outcome would be an historic arms control achievement, involving the first-ever destruction of modern weapons systems as the result of a negotiated agreement. It would also achieve the basic objectives of the dual track decision at a level of armaments less than the 572. A few hundred LRINF weapons would be sufficient to provide effective deterrence and "couple" the U.S. to the defence of Western Europe. Moreover, it would demonstrate clearly to Alliance publics that NATO is truly committed to security at the lowest possible level of armaments.

This commitment will be of increasing importance in building and sustaining a public consensus that has been weakened as a result of the divisive debates of the last five years. It is true that in most countries support for NATO remains strong, but public confidence in Alliance strategy has been seriously undermined. The INF debate has played a central role in this process. Having been told that INF deployments would produce arms control and mutual restraint, the public has seen little of either. Successful deployments and fewer protesters may signify the end of the INF issue as a chapter in Alliance nuclear history. Now, public discussion in the

Alliance has moved on to a new and potentially more significant level -- a widespread questioning of the risks and benefits of an Alliance strategy based on the threatened use of nuclear weapons. Public reassurance in the acceptability of current Alliance strategy will depend crucially on a reaffirmation with deeds as well as words that defence and detente remain truly equal parts of NATO's security policy, that this policy is based not only on military strength but also on the search for stability through dialogue and mutual restraint.

PART II

A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS

This section is intended to describe and analyse the major positions adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the situation regarding the NATO dual-track decision particularly in those countries selected for deployments.

The country studies are based on the visits of the Special Committee to member countries of the Alliance, on contributions from Sub-Committee members, and on staff research.

CHAPTER I - THE UNITED STATES

THE BACKGROUND

The airing of European concerns in 1977 and 1978 about the effect on European security of the shifting East-West military balance stimulated the United States to undertake new analyses of the Soviet threat. The replacement of less-accurate, stationary intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the SS-4s and SS-5s, in the Soviet Union by mobile, MIRVed and highly-accurate SS-20s, together with the deployment of the Backfire bomber, was the immediate cause of worry. These new Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons combined with the Soviet achievement of rough strategic parity with the United States to re-emphasise Western conventional inferiority and to raise questions about the credibility of deterrence and the 'coupling' of Europe and the United States. These complex questions were further compounded by the thought in some NATO circles that with increased and modernised Soviet air defences and aging NATO nuclear-capable aircraft some type of modernisation might be necessary in any case.

As the nuclear guarantor of the Alliance, the United States has traditionally had the role of making extended deterrence credible. As was noted earlier (see Chapter I on "The Evolution of NATO's INF Nuclear Doctrine"), the United States attempted to do this not only through modernisation and deployment of nuclear weapons, but through a number of procedural and technical measures aimed at ensuring consultations, without compromising the principle of ultimate American control of nuclear weapons.

ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS: THE HLG AND THE SG

The balance between involving Allies and maintaining American control was given another dimension by the commencement of strategic arms control negotiations (the SALT process) between the United States and the Soviet Union. From the beginning of the SALT process, the United States attempted with varying degrees of success to keep the Allies fully informed of developments in the negotiations, while respecting the limitations imposed by the bilateral nature of the talks. During the mid-1970's, as the implications of the SALT II Treaty for European security became clearer, consultations became a critical issue within the Alliance, and the importance to European security of the new nuclear weapons being deployed by the Soviet Union intensified the need for consultations. It became evident that the traditional institutional methods of consulting on nuclear issues were insufficient and that new mechanisms involving greater European participation were required. These mechanisms were provided with the creation of the High Level Group (HLG) in October 1977 and the Special Group (SG) in April 1979, each of which included high level representatives from National capitals. The High Level Group was established to study NATO's nuclear requirements and appropriate military and political response to the new Soviet nuclear weapons. The Special

Group was created to study possible arms control options for "theatre" or intermediate-range nuclear weapons. For the first time, the Europeans Allies became directly involved from the very beginning in the evolution of an Alliance nuclear modernisation decision. Together, the two groups and the Alliance as a whole worked on the "dual track" decision confirmed by the Alliance Ministers in December 1979.

THE SALT II CONTEXT

The evolution of the NATO dual-track decision must be viewed within the context of the SALT II negotiations taking place at the time, because the expectations of SALT II ratification played an important part in framing the NATO decision. Within this context, the two tracks of the decision take on special significance. With regard to the deployment track, numerous Europeans had expressed reservations about the SALT II Protocol restrictions on cruise missiles and the possible extension of the Protocol limits beyond 31 December 1981. From the European perspective, the cruise missile was viewed as a potentially valuable and relatively inexpensive addition to NATO's deterrent forces, a nuclear system capable of strengthening U.S.-European security coupling, if such was indeed required. Thus, the restrictions on range and deployment of cruise missiles in the SALT II Protocol, if extended, would close off an important option, and European security experts, official and unofficial, sought reassurance from U.S. officials that full cruise options would remain available after the expiration of the Protocol. On the other hand, the arms-control track of the decision gained special significance in that SALT II was focussed exclusively on limiting strategic systems, thus excluding both the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber. Even with SALT II ratification, an unlimited expansion in non-strategic nuclear systems was possible and, indeed, probable, given increased limitations on strategic systems. Apprehension about a one-sided, intermediate-range nuclear build-up by the Soviet Union was widespread and, in fact, constituted a central element in the concern expressed by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his now famous 1977 Alistair Buchan lecture. Chancellor Schmidt later expressed interest in having limitations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons incorporated in the SALT II negotiations but could not persuade American officials that inclusion in the strategic negotiations was the best way to proceed at that time.

It was widely assumed in Europe and the United States that a SALT II agreement would be reached and, despite sharp criticism from an influential and vocal minority in the United States, ratified. At an early stage in the consideration of the modernisation decision, therefore, considerable attention was directed to the incorporation of "theatre" (as they were then called) nuclear arms control negotiations within a SALT III framework. In particular, the need for global ceilings was stressed in order to avoid any suggestion of a "Euro-strategic" balance, with all its implications of de-coupling Europe from the United States. Considerable thought was given to the practicality and advisability of multilateral SALT III negotiations to replace the bilateral scope of previous SALT negotiations. In general, the United States and its Allies favored a bilateral scope, especially in view of the unlikely prospect of incorporating French and British independent strategic systems in the arms control negotiations. Recognising the deep engagement of European

security concerns in these negotiations, the Allies generally agreed that close consultations through the HLG and SG were imperative. The type of close consultations characteristic of SALT II in its later stages was considered exemplary and a model to be followed for SALT III. Multi-level negotiations were favoured, since the all-encompassing nature of single-level talks would make negotiations excessively complicated and reduce the likelihood of rapid agreement. SALT III, it was thought, could have one negotiating track dealing directly with European-based systems, while another negotiating track considered strategic systems.

THE GUADELOUPE CONFERENCE

SALT II and the "grey area" nuclear weapons -- as the 'theatre' were called because they were unregulated by any treaties or agreement -- were among the topics discussed at the Guadeloupe conference in January, 1979, when U.S. President Jimmy Carter, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and U.K. Prime Minister James Callaghan met to discuss, among other matters, Western security. How profoundly and in what detail these questions were discussed is still impossible to say, since only the heads of government were party to the discussions, nor was there a final communiqué. Some have argued that a decision was taken on NATO modernisation and even on the weapons systems themselves. However, there is nothing in the public literature to support this. The European leaders publicly supported SALT II and, according to Prime Minister Callaghan in comments to the House of Commons on 16 January, discussed "grey area" weapons but took no decision.

THE SALT II TREATY CHALLENGED

The general concern with the integration of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations into a SALT III framework was temporarily side-tracked, however, with the defeat of SALT II. Strong opposition within the U.S. Senate in 1979 had caused considerable doubt about the future of the Treaty, which had been signed by President Carter and President Brezhnev on June 18, 1979. Opposition centred on a number of points, among them the arguments that the Backfire bomber was indeed a strategic nuclear system; that nothing was done to offset the Soviet advantage in heavy missiles; that while U.S. ICBMs were becoming increasingly vulnerable, the Treaty did not address this; that the limits on cruise missiles were too restrictive; that verification was inadequate; and lastly, that the SALT process in general had done nothing to halt the Soviet military build-up, but in fact had placed the United States in a position of permanent strategic inferiority.

The SALT II treaty was still before the U.S. Senate when NATO reached its decision on 12 December 1979 after almost two-full years of consultations. The Allies had considered a Brezhnev proposal of October 1979 of some interest but certainly of insufficient significance to postpone the decision. President Brezhnev had offered unilaterally to reduce Soviet long-range intermediate nuclear forces (LRINF) if NATO did not deploy or

deferred its decision. Within the Alliance this was viewed as a misguided attempt to halt the NATO decision and create division within the Alliance. With the NATO decision itself there was widespread satisfaction. It linked possible modernisation with arms control in a manner that apparently left ample time to negotiate.

THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, shortly before Christmas, a chill came over East-West relations. The SALT II Treaty was already in deep trouble in the U.S. Senate. The Soviet action destroyed whatever hope for ratification remained. President Carter chose to postpone any further consideration of the Treaty by the Senate.

With the ratification of SALT suspended, the Soviet refusal even to engage in INF negotiations immediately after NATO announced its dual-track decision, and international attention fixed on the Afghan situation and its implications for the Persian Gulf and for Western security, there was a complete standstill on all arms control negotiations in the first half of 1980. In July 1980, on the occasion of a visit to Moscow by Chancellor Schmidt, the Soviet Union lifted its precondition that NATO withdraw its decision before negotiations begin and indicated its willingness to open INF talks.

PRELIMINARY INF TALKS: OCTOBER 1980

In October 1980, the United States and the Soviet Union opened preliminary consultative talks on INF. The U.S. presidential elections in November overtook these preliminary talks. During the election campaign President Carter and candidate Reagan differed sharply over SALT II. The latter reiterated the firm opposition to the Treaty which some Senators had voiced earlier, while President Carter promised to seek ratification immediately upon his re-election. With President Reagan's election, the demise of SALT II was considered certain.

THE EARLY PROGRAMME OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

The failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify SALT II after seven years of negotiations under three American administrations and after intense consultations with the Allies, particularly in the later stages, was a serious blow to widespread European expectations and a very serious disappointment. Early European enthusiasm for the new President began to wane because of signals on arms control issues during the first months of the Reagan administration, in combination with the President's renewed emphasis on military priorities, military might, and an apparently uncompromising stance

toward the Soviet Union. These persuaded many Europeans that arms control possibilities were still only a remote concern, at best, for Reagan officials. There was the long delay in the appointment of leading officials to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, followed by the appointment of figures known to be unsympathetic to arms control. After key appointments were made, it was stated that it would be nine months -- sometime in early 1982 -- before a review of strategic planning would be completed and, therefore, at least nine months before the SALT talks would be resumed. There was the apparent reluctance to continue preliminary talks on INF negotiations while the strategic review continued, giving the impression -- again in combination with other U.S. foreign policy elements -- that the Reagan administration was interested in modernising NATO's longer-range intermediate nuclear forces, but not in negotiating reductions. These impressions may well have been false, but they began to erode the public support for the dual-track decision in some European circles. The cumulative effect was another important impression -- that the United States was not particularly interested in concerns many Allies found vital and fundamental and was not listening to Europeans, however much the U.S. talked about the importance of NATO and consultations.

Notwithstanding these initial impressions, the Allies continued to encourage positive initiatives in the field of arms control and to emphasise the dual-track nature of NATO's decision. Anti-nuclear public opinion in Europe, expressing its strong opposition to nuclear weapons through public demonstrations, may have exerted a certain influence on the Reagan administration to re-take the initiative on INF issues. At the NATO ministerial meeting in Rome in May 1981, it was announced that INF negotiations might begin before the end of the year. Then in his first major foreign policy speech on 18 November 1981, President Reagan announced several arms control objectives. Among them was the proposal for the 'zero option' as the basis of the U.S. and NATO position at Geneva, a negotiating position first advanced by several European Allies. In the same speech President Reagan also announced that INF negotiations would open at the end of November 1981.

THE 'ZERO-ZERO' PROPOSAL

The Special Consultative Group (SGC), established in January 1980 as successor to the Special Group to continue Allied consultations on arms control, was instrumental in the formulation of a position at the INF negotiations advanced by the U.S. and supported by the Allies. The SCG endorsed the zero proposal and urged "concrete negotiated results at the earliest possible time". Consultations between the U.S. and its NATO Allies were reportedly satisfactory to the Europeans, and the United States indicated great satisfaction as well. As then Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, former Special Consultative Group leader, remarked, "The intensity of the Special Consultative Group consultations since the Rome Ministerial meeting in May (1981) symbolises the American commitment to Allied interests as well as the common desire of the United States and its Allies to achieve genuine arms control. These consultations played an invaluable role in developing the United States negotiating position".

U.S. START PROPOSALS

Nearly six months after the American proposal of the zero option for the Geneva INF negotiations, President Reagan announced the U.S. position for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which were to commence in June, 1982. Again, it appears that European support for a balanced approach to nuclear issues played a part. Not only did the Europeans insist on the need for vigorous arms control initiatives following the demise of SALT II, but, equally as important, there was growing worry in Europe that the INF talks in Geneva were taking place in isolation from strategic weapons negotiations. This latter feeling renewed the fear that arms control negotiations on European-based systems, isolated from strategic talks, could lead to the establishment of an Euro-strategic balance with potentially severe implications for the coupling of the United States to Europe. With both sets of negotiations announced and soon recommenced, this particular worry about decoupling was alleviated. In fact, the United States had earlier sought to reassure concerned Allies that agreements made at the time of the formulation of the dual-track decision were being kept. For example, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene V. Rostow, said, in November 1981, that the United States would make every effort to keep the two negotiations "on the same track and that the positions taken are compatible with each other". He stated that it might well be "that at a given point we could combine them". Once the INF and START negotiations in Geneva were both in session, official sources indicated that consultations between the two U.S. negotiating teams were very frequent, almost daily.

U.S. PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS: 1982

A significant development in the United States during 1982 was the growing public concern with what was perceived as the unrestrained proliferation of nuclear weapons, a possible new round in the nuclear arms race, and the threat of nuclear war. President Reagan's earlier position regarding strengthened strategic nuclear programmes, combined with the increased military budget, the large budget deficit, an economic recession, and growing alarm with nuclear weapons, all played a role in the growing movement. It found expression on the grass-roots level with town councils in numerous states passing resolutions calling for a nuclear freeze and on the national level with resolutions tabled in both houses of Congress. In March 1982, Senators Kennedy and Hatfield introduced a proposal with 18 co-sponsors calling for the United States and Soviet Union "to decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems". A similar resolution was introduced in the House, co-sponsored by 129 Representatives.

The Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution attracted widespread attention and support. Other sections of Congress, however, opposed the Kennedy-Hatfield approach. Senators Jackson and Warner introduced a counter-resolution, calling for "a long term, mutual and verifiable nuclear force freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces". The Reagan administration backed the

latter resolution, which counted 56 co-sponsors in the Senate. The Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution was defeated in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June, 1982. Voting was on strictly party lines. The House resolution passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by 28 to 8 votes, but was defeated in August 1982 on the House floor. Instead, the House adopted, by 204 to 202 votes, a resolution similar to that introduced by Senators Jackson and Warner.

Despite its defeat in both the Senate Committee and on the House floor, a version of the freeze resolution as originally framed by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield survived on another level: it was adopted by the Democratic Party's mini-convention in June 1982 and received powerful backing from potential Democratic Presidential candidates, including former Vice-President Walter F. Mondale. The attractiveness of the freeze issue to a wide range of public opinion was also demonstrated by a rally in June 1982 in New York City's Central Park, which drew an estimated 750,000 people.

The differing American views on an immediate freeze could be explained not only in terms of party politics, but also with reference to differing views of the Soviet-United States strategic nuclear balance. In general, nuclear freeze proponents argued that an essential parity already existed on the strategic level; that the notion of a 'window of vulnerability' (meaning Soviet capability to launch a disarming counterforce strike against U.S. ICBMs, leaving the United States President with no option but to surrender in order to avoid mutual suicide) was a scientific, technological, and strategic fabrication with no realistic basis; that 'war-fighting' and indeed counterforce capabilities were destabilising; that "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD) remained the best strategic posture; and that, given essential strategic parity, it was in both Soviet and American interests to achieve reductions in strategic systems following the adoption of a freeze.

Opponents of an immediate freeze, including officials of the Reagan administration, maintained contrary views on the strategic balance and therefore opposed a freeze before reductions to equal levels were achieved. They argued that an immediate freeze would lock the United States in a position of permanent inferiority; that it would eliminate any Soviet incentive to negotiate reductions; that counter-force capabilities strengthened deterrence by eliminating any Soviet advantage in this category; that the proposed strategic modernisations would close the 'window of vulnerability'; and that an immediate freeze would undermine the dual-track nature of the NATO LRINF decision.

This last point was of some significance to supporters of the 1979 decision, for it was unclear whether the proponents of a nuclear freeze had clearly thought through the implications for Europe of a freeze on NATO's nuclear posture and its cohesion. A Soviet-American agreed freeze would have eliminated the modernisation track of NATO's LRINF decision and discarded the rationale for that decision. It would not only have locked NATO into permanent inferiority at the "Euro-strategic" level, given the hundreds of SS-20s deployed by the Soviet Union, but would have reduced the credibility of NATO's military doctrine of flexible response. Equally as important, elimination of

the modernisation track of the dual-track decision would have put NATO in a weakened negotiating position. It was inconceivable that the Soviet Union would unilaterally withdraw its IRBMs without any incentive, other than NATO's good will, to do so.

GAINING THE FULL CONFIDENCE OF THE ALLIES

By mid 1982, the Reagan administration had drawn together a series of policies that promised to overcome lingering suspicions about its full commitment to arms control : the strategic review was completed; the START and INF negotiations were under way in Geneva; the HLG and SCG were meeting regularly to ensure Alliance consultations and to help build consensus; and there was a new Secretary of State, George Schultz, who soon proved himself adept in controlling the divisive bureaucratic squabbles that left European on-lookers wondering which tendency represented American policy. Some Atlanticists periodically expressed dissatisfaction with American rhetoric considered excessively militant or undiplomatic regarding East-West relations and the Soviet Union, and suspicions did continue, particularly among anti-nuclear groups, but the level of Allied confidence in American leadership was generally on the rise.

THE 'WALK-IN-THE-WOODS' UNDERSTANDING: JANUARY 1983

This rising level of general confidence among the Allies received in 1983 a sharp set-back which again raised questions about effective consultations and about the American policy-making process. It was made public in December 1982 that the two chief INF negotiators, American Paul Nitze and Soviet Yuli Kvitsinskiy, had informally discussed a formula for a compromise agreement in mid-July 1982 which each would present to his government -- the celebrated "walk-in-the woods" formula. (For further analysis see p. 27.) According to reports, several officials in the Pentagon found the formula deficient because it completely excluded the Pershing II. With the Pershing II reinstated in the informal formula, chief negotiator Nitze was encouraged to continue explorations with his Soviet counterpart. On the Soviet side, negotiator Yuli Kvitsinskiy replied after some delay that the informal understanding was completely unacceptable to Soviet authorities as the working basis even for informal talks.

The news that the 'walk-in-the-woods' had taken place and the informal formula rejected created various difficulties within the Alliance. First, some Europeans -- the German Social Democratic Party, in particular -- took umbrage because there had been no consultations whatsoever on the formula. For those who did not believe in the military necessity of further NATO deployments, the exclusion of the Pershing II was a positive advance which might allow for an interim agreement; and for them, reincorporating the Pershing II was confirmation of American inflexibility. That American officials authorised continuing informal discussions and that Soviet authorities utterly rejected the formula, even with the PII excluded, were

often lost from sight in this argument. Throughout 1983, the 'walk-in-the woods' formula remained for many a 'lost opportunity', a compromise that promised a breakthrough in the INF negotiations -- despite the fact that the Soviet Union itself never demonstrated remote interest in tabling it formally as a proposal. Whatever interest officials of Allied governments sometimes publicly showed in it was apparently not reflected in the frequent meetings of the SCG, at least to judge by the group's communiqués and press conference.

A second series of repercussions from the 'walk-in-the woods' event developed with the consequent shake-up in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA director Eugene Rostow was seen as having exceeded his authority in authorising the informal talks, an action that contributed to his resignation in January 1983. European concern that U.S. arms control policy might be in disarray was compounded by the nomination of a relatively inexperienced, in terms of arms control issues, successor, Kenneth L. Adleman, to replace Eugene Rostow as ACDA director. Vice-President George Bush's trip to Europe in early February for consultations was widely viewed as an attempt to allay these fears -- an American gesture all the more important because of the approaching German elections on 6 March 1983. In addition to consulting with the Allies, Vice-President Bush emphasised in his public addresses that while the zero proposal held the 'high moral ground' in the INF negotiations, it was not a 'take it or leave it' offer, and the United States with the Allies was prepared to be flexible to reach an agreement.

THE FIRST INTERIM PROPOSAL: MARCH 1983

During the early months of 1983, the negotiability of the zero proposal became more and more doubtful because of the continuing Soviet rejection and the failure to achieve any progress in the Geneva negotiations. The willingness of the Alliance and the U.S. to 'move beyond' the zero proposal came to be seen more and more as a test of Western flexibility and of Western seriousness in the negotiations, and pressures in the United States and in Europe began building for movement toward an interim agreement proposal. After intensive consultations within the SCG, the United States tabled in late March 1983 a 'build-up/build-down' proposal, according to which the Soviet Union and NATO would be entitled to equal numbers of warheads. The Soviet Union would be required to dismantle SS-4s, 5s, and 20s to the level of its choosing, while NATO could build its LRINF forces to equal the Soviet level. The proposal put the onus of choosing the level of deployments on the Soviet Union and indicated NATO's flexibility and commitment to seek the lowest possible level. The zero proposal was not entirely abandoned: the 'build-up/build-down' proposal was presented as an interim step toward the long-term objective of zero deployments on both sides. The interim proposal retained earlier Western demands for equal global ceilings on all U.S. and Soviet warheads deployed on LRINF land-based missiles.

The new Western offer was dismissed by the Soviet Union as an offer holding nothing new, in particular, because French and U.K. strategic systems were not included. Unconfirmed reports from Geneva stated that in one session the Soviet negotiator three times refused even to examine the new offer. On

the Western side, two criticisms were sometimes made of the interim proposals. First, it provided no incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate. Given the then current level of Soviet deployments, the Soviet Union would have had to dismantle most of its SS-4s and SS-5s and about half of the SS-20s deployed, while it would legitimise deployment of the full 572 NATO LRINF. Secondly, with its demand for equal numbers and ceilings on LRINF, the interim proposal appeared to endorse the Euro-strategic balance rejected by the 1979 decision and its rationale, which stipulated that arms control negotiations should seek equal rights and ceilings, not necessarily equal numbers. This logical flaw of the interim proposal was not necessarily viewed with great concern, since Soviet willingness to legitimise NATO deployments in any way, such as that implicit in the interim proposal, was considered highly unlikely.

A NEW START PROPOSAL

While the consultations within the Alliance about the interim proposal were still taking place, the Reagan administration was also giving thought to new START initiatives. In mid-February 1983 the United States tabled a new START offer refining its first position by proposing additional limitations on strategic bombers and on air-launched cruise missiles. While the Soviet Union did not respond favorably to the new proposal, the proposal itself reflected some positive American movement on the strategic issues, a matter of some importance in the struggle to convince Allied publics of the negotiating credibility of the Western positions. Credibility on INF issues affected credibility on strategic issues, and vice-versa.

THE IMPACT OF THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION

During the first half of 1983 the arms-control negotiations began to bear more and more of the weight of East-West relations, and as it became increasingly possible -- many thought probable -- that NATO would be required to implement deployment, East-West relations became increasingly tense. In the United States, concern was reflected in Congress not only by the various freeze resolutions, but by the debate on the President's strategic programmes, especially the MX missile. The production funds for the MX had been cut off by Congress in 1982 because of the inability to solve satisfactorily the problem of the missile's basing, a problem that had earlier challenged the Carter administration. President Reagan had appointed a bi-partisan committee of security experts, led by the former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, to restudy the problem and advance recommendations. In April 1983, the Scowcroft commission published its conclusions, recommending that 100 MXs be built and based in older missile silos that would be further hardened. In addition, the Scowcroft commission recommended that in future programmes for strategic weapons the U.S. move away from MIRVed missiles toward small, single-warhead missiles called 'Midgetmen'. It was argued that numerous Midgetmen mounted on mobile launchers would be less vulnerable to a first strike, more survivable, and therefore more stabilising.

Supported by the Scowcroft short-term and long-term recommendations, the Reagan administration was in a better position to argue the case in Congress for MX production funds. After intensive efforts by the President and his officials, arguing that the MX was necessary to upgrade the U.S. strategic arsenal and eventually to win Soviet concessions, the Senate voted MX production funds by 59-39 and the House by 239-186. In the process of persuading Congress to approve funding, the Reagan administration promised congressmen who insisted on greater START flexibility and negotiability that it would make greater arms control efforts. Consideration would be given in particular to incorporating the 'mutual guaranteed build-down' proposal advanced by Senators Nunn and Cohen and enjoying broad congressional support. According to this proposal, for every new nuclear warhead deployed, two would be withdrawn.

On 8 June, 1983, the day the next START session opened in Geneva, the United States announced a new position, based, it was said, on the Scowcroft recommendations. The offer suggested higher limits on land-based missiles to reward any movement toward smaller single-warhead missiles. The ceiling was also closer to that proposed by the Soviet Union -- 1800. Critics of the proposal considered the higher number 'potentially significant', but finally thought the new offer non-negotiable because it would still require substantial cuts of the Soviet land-based ICBM forces, while allowing all major U.S. modernisation programmes -- Trident, the MX, and cruise missiles -- to go unaffected.

SOVIET REACTIONS

The Soviet Union quickly rejected this new proposal, dismissing any notion of American flexibility and claiming the United States was interested only in unilateral disarmament and military superiority. It countered with a new proposal of its own, which included no limits of its 'heavy' missiles, which the United States found particularly threatening. The negotiating sessions themselves were described as 'acrimonious' in character with occasional shouting matches. At the conclusion of the START session that ended in July, the chief Soviet negotiator, Victor Karpov, reported that no progress had been made and the United States had still not reacted positively to the initial Soviet proposal suggesting lower numbers of missiles. The United States, he said, was simply marking time. Chief U.S. negotiator Edward Rowney stated that the round of negotiations just concluded had been the most significant thus far, with both sides demonstrating some flexibility. An Autumn round of negotiations was scheduled to open on 5 October.

Nor was any substantial progress being made in the INF negotiations. A new round began on 17 May, with the U.S. 'build-up/build-down proposal' tabled, but as noted earlier, given hardly any hearing by the Soviet Union. There was already discussion in the international press of the likelihood that the Soviet Union would break off the negotiations if NATO deployed. In addition, the INF talks were now taking place in a context of Soviet threats. Declaring that NATO deployments would constitute a new nuclear threat, the Soviet Union already in early May had threatened to deploy 'comparable'

systems in Eastern Europe. During the next few months this threat was repeated with some frequency and was specified in greater detail. On 28 May, shortly before the Williamsburg Summit opened, Moscow said it would have to consider 'additional deployments' as retaliatory measures if NATO deployed. An article in *Pravda* stated that the unilateral moratorium supposedly imposed in 1982 would need to be reconsidered. "The need would also arise to implement, in arrangement with other Warsaw Treaty member countries, other measures as well to deploy additional means with the aim of creating the necessary counterbalance to the growing grouping of the U.S. forward-based systems in Europe and the nuclear arms of other NATO countries..." The new systems were to be deployed in Czechoslovakia and in East Germany. In mid-June, in another gesture aimed at influencing Western publics and stopping NATO deployments, the Supreme Soviet instructed the government to seek a freeze on all nuclear weapons in Europe, a freeze on strategic weapons, and limitations on strategic qualitative modernisation. Soviet officials also made it clear that the Soviet Union would not limit medium-range missiles in Asia for two basic reasons: first, the United States had plans, it said, to deploy cruise missiles capable of hitting Soviet territory on ships of the Pacific fleet; secondly, China's nuclear arsenal, then estimated at 150-200 systems, was expected to reach 500 within 5 years.

U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The U.S. and NATO programme to counter Soviet efforts to stop deployments took advantage of the NATO consultation processes and of every useful forum. The Spring 1983 NATO ministerial meetings reaffirmed NATO's commitment to the two-track decision and to a position of flexibility in the negotiations. The Williamsburg Summit affirmed that "security is global and indivisible" in a context of search for genuine peace. At the same time, newspaper articles reported on pertinent developments in the Soviet Union, such as Soviet plans to expand the number of SS-20s based in Asia and an indication of the number of construction sites begun. When the Soviets threatened to deploy nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe if NATO deployed, an American official replied that the threat was "tantamount to a demand for effective military superiority and thus global hegemony". A few days later, in early June 1983, Secretary of Defence Weinberger stated that in fact the Soviet Union had already deployed nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe. The Weinberger statement made it clear that the military threat was not new, though the Soviet Union might accelerate deployments. The political threat, however, was new.

SOVIET POLITICAL STRATEGY

The conviction was firmly held by officials of the Reagan administration, as well as by many security experts in other Allied countries, that the Soviet Union would only begin to negotiate seriously once NATO had begun deployments. Until that time, it was believed the Soviet Union would block any progress in the negotiations and conduct an intense campaign to stir Western public opinion against deployment. As U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz stated, "The Soviet Union has no higher goal than to intimidate NATO"

into cancelling deployments. Or in the words of Richard Perle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy, "Their basic objective is to kill our deployment while preserving the monopoly they now enjoy". The Federal Republic of Germany, where the Social Democratic Party was moving toward full opposition to deployment, was generally considered the Soviet Union's number one target of opportunity.

When the INF round concluded in June 1983, no progress had been made. Paul Nitze, the head of the U.S. INF negotiating team, said that the Soviet Union was maintaining "a rigid and uncompromising attitude" whereby it would keep its SS-20s and NATO would deploy nothing. The negotiators had still not reached agreement on what weapons should be included in the talks and the Soviet Union was threatening to reassess its strategic position if NATO deployed. Soviet officials were also publicly suggesting the U.S. table formally the 'walk-in-the-woods' formula, apparently to stir anti-nuclear sentiment in the West, since the Soviet negotiators made no effort to table it themselves. At the SCG meeting in late July, it was said that no NATO country supported the 'walk-in-the-woods' formula and that production of SS-20s was continuing. The next round of the INF negotiations was scheduled to open on 6 September, with the concluding date left open. Prospects for a negotiated agreement were extremely gloomy.

The impasse on arms control issues was leading to an increased deterioration in American-Soviet relations. On the one hand, the Reagan administration and other governments, of the Alliance were convinced that the Soviet Union was intent on blocking deployment and would not begin to negotiate seriously until it was convinced the Alliance cohesion would remain firm, i.e. until some LRINF weapons were deployed. On the other hand, the position of the Soviet Union was apparently unshakeable. It had gained some success among Western public opinion in its insistence on the inclusion of the French and British independent strategic forces, and it was clearly attempting to lay the onus of responsibility for the failing negotiations not on the European members of NATO, but on the U.S.. The Soviet attempt to separate the United States from Europe was clear and not very subtle. At the same time, the Soviet Union was increasing pressure on the Kohl government in the Federal Republic of Germany which would debate in parliament in November the implementation of the dual-track decision. The deteriorated state of East-West relations caused widespread discomfort throughout the Alliance. In part to respond to that disquiet, in part to lift pressure from the arms control negotiations, in part, certainly, to serve national constituencies, the Reagan administration began initiatives to broaden and improve East-West relations. In August, a five-year grain deal was signed with the Soviet Union. Restrictions were lifted on the supply by the Caterpillar company to the Soviet Union of pipe-laying tractors for the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline. There was increasing talk about the possibility for an Andropov-Reagan summit meeting and speculation that the Secretary of State might have preparations for a summit on the agenda for his meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko when the two were in Madrid in September to sign the concluding document for the CSCE review conference. These fragile steps toward improved Soviet American relations came to an abrupt halt on 1 September, when it became known that Soviet aircraft had destroyed a Korean airlines civilian airliner en route to Seoul.

THE SOVIET SHOOT-DOWN OF THE KAL PLANE: SEPTEMBER 1983

The Soviet destruction of the Korean civilian airliner with a loss of 269 lives set off a series of condemnations and denunciations of the Soviet action throughout the Western world and raised serious questions about who in the Soviet Union authorised the action as well as about the competence of Soviet military forces. In denouncing the Soviet destruction, President Reagan made clear at once that the United States would not cut off the INF negotiations in retaliation. Sanctions would indeed be imposed, but according to the President the importance of continuing the negotiations transcended the immediate Soviet violation.

The KAL destruction by the Soviet Union and subsequent truculent Soviet behavior constituted a serious, further setback to the Soviet desire to be perceived as a peace-loving and peace-seeking nation and undoubtedly harmed its peace campaign among anti-nuclear groups, though it is impossible to estimate the total effect. In addition, the KAL destruction followed closely a new INF proposal put forward by Soviet President Yuri Andropov on 27 August and almost eclipsed it. Mr. Andropov declared the Soviet Union would not only reduce its European-based SS-20s to 140 -- a rough equivalence with the French and U.K. nuclear weapons launchers -- but would destroy nuclear weapons beyond that number if NATO did not deploy. The proposal was an elaboration of an Soviet statement in May 1983, which left it unclear whether the weapons would be destroyed or redeployed to the Asian Soviet Union. A few days after Mr. Andropov made the August offer, Soviet negotiators in Geneva clarified that Mr. Andropov was referring not to a destruction of missiles, but of missile launchers.

While the offer was considered by NATO basically unacceptable because it included French and U.K. nuclear forces and was construed as another attempt to influence western public opinion, it was also considered by some NATO governments as a small Soviet advance, insofar as destruction of missile launchers was promised. A number of Western security experts also found in the offer tacit Soviet admission of LRINF nuclear superiority.

The opening on September 6 of the next round of INF negotiations, the last opportunity to prevent deployment in 1983 by reaching an agreement, took place in the atmosphere of increased East-West tension caused by the Soviet destruction of the KAL flight. The Reagan decision to continue to negotiate was considered both courageous and realistic, the latter because U.S. congressional and Allied support for arms control measure was strong and, with the 'hot autumn' approaching in Europe, a break-off in negotiations would have damaged Alliance solidarity. Particularly from September 1983 onward, U.S. policy was designed to demonstrate flexibility and firmness. The firmness was shown, among other ways, by continued American insistence on publicising Soviet aggressive activities. In early September, General Rogers, SACEUR, reinforced earlier American statements on Soviet nuclear deployments in Eastern Europe, saying that SS-21s with nuclear warheads had already been deployed in Eastern Germany and that the Soviet Union was on the point of installing SS-23s. In mid-September, it was announced that the Soviet Union had begun construction of three new SS-20 bases.

NEW U.S. PROPOSALS: SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1983

That the Alliance was demonstrating flexibility was one theme of a letter President Reagan addressed to the heads of government of the five Allied basing countries in early September 1983 : the President reportedly explained his latest instructions to the U.S. INF negotiator Paul Nitze, giving him maximum flexibility without abandoning essentials. Far more significant in terms of demonstrating U.S./NATO flexibility was the President's address to the UN General Assembly on 26 September. President Reagan first exhibited an element of firmness in speaking of the Soviet Union as "an empire" with "subservient nations" and "client governments", and he spoke of the Soviet shoot-down of the KAL aircraft as "brutal disregard for life and truth". Moreover, President Reagan stated, despite the fact that the Soviet Union had violated arms control agreements in the past, the U.S. was still ready "to be flexible in our approach, indeed, willing to compromise" to reach an agreement at Geneva. "The door to an agreement is open. It is time for the Soviet Union to walk through it." President Reagan outlined new elements for an INF interim agreement, proposing equal ceilings on nuclear warheads but stating that the U.S. would agree not to deploy all to which it was entitled. Moreover, the U.S. was willing to include ceilings on medium-range, nuclear-capable bombers and was prepared not to deploy all 108 Pershings IIs. The proposals, which had been thoroughly discussed by the Allies in the SCG, were considered a persuasive demonstration of U.S./NATO flexibility. Moreover, by deciding not to seek equality in deployment, the U.S. solved the problem sensed in earlier proposals that a decoupling, Eurostrategic balance would be created. Applauded by the Allies, the proposal was rejected almost immediately by the Soviet news agency Tass. Because French and U.K. strategic systems were not included, Tass found no sign of flexibility but, on the contrary, another attempt to gain supremacy.

The new, more flexible American offer on the INF talks was followed in early October by a new START proposal that included nuclear build-down formulas whereby for each new nuclear warheads deployed one or more warhead (depending on the nuclear weapons system) would have to be removed. The new Reagan offer suggested a five-percent annual reduction in nuclear warheads, or a reduction based on build-down, whichever was greater, and indicated the U.S. was willing to consider lower ceilings on the number of its strategic bombers and bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles. Further, it was suggested that a special Soviet-U.S. working group be set up parallel to the START negotiations in Geneva to discuss the build-down formula. Chief U.S. START negotiator Edward Rowney was told to table the proposal. The incorporation of the build-down proposal, suggested earlier in the year by Senators Nunn and Cohen, was considered a significant advance, especially by congressional supporters of increased arms control measures. Taken together, the INF offer outlined at the UN on 26 September and the START proposal in early October amounted to a public demonstration of reasonableness and flexibility that presented a difficult target for domestic and international critics of U.S. arms control policy and for critics of the full implementation of the NATO 1979 decision.

Again the Soviet Union quickly rejected the offer. Soon after the new U.S. START proposals were tabled, Tass rejected them as mere words. Later in October, after the week of international demonstrations, Pravda published an article rejecting the new START proposals as "a new U.S. propaganda invention" designed for unilateral U.S. advantage. The build-down principle, it said, changed the situation in no way. In the meantime, a member of the Soviet general staff, General Nikolai Chervov, made the first public confirmation that Soviet troops in Eastern Europe were already armed with tactical nuclear weapons. Denying that Soviet forces in Eastern Europe possessed medium-range nuclear weapons, General Chervov stated, "Everywhere outside the Soviet Union where Soviet divisions are stationed, the appropriate missile units have tactical nuclear weapons with a range of up to 100 kilometres". The Soviet Union continued to charge the U.S. with blocking the INF negotiations in order to build up its own nuclear forces in Europe. Chief negotiator Yuli Kvitsinskiy again declared that Western unwillingness to include French and U.K. strategic systems was the decisive obstacle and that the Soviet capacity for new offers was exhausted.

THE U.S. 'HOT AUTUMN'

In the United States, the October demonstrations of opposition to the deployment of new medium-range nuclear weapons did not reach the same magnitude as the major demonstrations in Europe, despite the fact that six of the seven Democratic presidential candidates supported a nuclear freeze. Reports indicated that several hundred were arrested in various American cities. Opponents of deployment might have argued that it was significant that even small demonstrations took place, since the new weapons were to be deployed in Europe. Still, the variation in scale from European demonstrations marked a difference and perhaps a public victory for the Reagan administration's arms control policies.

The flexibility demonstrated by the Reagan administration in the September-October INF and START proposals was reinforced by another American offer in mid-November immediately before the special conference of the Federal Republic's Social Democratic Party on INF and the Bundestag vote on full implementation of the 1979 decision. The international political context of the offer was the alternating hard/soft Soviet pressure on the Federal Republic, now threatening the Federal Republic with dire consequences should it support full implementation and, consequently, deployment, now casting the entire blame for deployment on a supposedly war-mongering United States. The new U.S. offer, made after consultation with the Allies, was a refinement of the earlier build-up/build-down proposal, indicating a global upper limit for medium-range nuclear weapons and a U.S./NATO commitment that it would only deploy in Europe the number of medium-range nuclear missiles equal to the Soviet number —at the time 243. This proposal was publicly rejected by the Soviet Union the next day, with the explanation that it would still allow the installation in Europe of nuclear weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union within several minutes.

THE SOVIET WALK-OUT

The abrupt, unilateral Soviet termination of the INF negotiations on 23 Novembre, following the Bundestag resolution supporting deployment in the absence of an agreement, was met on the American and NATO side by expressions of regret and willingness to resume whenever the Soviets so wished. It was noticed that the Soviets did not walk out of the negotiations when the first cruise missiles were deployed -- at Greenham Common on 14 November -- but only after the Bundestag vote.

Immediately after the Soviet walkout from the INF talks, the fate of START became an uppermost consideration and the next telling symbol of the future for East-West relations. For some time the Soviet Union had insisted on the close relationship of the two sets of negotiations and indicated it might also break off START. START rounds usually terminated with a statement that included a resumption clause specifying the date for the opening of the next round. When the round concluded in early December prior to the Christmas holiday break, no resumption clause was included.

If American and NATO hopes for a resumption of the INF talks were clear, their expectations were not at all so. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger stated the talks would probably resume in a matter of months, though it was admittedly difficult to expect a policy decision of such magnitude when it was known that Soviet President Andropov was seriously ill. Chief negotiator Paul Nitze appeared less hopeful. He stated that the INF talks had reached a crucial junction when the Soviets broke off : the Soviets were proceeding toward genuine discussion of numbers and retreating from their long-time demands for inclusion of French and U.K. strategic forces. Mr. Nitze said he had been approached informally in late October 1983 by Chief negotiator Yuli Kvitsinskiy, who suggested equal reductions on both sides, with compensation for French and U.K. forces in another forum. In early November 1983, Mr. Kvitsinskiy said the Soviet government would accept this offer if the United States proposed it. Without consulting the Allies, the U.S. rejected the offer on the basis that the reductions still left the Soviet Union with an unacceptable preponderance in INF weapons. (It was this Soviet offer Chancellor Kohl spoke of in mid-November; the Soviet Union immediately denied the offer was its own, saying it came from the Americans). Commenting later on the possible resumption on talks, Mr. Nitze was quoted as saying the INF talks would resume "as soon as (the Soviets) have squeezed every imaginable psychological advantage that they think they can get from their withdrawal from Geneva".

A SHIFT IN U.S. AND WESTERN POLICY: THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN DECEMBER 1983

The most far-reaching Western reaction to the Soviet break-off of negotiations and to the first deployments of the missiles was a shift in East-West policy with an accompanying change of tone. The shift by the Reagan administration away from confrontational rhetoric was marked. With its solidarity intact and the relief of victory, the Alliance sought not to

aggravate the Soviet Union further, but to broaden East-West relations and encourage the Soviet Union to resume negotiations. Consideration was given to a merger of INF and START, though the Soviet Union itself had so far given no indication of interest in merged negotiations. At the meeting of the NATO Defence Ministers in early December, the Ministers expressed the hope that the INF talks would resume "as soon as possible to achieve an agreement on equal global limits on U.S. and Soviet missile warheads at reduced levels, preferably zero for both sides." U.S. Secretary of Defence Weinberger declared the U.S. was willing to resume "at any table anywhere in the world". The Defence Ministers rejected the idea of merging the negotiations. At the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting on 9 December the Ministers agreed on the Brussels Declaration, an initiative advanced by Foreign Minister Genscher and considered an important political signal to the Soviet Union. Described as a message of peace, the Brussels Declaration called on the Soviet Union to take account of the legitimate security concerns of the West, restated the peaceful and defensive nature of the Alliance, and affirmed the West's interest in constructive, long-term, balanced relations aimed at genuine detente. During the same meeting, on the initiative of Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans, the Ministers decided to undertake a new Alliance study concentrating on measures to reduce tensions and inject new, positive elements into East-West relations. Finally, it was decided that the opening of the CSCE Conference on European Disarmament in Stockholm on 17 January would be up-graded to the Foreign Minister level, and the Ministers would arrive early in Stockholm to co-ordinate a comprehensive package of concrete measures. The NATO ministerial meetings were generally characterised by unity and harmony.

These meetings established the basic guidelines that NATO and the United States have followed up to the present. In fact, there was no certainty at all about specific measures that would be effective in bringing the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. The Soviet demand that the new NATO weapons be removed before resumption of the INF talks was so thoroughly unacceptable that it received no consideration. There was a widespread conviction that the failure of the Soviet gamble to stop deployment and to separate Europe from the U.S. constituted a major setback for Soviet policy. There was speculation that Soviet policy was in disarray and that the Soviet Union needed time to reconsider its policies. Moreover, there was the continuing unexplained absence of Soviet President Andropov, a mystery that made the future of Soviet policy even more opaque.

The policy of flexibility and firmness commenced earlier by President Reagan was continued. When Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau went to Washington in mid-December to discuss his ideas for advancing East-West relations and the prospects for world peace, President Reagan, without endorsing particulars, stated that he shared Mr. Trudeau's concern for world peace and the "broad thrust" of his ideas for engaging in dialogue with the Eastern European countries.

DEPLOYMENTS OPERATIONAL

In late December, immediately before the first P-IIs and cruise missiles in Europe were to become operational, it was announced that the Soviet Union had deployed nine additional SS-20s in the month of December, bringing the number to 378. Soviet deployments, it was noted, had continued during the entire period of INF negotiations, making it extremely difficult for the West to understand how the first few NATO deployments could be used to justify termination of the negotiations. It was also announced that NATO had withdrawn one nuclear warhead for every new missile deployed.

At the opening of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm on 17 January, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz reiterated U.S. willingness to resume arms control talks whenever the Soviets were willing. He affirmed, as did other NATO Foreign Ministers, that the CDE could be a turning-point in East-West relations. While the CDE could serve that purpose in terms of reaching confidence and security building measures and in terms of broadening the East-West dialogue, it has been agreed among the Allies, if not among all 35 signatories, that nuclear disarmament would not be discussed at this stage.

SOVIET RESENTMENT

The vitriolic attack on the United States by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in his address to the Stockholm conference, blaming the U.S. for the breakdown of the INF talks and for intensifying international tensions, indicated the depth of Soviet resentment at their failure to prevent NATO deployments, and the 6 hours of talks between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State were reportedly very tough. Despite Soviet intransigence, the U.S., taking an approach broadly agreed through consultations with the Allies, continued to pursue a policy of conciliation and firmness. President Reagan's 20 January 1984 address was widely seen as conciliatory toward the Soviet Union. The President reiterated U.S. willingness to resume negotiations at any time in any place and urged the Soviet leadership to take advantage of this open door. That the U.S. would maintain firmness was evident several days later when President Reagan charged the Soviet Union with 7 violations of various arms control agreements.

THE CHERNENKO SUCCESSION: POLICY CONTINUITY

The long absence of Soviet President Yuri Andropov -- he was last seen publicly in August 1983 -- was at last explained in early February: after a lingering illness, it was announced that he had died. The speed with which his successor was chosen within a few days came as something of a surprise to Western Kremlinologists. The choice of 72-year old Konstantin Chernenko, a long-time Brezhnev protégé, as General Secretary of the Communist Party, and soon confirmed as Soviet President, was widely viewed in the West as a

stop-gap measure. Of immediate concern was the measure of opportunity for significant foreign policy change the leadership change might offer. Some Western leaders who attended the Andropov funeral and spoke with the new Soviet leader afterwards detected slight signs of possible greater flexibility, but U.S. Vice-President George Bush was unable to offer much basis for hope in this regard. In fact, Mr. Chernenko soon confirmed the continuity of Soviet policy on the INF negotiations. Because of the new President's age and relative inexperience in international relations, many analysts believed the key foreign policy decision-makers were, first, veteran Foreign Minister Gromyko and, second, Defence Minister Marshall Dimitri Ustinov.

THE IMPASSE

During 1984, there was virtually no positive movement on the INF and START arms control negotiations. The U.S. and Soviet positions were diametrically opposed one to the other. The position adopted by the U.S. and NATO was that no arms control concessions should be made to lure the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. In the U.S. view, this would be construed by the Soviets as weakness. The Soviets repeatedly stated their willingness to resume the negotiations, but only if NATO withdrew the missiles already deployed. This was the consistent Soviet message in public articles and in private discussions with visiting European Foreign Ministers Andreotti, Genscher, and Howe. The suspicion in Western circles that the Soviet Union would not resume INF negotiations before the U.S. Presidential elections gradually became the conventional wisdom. As Brent Scowcroft, former U.S. National Security Advisor and Chairman of President Reagan's Commission on Strategic Forces stated after a visit to Moscow, the Russians "are not interested in doing anything which would contribute to the re-election of the President". Mr. Scowcroft had gone to Moscow in April with a personal letter from the U.S. President, but the letter went undelivered since the Soviets would not arrange a meeting at what the U.S. considered an appropriately high level. Mr. Scowcroft's remarks upon his return were also notable for other reasons. He stated that President Reagan's rhetoric "has certainly given the Soviet Union a negative view" on chances for progress in INF talks though there is "no question the President is sincerely interested in meaningful arms control and in serious dialogue with the Soviet Union". He took the view that "by and large, the chances of nuclear war tend to be decreasing" because a clear strategic balance offered "no obvious incentives in a first strike".

U.S. STUDIES

The break in the INF negotiations allowed a reexamination of certain aspects of U.S. arms control policy. Chief START negotiator Edward Rowny stated in February that the U.S. was continuing work on its START proposals and if the Soviet Union proposed to discuss INF in a START framework, it would not be rejected automatically, though a merger was not U.S. policy. A study by U.S. Senate staff came to the conclusion that the 'walk in the woods' formula was most acceptable to an overwhelming majority of European specialists and to American arms control officials. A study by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office on the 'build down' proposal for START concluded

that it could lead to increased stability between the U.S. and the Soviet Union by producing more balanced forces and could be achieved with great economic savings.

VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES

Perhaps as disturbing as the failure to make any progress at all on resuming negotiations was the testimony in March before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee by Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy, Richard Perle. Mr. Perle argued that there was an "expanded pattern of Soviet violations of arms control agreements" that brought into question the entire arms control process. Soviet compliance with arms control agreements, according to Mr. Perle, was frequently irregular and deliberately circumventive. In other cases, such as that of the ABM Treaty, the SALT II Treaty, and the chemical and biological treaties, Mr. Perle argued that the Soviet Union had deliberately violated specific treaty provisions. Without strict Soviet compliance, arms control would amount to unilateral disarmament. The Perle testimony raised serious questions about the advisability of entering into arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, with clear implications for future U.S. arms control policy.

It was not surprising to read reports a few weeks after the Perle testimony that the U.S. was considering abandonment of its commitment to the provisions of the SALT II treaty. The immediate occasion was the scheduled deployment of another Trident submarine which would exceed SALT I and SALT II limits unless other strategic nuclear submarine missiles were dismantled.

U.S. AND NATO POLICY

The Special Consultative Group (SCG) continued to meet once a month to review policy. In general, the communiques noted U.S. willingness to resume negotiations, urged the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table as soon as possible, and confirmed the determination of the Allies to continue deployments in the absence of an agreement. There appeared to be no interest among the Allies in making any substantive concession to entice the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. After the March SCG meeting it was announced that 3 new SS-20 bases were under construction in Eastern and Western Europe; 27 additional SS-20's were expected to become operational in the coming months. At the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Cesme, Turkey in early April, the Allies again expressed regret at the Soviet refusal to resume negotiations and reaffirmed the commitment to deploy. At the Spring ministerial meetings in early June, the Alliance indicated it was willing to "halt, modify, and reverse" deployments in the context of an equitable agreement, and while the Alliance demonstrated its concern to improve East-West relations with the 'Washington Declaration', there was no pressure to undertake new INF initiatives or concessions to get the Soviets back to the negotiating table.

EMERGING NEW ISSUES: SPACE WEAPONS

While the INF questions remained of high attention to the Alliance, with the impossibility of any progress there because of Soviet intransigence, other strategic and arms control issues began to emerge, both between the U.S. and Soviet Union and among the Allies. Among the most important was the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence Programme first announced by President Reagan in March 1983. The speech initiated a wide-ranging debate throughout the Alliance about the possibilities for its ultimate feasibility, its strategic implications, and its relationship to the ABM Treaty. European Allies began questioning whether such a programme would indeed still ensure a U.S. nuclear umbrella for Europe, and the NPG April meeting in Turkey reportedly devoted some attention to these questions.

The 'star wars' project also served to stimulate a broader East-West debate. Soviet President Chernenko had called in March for the U.S. to show its sincerity in arms control by taking initiatives in three areas: chemical weapons, negotiations to prohibit anti-satellite weapons, and the underground Nuclear Test Treaty of 1974. In April the Soviets rejected the U.S. chemical treaty proposal as propaganda because of the verification procedures stipulated. In late June, the Soviet President suddenly proposed talks on banning anti-satellite weapons, to begin in Vienna in September. The quickness of American acceptance apparently took the Soviet leadership by surprise, and the U.S. was charged with setting pre-conditions, a charge a spokesman for President Reagan promptly rejected. As the U.S.-Soviet debate over holding the talks developed, it became evident that the Soviet Union was keenly aware of the implications of holding negotiations six-weeks before the U.S. presidential elections.

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND U.S. PUBLIC OPINION

What impact the dynamics of the U.S. presidential campaign will have on U.S. arms controls and modernisation positions for the short term is far from clear: the campaign will probably prevent the Reagan administration from formulating and advancing new positions. The long-term impact of the campaign is a matter of speculation, since it is always difficult to predict the relative importance of foreign policy issues in any electoral campaign.

According to the most recent poll conducted by the International Herald Tribune and the Atlantic Institute, the results of which were released in June, the American electorate registered a sharp drop in interest in foreign policy generally and in several significant issues. Fear of war dropped to 32% from 45% six months earlier; nuclear concerns dropped to 28%, and concern about adequate defence fell to 10% (24% 6 months earlier). Only 30% thought arms control was likely to increase security, down 9% in 6 months.

CHAPTER II - THE SOVIET UNION

The decision-making process in the Soviet Union has never been transparent to Western analysts, even for relatively small matters. In regard to strategic questions -- without a doubt an area the Soviet leadership considers of central and fundamental importance -- the obscurity shrouding the process has greatly reduced the possibility of Western comprehension. It is by inference that one concludes that a specific decision to modernize Soviet medium-range nuclear missile forces by replacing the aging SS-4s and SS-5s with mobile triple-warhead SS-20s had to have been taken in 1972 or 1973. When it became evident that NATO found the SS-20 a qualitative new threat to Western security interests and would feel required to respond, the Soviet leadership began to advance arms control proposals, even as it began deployment of the SS-20 missile.

THE SOVIET POSITION: AN EXISTING BALANCE -- INCLUDING FRENCH AND U.K. FORCES

The basic Soviet position on the LRINF has consistently been distinguished by the insistence that a fundamental equivalence or balance between East and West on LRINF already exists and that this balance would be upset by new U.S./NATO deployments. The Soviet Union reaches this notion of a balance, on the one hand, by including the U.K. and French strategic systems, and, on the other, by including some U.S. nuclear systems and excluding comparable Soviet systems. In virtue of this central contention, the Soviet leadership has established Soviet positions, rejected Western positions, and threatened retaliatory measures.

EARLY BREZHNEV PROPOSALS

Soviet suggestions to open negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons began prior to December 1979 while NATO apprehensions about growing Soviet nuclear capabilities were increasing and NATO was in the process of formulating its response. During the May 1978 meetings of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Bonn, the Soviet President expressed Soviet willingness to negotiate about nuclear as well as conventional weapons in Europe. In a passage that, was considered highly significant, at the time, it was stated that neither side would seek superiority. In early 1979, President Brezhnev reiterated Soviet willingness to negotiate on nuclear weapons in Europe. The first major Soviet proposal was launched by President Brezhnev in East Berlin on 6 October 1979 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the independence of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet President stated that during the last ten years, the number of Soviet launchers had not been increased by a single missile or airplane. In fact, he stated, the total power of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons forces had decreased, as had the number of medium-range nuclear weapons bombers. He said the Soviet Union was prepared unilaterally to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in Soviet Europe if no additional medium-range

nuclear weapons were deployed in Western Europe and NATO deferred its decision. He added that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear weapons against countries which did not possess them or in which no nuclear weapons were deployed. NATO immediately rejected this proposal as a patent propaganda effort to halt its decision and to promote division within the Alliance.

RESPONSE TO THE 1979 NATO DECISION: REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE

Following that decision, Soviet officials maintained that the very basis for negotiations had been nullified, since a rough equivalence of medium-range systems already existed. The Soviet Union argued that the SS-20 was a modernisation programme to replace the SS-4s and SS-5s, not an expansion programme, and dismissed the idea that the SS-20 constituted a significant new threat to the West. Moreover, the future deployment of Pershing II's and cruise missiles, they argued, constituted a strategic threat to the Soviet Union, since the new weapons could hit the Soviet homeland. As such, the new American/NATO INF missiles were considered by Soviet leaders a circumvention of SALT II aimed at up-setting the nuclear balance and at giving the U.S. strategic superiority. (The SALT II Treaty had been signed in July 1979 in Vienna by President Carter and Soviet President Brezhnev. The Supreme Soviet subsequently ratified the agreement, but the Treaty ran into strong opposition in the U.S. Senate. Though President Carter postponed further consideration of ratification after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, both sides later agreed to abide by the provisions of SALT II. The Soviet Union was claiming, then, that the new NATO INF missiles would be in violation of that SALT II arrangement.) NATO and the U.S. rejected the Soviet contention that an INF balance existed, noting that the Soviet Union did not include all comparable nuclear weapons for both sides and could not accept the Soviet definition of 'strategic'. The Soviet leadership then took the position that in such circumstances it would not negotiate.

For the first six months of 1980 the Soviet Union refused even the possibility of negotiations. Then, following Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in June 1980, the Soviet Union dropped its precondition that NATO rescind the 12 December 1979 decision, and, despite the non-ratification of SALT II, agreed that preliminary discussions on limiting medium-range systems could begin. The Soviets took the position that American forward-based systems (FBS) should be included in the negotiations and stated that no agreement could be implemented before the ratification of SALT II. Preliminary INF discussions were started in the fall of 1980 but were then halted because of the American presidential elections.

THE BREZHNEV MORATORIUM PROPOSAL

While the new administration of President Ronald Reagan was still in the process of formulating its strategic policy, another major proposal was advanced by the Soviet President at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981. Mr. Brezhnev proposed that nuclear weapons in Europe be frozen at current levels and a moratorium be established on the deployment of any new nuclear

systems in Europe. This proposal was later reiterated during the Schmidt-Brezhnev meetings of November 1981; the proposed moratorium was still conditional either on NATO's non-deployment or on a NATO refusal to deploy while the INF negotiations in Geneva were still in process. NATO rejected both proposals immediately, since, among other reasons, they would not require any reduction of Soviet missiles for the duration of the negotiations.

THE INF GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS: 1981

President Reagan's proposal of the 'zero option' as the basis for INF negotiations, advanced in November 1981, was quickly rejected by the Soviet Union. At the negotiations in Geneva, which opened in November, 1981, the Soviets continued to maintain that an essential balance already existed in Europe, reaching this conclusion in part by including the British and French independent nuclear forces. The United States maintained that the Soviet Union had a 3-1 or 6-1 INF nuclear advantage, depending on which systems were counted. In February 1982, the Soviet Union introduced a proposal which envisaged a two-thirds reduction (to "300 units on each side") of European-based systems by 1990. Because the proposal rested on a Soviet count unacceptable to the West and acceptance would have perpetuated an imbalance, albeit at lower levels, United States and NATO officials rejected this proposal.

UNILATERAL SOVIET MORATORIUM? MARCH 1982

In an address to the Soviet Trade Unions on 16 March, 1982, President Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union had unilaterally halted deployment of the SS-20 in the European Soviet Union. He also announced that the Soviet Union intended to make unilateral reductions later in 1982 "unless there is a new aggravation of the international situation", and that it remained ready to negotiate serious reductions of all medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet President's speech was noteworthy for two other passages, one in which he proposed a "mutual restriction of naval operations", and one in which he made a veiled threat to respond to NATO deployments by augmenting Soviet nuclear capabilities in the Western hemisphere.

This Brezhnev proposal was not generally considered new, and Allied reactions were extremely reserved, ranging from a French official's statement that it was "nothing new" to the Italian Foreign Ministry's statement that Brezhnev's intention to negotiate still had to be proved. At its March 1982 meeting in Colorado Springs, the Nuclear Planning Group rejected any moratorium proposal, and United States spokesmen spoke against it firmly and persuasively. Allied officials viewed the Soviet moratorium as securing the Soviet INF monopoly of land-based systems and United States INF inferiority, at the same time that it undermined Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously in Geneva. It was also seen as an attempt to appeal to Western public opinion, to fuel the anti-nuclear "peace" movement, and, ultimately, to split NATO and undo the 1979 dual-track decision. The unilateral Brezhnev moratorium on deployments in Soviet Europe was regarded as propaganda, since

it did not restrain deployments East of the Urals, from where the SS-20 could still threaten Europe. Moreover, it would last only as long as the NATO countries did not "actually go over to practical preparations to deploy Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles in Europe". Since preparations had, in fact, already begun, the Soviets could invoke the latter condition as an escape clause at any time.

Moreover, despite the announcement of a unilateral moratorium, deployment of the SS-20 continued for some months. More ominous was the gradual emergence of evidence indicating that some SS-20s were probably being deployed with one additional reload rocket. The SS-20 is known to have a relatively fast reload capability. The number of SS-20s already deployed, plus the reloads, suggested a very powerful Soviet INF capability, certainly more than was needed for defensive purposes.

SALT II AND START

With regard to President Reagan's first START proposal, the Soviet response was almost totally negative. For a time, the Soviets continued to insist that any negotiations should be conducted on the basis of SALT II, which they had ratified. In the course of the START negotiations, however, the Soviets also tabled their own proposal, calling for a reduction in the total number of long-range missiles and bombers to 1,800 (entailing a Soviet reduction of about 700 systems and a U.S. reduction of about 200). In return, Moscow demanded that the United States forego the deployment of LRINF in Europe. The latter demand was wholly unacceptable, although the former proposal was not rejected out of hand. At the same time, the Soviet Union reiterated that the "best elements" of the SALT II treaty should form the basis of a new agreement.

A SOVIET 'PEACE' MOVEMENT

Soviet media have reportedly given extensive coverage to Western anti-nuclear demonstrations, and the Soviet Union has been known to sympathise with and support anti-nuclear groups in the West. While there is a very large Peace Council in the Soviet Union, it is kept under strict control. The only Soviet movement similar to the anti-nuclear 'peace' movements in the West was quickly crushed. On 4 June 1982, an eleven-person group of Soviet citizens held a press conference with Western correspondents in Moscow to announce the formation of the 'Committee to Establish Trust between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.'. Its goals were relatively modest: to form a movement for disarmament and peace, to encourage greater U.S.-Soviet Union citizen contact, and to open discussion on questions of war and peace. Within days, all but one of the members were called in by the police and warned about continuing these activities, which were considered illegal, provocative, and anti-social. The members of the group were harassed by police in other ways. Before some 300 International Peace Marchers arrived in Moscow, some members were warned to leave the city, others were jailed, and the rest were kept under surveillance, so they could not meet the marchers. According to reports, the artist-leader of the Committee was eventually put in a psychiatric institution.

The Soviet Union consistently emphasised the claim that an INF balance already existed and that NATO deployments would destroy the balance. For some in the West, this claim had a bizarre quality precisely because the Soviet Union claimed a balance existed in 1977, 1978, 1979, etc, while it continued to deploy more SS-20s and retire fewer SS-4s and SS-5s. Yet it was this argument of an existing balance that formed the essence of the Soviet rejection of the zero-zero proposal.

THE ANDROPOV SUCCESSION: THE DECEMBER 1982 PROPOSAL

With the death of President Brezhnev in November 1982 and the unexpectedly rapid selection of Yuri Andropov to succeed him as Party General Secretary, it was thought that the Soviet Union might show greater flexibility. Such expectations were short-lived. The new Soviet leader maintained positions essentially the same as those of his predecessor; the fundamental continuity of Soviet INF policy remained. On 11 December 1982, Mr. Andropov declared that the Soviets were prepared to reduce the number of SS-20's in the European Soviet Union to 162, roughly the number of French and U.K. strategic missiles then deployed. This proposal, which again was conditional on non-deployment by NATO, was a refinement of an earlier one, with the notable addition of the offer to reduce Soviet SS-20s already deployed. It was not clear from Mr. Andropov's speech whether the number of reduced missiles would be destroyed or re-deployed and the remarks of other Soviet spokesmen were inconsistent. When Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Bonn at the invitation of Chancellor Kohl in February 1983 during the campaign period for German elections on 6 March, he said some SS-20s would be re-deployed to areas from which they could not hit Europe, others would be dismantled. Yet when SPD leader Hans Joachim Vogel went to Moscow in January 1983, he was reportedly told all missiles above 162 would be moved beyond range of Western Europe. (Some months later Mr. Andropov clarified this aspect of the proposal). In any case, the Atlantic Alliance found the new proposal as unacceptable as earlier offers: it still allowed the Soviet Union to maintain INF superiority, at the same time that it compensated the Soviets for French and U.K. independent strategic forces.

SOVIET START PROPOSALS

By early 1983, then, there had been little substantial progress in the INF negotiations on two central issues, the weapons to be counted and the geographical area of application. The strategic negotiations, START, were also moving at a slow pace. The Soviet Union had rejected the initial START position tabled by the Reagan administration. In January 1983, it made known its START position, which was firmly based on the SALT II framework. The Soviet Union called for phased reductions to 1800 on all strategic launcher and for equal warhead limits. In addition, the Soviet proposal called for prohibition of cruise missiles with a range greater than 370 miles (the 600 km range stipulated in the SALT II Protocol) and a ban on what the Soviet Union traditionally called U.S. 'forward based systems', (FBS), that is, European-based nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union.

There were certain aspects of the Soviet START proposal that were very likely to meet American objections. The United States long resisted consideration of its FBS in strategic arms talks, suggesting rather that they be included in INF talks, and it was not at all probable that the U.S. would accept a ban on long-range cruise missiles.

SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL: MARCH 1983

For the Soviet leaders, the first U.S./NATO proposal for an interim agreement, the 'build-up/build-down' proposal -- made in late March 1983 and suggesting equal numbers of warheads for each side at a level indicated by the Soviet Union -- offered nothing new because French and U.K. systems were excluded from the counting. Unofficial reports from Geneva said that at the negotiating table the Soviet delegation three times refused even to look at the offer. On 3 May, the Soviet Union offered still another refinement of its earlier position, when President Andropov proposed that the two sides count warheads on both missiles and aircrafts. The Soviet idea was still to include French and U.K. strategic systems in the INF talks, and to include as well U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft, the so-called FBS. The Allies welcomed the notion of using warheads as the basic 'unit of account'. However, they still found the inclusion of French and U.K. strategic forces wholly unacceptable and rejected the proposal for reasons made clear in the SCG communiqués.

A few days later, an authoritative article in *Pravda* clarified that Mr. Andropov's new offer and the American 'build-up/build-down' proposal were incompatible: U.K. and French nuclear weapons had to be taken into account. In the 18 months since negotiations had started, according to the Moscow newspaper, the U.S. had blocked all possibilities for progress. In the same period, the Soviet Union begun threatening retaliatory measures if NATO deployed. The first such threat occurred in early May. Then, shortly before the Williamsburg Summit was to convene in late May 1983, the Soviet Union issued the second in what was to become a series of threats at retaliation.

SUGGESTIONS OF SOVIET RETALIATORY MEASURES: MAY 1983

An article in *Pravda* stated that the unilateral moratorium supposedly imposed in 1982 would need to be reconsidered. "The need would also arise to implement, in arrangement with other Warsaw Treaty member countries, other measures as well to deploy additional means with the aim of creating the necessary counterbalance to the growing grouping of the U.S. forward-based systems in Europe and the nuclear arms of other NATO countries...". The new systems were to be deployed in Czechoslovakia and in East Germany. In mid-June, in another gesture aimed at influencing Western publics and stopping NATO deployments, the Supreme Soviet instructed the government to seek a freeze on all nuclear weapons in Europe, a freeze on strategic weapons, and limitations on strategic qualitative modernisation. France, among other Allies, rejected this proposal because it would freeze the existing imbalances. Soviet officials also made it clear that the Soviet Union would not limit medium-range missiles in Asia for two basic reasons. First, the United States had plans, it said, to deploy on ships of the Pacific fleet cruise missiles capable of hitting Soviet territory. Secondly, China's nuclear arsenal, then estimated at 150-200 systems, was expected to reach 500 within 5 years.

An extraordinary Warsaw Pact summit was called for 28 June 1983 to convene in Moscow. The summit was allegedly called on short notice, in part to produce a reply to the Williamsburg Summit. It was widely expected that the summit would support the Soviet threats to deploy additional weapons in Eastern Europe if NATO deployed. The Moscow summit, however, produced an appeal to return to detente and eliminate the nuclear threat. It spoke of an unprecedented arms race and the urgent need to find a balance at the lowest possible level. However, there was nothing in the communique about support for additional Soviet deployments if negotiations failed. In fact, there were indications later that disagreements had surfaced in the Warsaw Pact summit, and President Ceausescu of Romania was thought to be the maverick. In any case, the Moscow Summit did not endorse Soviet retaliatory measures.

THE SAKHAROV LETTER

While there began to emerge in Eastern Europe other signs of dissatisfaction with Soviet policy in addition to those of Rumania, among the most unexpected was the open letter from Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov smuggled from his residence of internal exile in Gorki to the West and published in a Western journal. This letter from a Soviet personality respected throughout the world appeared to undermine thoroughly whatever credibility as a pacifistic leadership the Soviets were trying to construct. Mr. Sakharov recognised that a nuclear war would be an unmitigated calamity. Still, he argued that pacifist sentiments must be tempered by political, military, and economic realities, including in these realities land-based missiles. The Soviet leadership, he argued, would not unilaterally relinquish any lead it had in medium-range missiles, and the Soviet Union would not reduce its medium-range nuclear weapons if NATO had nothing to negotiate. In short, he doubted the Soviet Union would negotiate seriously before NATO deployed analogous systems. Mr. Sakharov was bitterly denounced by *Izvestia* for urging the United States to continue in its basic negotiating position.

SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

On the occasion of the state visit of FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl in early July 1983, Soviet Prime Minister Nicolai Tikhonov reiterated Soviet intentions to expand its nuclear arsenal if NATO deployed. The Soviet Union, he said, would not soften its position at the Geneva negotiations, but would take additional steps to develop a counterbalance and strengthen its security. The result would be a restored nuclear balance, but at higher levels. The Chancellor also discussed with Soviet leaders the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet summit, an idea that received more and more attention during the summer of 1983, as it became increasingly apparent that the INF negotiations were stalled, that NATO deployments were probable, and that East-West relations were being too narrowly concentrated into the arms control negotiations. The Soviet leadership sometimes appeared to consider a summit a genuine possibility, sometimes indicated that no summit was possible unless the U.S. changed its arms policy.

As the 'hot autumn' approached when several NATO members' parliaments would again debate the implementation of the 1979 decision; when scheduled large-scale demonstrations would take place; and when the first new medium-range nuclear missiles were likely to be deployed, the Soviet Union pursued a policy of threatening and cajoling the Alliance as a whole and individual member countries. There was little doubt in the West that Soviet policy was aimed at activating Western public opinion to oppose deployment and, if possible, break the solidarity of the Alliance. Beginning in this period, too, a number of contrary if not contradictory indications began coming from the Soviet Union, leaving one wondering who was speaking for Soviet policy. Depending on who was speaking when and to whom, U.K. and French forces might be excluded, had to be included, would be partially included. The 'walk-in-the-woods' informal formula might be worthy of reconsideration; no, it would not serve even as a basis for negotiations. Whether this was a deliberate Soviet tactic or a result of President Andropov's illness is simply not clear. However, the multiplication of contrary Soviet policy possibilities was unusual for Soviet practice and somewhat confusing.

THE ANDROPOV AUGUST 1983 PROPOSAL: LIQUIDATION OF EXCESS SS-20S

In August 1983 Soviet Defence Minister Marshall Ustinov reiterated the Kremlin's intention to implement countermeasures if NATO deployed, countermeasures that would intensify the threat to the United States and to the European Allies which accepted deployment. While the Defence Minister's tone was considered moderate in that he stated Moscow was not seeking military superiority, he was firm in his insistence that French and U.K. strategic weapons be included, and he insisted that the P-II was a first-strike weapon. The mid-August meeting of nine U.S. Senators, led by Senator Claiborne Pell, with President Andropov was notable for the President's expressed desire to reach an "honest" agreement on arms control prior to NATO deployments. (This visit with U.S. Senators also marked the last time the Soviet President was seen by a Westerner.) The most significant Soviet move in August, however, was undoubtedly the Andropov proposal of 26 August, repeated in several personal letters to heads of Western governments, to "liquidate" SS-20s in the European Soviet Union over and above the levels agreed in an arms control treaty. This proposal clarified the May 1983 Andropov offer which had left open the possibility of redeployment of weapons above 162 to Soviet Asia. It was later confirmed that the 26 August offer entailed dismantling of the missiles and launching platforms. Conversely, in the absence of an American about-face, Soviet officials warned that agreement was impossible on the current basis and the Soviet Union would be obliged to annul the unilateral March 1982 moratorium and to install new missiles in Eastern Europe and new missiles aimed at the U.S.

Alliance authorities did not consider the 26 August Andropov proposal a significant advance, since it was based on inclusion of the French and U.K. strategic forces. However, the offer to destroy missiles made a factor of imbalance through an arms control agreement appeared promising at the same time that it appeared as tacit Soviet admission of medium-range superiority.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER

On 1 September, shortly before the sixth round of LRINF negotiations opened in Geneva, Soviet planes shot down over restricted Soviet territory a Korean civilian airliner, killing 269 civilians and bringing to a temporary halt the hesitant steps taken toward a U.S.-Soviet summit and a broadened East-West dialogue. All Soviet explanations were found entirely inadequate and the Soviet Union refused any expression of regret. President Reagan decided that despite the outrage and inadequacy of Soviet explanations, the U.S. should continue in the negotiations, scheduled to open on 6 September. That the KAL incident somewhat damaged Soviet negotiating credibility with Western anti-nuclear groups was undoubtedly the case.

SEPTEMBER 1983: THE FINAL NEGOTIATING ROUND

During September, while the negotiations continued in Geneva, the Soviet Union, according to Western reports, accelerated the deployment of SS-21 missiles with units in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia to four per month and began the construction of three new SS-20 bases in Soviet Asia. The Soviet leadership found little new in President Reagan's 26 September proposal for equal ceilings on nuclear warheads, an American commitment not to deploy all weapons to which it was entitled, and limitations on medium-range nuclear-capable aircraft. The Soviet Union quickly rejected the proposal, dismissing the supposed "flexibility" of the United States because French and U.K. strategic systems were not included. The U.S. 'build down' proposal for START, proposed in early October and calling for automatic warhead reductions by agreed levels as new nuclear missiles were deployed, met a similar fate: the Soviet Union dismissed it as "mere words".

THE OCTOBER 1983 ANDROPOV PROPOSALS

Soviet spokesmen continued to charge the U.S. with blocking the Geneva negotiations by the refusal to include U.K. and French strategic weapons and indicated that the Soviet capacity for new offers was becoming exhausted. These were the policy positions repeated by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in his mid-October meetings with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher. In October, too, Soviet officials gave the first firm statement that short-range nuclear missiles were already deployed with Soviet units in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Defence Ministry announced that plans were underway to deploy additional missiles in East-Germany and Czechoslovakia if

NATO went ahead with deployment. Then, on 26 October, Soviet President Yuri Andropov offered another proposal: the Soviet Union, he said, would reduce its European-based SS-20s to "about 140" to obtain a roughly equal level of missiles and warheads if NATO did not deploy; would stop deployment of SS-20s in Soviet Asia at the moment an INF agreement came into force if the U.S. deployed no new nuclear weapons capable of reaching Soviet Asia; and would make a new offer on nuclear-capable aircraft that would not entail excessive U.S. cuts. The Soviet President also warned that deployment of cruise and P-II missiles would "make continuation of the present talks in Geneva impossible". The 26 October Soviet offer ran headlong into the main Western objections to earlier Soviet proposals: it was based on inclusion the U.K. and French systems and was, therefore, unacceptable and non-negotiable.

The final American INF proposal made in mid-November 1983, shortly before the SPD convention and the Bundestag debate on full implementation of the 1979 decision, was likewise found unacceptable by the Soviet Union. The American refinement of its earlier build-up/build down proposal suggested a global ceiling of 420 LRINF, with a U.S. commitment to deploy in Europe only a number equal to that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union rejected it the day after it was made public, declaring it would legitimise the installation in Europe of missiles capable of hitting the Soviet Union within a few minutes.

NOVEMBER 1983: THE BUNDESTAG VOTE AND THE SOVIET WALK-OUT

The Soviet Union appeared to oscillate in November between threats of retaliation and expressions of its sincerity about reaching an agreement on its terms. The Federal Republic of Germany in particular was the subject of an alternating gentle/hard approach. One curious diplomatic episode that transpired was the informal approach by chief Soviet negotiator Yuli Kvitsinskiy to chief U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze. Mr. Kvitsinskiy privately suggested that if the U.S. would propose that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union reduce LRINF by 572 warheads, the Soviet Union was prepared to consider the offer seriously and deploy in return only 120 SS-20s capable of hitting Europe. Compensation for French and U.K. forces would be sought in another negotiating forum. Several versions of this secret talk made their way into the press. One version heard in the FRG was that the Soviet Union was reconsidering its insistence on inclusion of the French and U.K. forces. Soviet spokesmen quickly rejected this contention. Another version attributed the secret proposal to the United States; Paul Nitze quickly denied that. The Soviet Union chose not to break-off negotiations following the arrival of the first cruise missiles at Greenham Common on 15 November. It was on 23 November, the day following the Bundestag vote in favor of deployment, that Soviet negotiators walked out of the Geneva INF negotiations. President Andropov was quoted as saying that "The Soviet Union considers its further participation in these talks impossible". The Soviet Union took the position that the missiles already deployed must be removed before the talks could be resumed.

THE TERMINATION OF START

The Soviet attempt to stop further NATO deployments continued in late November and December. President Andropov wrote letters to Western heads of government, urging a halt in deployments and emphasising the damage they would do to East-West relations. In early December when the START round ended, the Soviet negotiators refused to set a resumption date, effectively terminating START. Within the framework of Soviet strategic logic, the START termination was logical, since the Soviets had long insisted that NATO's LRINF were strategic weapons — strategic because they could hit the Soviet Union. Any Western hope for a resumption of talks by merging INF and START was squelched by Marshall Nicolai Ogarkov, who, at a Moscow press conference, rejected the possibility of a merger.

SOVIET REACTIONS

According to U.S. State Department reports, the Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Moscow on 9 December was marked by some dissension. Rumania reportedly refused to send a representative to the summit. In any event, the Andropov position on NATO deployments and on the suspension of the Geneva negotiations was confirmed by the Supreme Soviet in a meeting in late December. Mr. Andropov's absence was noted by Western analysts, who conjectured that the Soviet President's ill health was severely limiting any possibility for new initiatives. Within the coming days and months, Soviet leaders repeated the fundamental Soviet position: a readiness to return to negotiations if the U.S./NATO missiles were withdrawn. A few days after the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stated that Western hopes for the resumption of negotiations were misleading, an attempt to downplay the importance of NATO deployments. At the opening of the Stockholm conference on European Disarmament, Soviet diplomats stated unequivocally that the INF talks were terminated, and Foreign Minister Gromyko attacked the U.S. with a bitterness not heard in years, an attack he repeated in early February in Bucharest, accusing the Reagan administration of cheating and undermining the Geneva talks. The conciliatory approach adopted by President Reagan in his 20 January speech was simply dismissed as propaganda. The Soviet President himself wrote in Pravda that the Soviet Union would negotiate if NATO returned to the pre-deployment situation and a freeze was imposed on all nuclear weapons deployments. To President Reagan's charge in late January that the Soviet Union had violated 7 different provisions of arms control agreements the Soviet Union replied that it was the U.S. that was violating arms control agreements with the MX and Midgetman missiles. A day later, in an official note delivered to the State Department in Washington DC, the Soviet Union officially accused the U.S. of violating SALT II with deployment of the Pershing II. It was also reported in January that Soviet missile units had arrived in East Germany and in Czechoslovakia and that in the latter the units were manning SS-20 missiles.

THE CHERNENKO SUCCESSION

The announcement of Soviet President Andropov's death in early February after a long illness raised at least as many questions as it answered, such as whether Mr. Andropov had been in sufficiently good health to manage foreign policy; who was, in fact, giving direction to Soviet foreign policy; what positions would the new leadership take vis-à-vis the INF issues once its power was consolidated. The rapid choice of Mr. Chernenko came as something of a surprise to Western analysts, as had the rapid choice of his predecessor. Because of his age -- 72 years old -- it was thought Mr. Chernenko was an interim Party Secretary; because of his inexperience in international affairs and foreign policy, it was thought that the decision-making power of Foreign Minister Gromyko would be reinforced and perhaps that of Defence Minister Dimitri Ustinov.

THE CHERNENKO POLICY : CONTINUITY

The meetings between Mr. Chernenko and Western leaders immediately following the Andropov funeral were generally occasions of protocol rather than opportunities for extended substantive discussion. On the troubling INF questions, Western leaders came away with the impression that the door to a resumption of negotiations might not be entirely closed. For example, Mr. Chernenko told U.S. Vice-President George Bush that the Soviet Union desired to negotiate, but on the basis of "equality and equal security".

Within a very short time, the position of the Soviet Union on resumption of negotiations was clarified; it was exactly the same as with Andropov: resumption of the negotiations if the U.S. withdrew the cruise and Pershing II missiles already deployed. In the coming months, this position was repeated frequently with only slight variation on the theme. One or the other Western European Foreign Minister on a visit to Moscow, such as Mr. Cheysson or Mr. Andreotti, might catch a glimmer of a possible change in a nuanced expression, but these possible changes of position proved chimerical. The requirement to withdraw the missiles already deployed was stated without cavil to Foreign Ministers Genscher and Howe during their visits to Moscow in mid 1984. The leader of the German SPD, Hans-Joachim Vogel, was told the missiles deployed constituted a "new strategic threat". The message was also repeated with regularity in Pravda, by Tass, and in international fora, often coupled with attacks on the U.S. or President Reagan for "militarist ambitions" and for deliberately aggravating international tensions. Soviet reluctance to move at all on the INF issues was accompanied by denials that it was stalling until after the U.S. Presidential elections.

PROGRESS ON INF ARMS CONTROL BEFORE THE U.S. ELECTION?

With possibility for action on INF issues stalled and the Soviet Union attempting to place all responsibility for the deadlock on the U.S., the Soviet leadership also began trying to move the focus of international attention to other arms control issues. In late February, Mr. Chernenko said the U.S. could prove its "sincerity" on arms control issues by taking initiatives on a chemical weapons treaty; on anti-satellite negotiations; and on the 1974 treaty limiting underground nuclear testing. Yet when the U.S. tabled a chemical weapons treaty in early April 1984, the Soviet Union immediately rejected it as an unacceptable "propaganda ploy" because of provisions for on-site verification. On 29 June, Mr. Chernenko suggested the commencement in September of U.S.-Soviet talks banning anti-satellite weapons. A quick U.S. acceptance in principle was met with Soviet charges that the U.S. was not serious about the talks, but wanted to discuss a resumption of the INF negotiations, a discussion that the Soviet Union would not permit in that context. In the coming weeks, the possible anti-satellite talks came to dominate U.S.-Soviet exchanges.

A minor glimmer of hope for those favoring the resumption of the INF talks was the interview given in early June by a Soviet arms control expert to William Beecher, a writer for the newspaper *Boston Globe*. The Soviet expert said a new approach to the nuclear arms control issues was under consideration in Moscow. Whether or not it would finally be adopted he did not know, but it involved taking into consideration at the same time all kinds of nuclear weapons, both strategic and intermediate-range. The interview was not repudiated later, but since it was unofficial, repudiation was not required. Still, in the Soviet Union proposals of this nature are not generally suggested without prior authorization. To the foreign observer, the approach under consideration in Moscow resembled a merger of the INF negotiations and START. In any case, no Soviet action on this or any other nuclear weapons arms control proposal was expected before the American presidential election.

UNREST IN EASTERN EUROPE

Mention was made above of the very small U.S.-Soviet Friendship Society organized by Soviet private citizens in July 1982 and quickly -- within a month -- repressed. That brief movement and the letter by Mr. Sakharov were the only signs detected in the Soviet Union of private opposition to official security policy and to the continuing deployment of the SS 20s. Greater opposition to Soviet security policy was remarked in several member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

In the German Democratic Republic (GDR) the churches have been in the forefront of some opposition to Soviet deployments. Periodic reports of peace meetings sponsored by the churches were published during 1982 and 1983. In November 1983, Protestant pastors and Roman Catholic priests protested the government's policy of trying to rally support among the workers for new

Soviet missile deployments. Western newspapers later reported that the government began a crackdown on opponents of additional deployments. That the crackdown or intimidation campaign was not entirely successful was evident from December 1983 reports indicating that one hundred members of the evangelical churches signed an appeal against new Soviet deployments, an appeal that had been expressed earlier by the Synod of the evangelical church in Saxony. Moreover, in summer 1984 GDR leader Erich Honecker publicly expressed some reservations about installation of new Soviet missiles and planned to discuss reduction of East-West tensions during his September visit to Bonn. Under Soviet pressure, the visit was later postponed.

In Romania, President Ceausescu has been relatively outspoken in his criticism of the Soviet Union's security policy. Mr. Ceausescu had ardently supported the zero-zero proposal and in published letters to President Reagan and President Andropov called on NATO not to deploy and called on Moscow to dismantle the SS-20s targetted on Western Europe. After the Soviet Union broke off negotiations, Romania refused to send a representative to the meeting scheduled in Moscow for 9 December 1983. A few days later the Romanian President called on the Soviet Union and the U.S. to halt all missile deployments and resume arms control negotiations.

Some opposition to the deployment of Soviet missiles also developed in Czechoslovakia. Shortly after the state-controlled Czech media announced on 24 October 1983 that Soviet "operational tactical missile complexes" were under preparation, petitions opposed to the new installations began circulating and the country's parliament urged a continuation of the Geneva negotiations. In November, the Communist Party daily newspaper Rude Pravo acknowledged that it had received "stacks of letters" expressing concern about the installation of new Soviet missiles. In December 1983 it was reported that 24 factory workers publicly protested the new Soviet missiles and called for "the immediate dismantling of all similarly equipped rockets that have been deployed on the territory of our state for some time" -- a reference to older Soviet short-range nuclear weapons stationed in Czechoslovakia. The dissidence continued in 1984, though it is difficult to ascertain whether it spread. In February 1984 a petition that had been circulating clandestinely was turned over to the government with almost 1000 signatures, and it was reported that opposition to new Soviet missiles was being voiced at local Party meetings. In March there were further reports of criticism by students and some municipal authorities, and government-controlled newspapers were publishing letters from citizens concerned with the new Soviet missiles.

In late 1983 there were reports of concern in Bulgaria that the Soviet Union might want to deploy new nuclear missiles there. In November 1983 Bulgarian President Zhivkov stated there were no plans to station SS-20s in Bulgaria. In December 1983 he expressed some concern that new Soviet deployments would harm the East European economies. The Bulgarian President has been a strong proponent of a Balkan nuclear-free zone. Bulgaria is known to possess dual-capable artillery.

CHAPTER III - THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

West German disquiet over a growing imbalance in intermediate range nuclear forces was instrumental in developing the dual-track decision, and German political criteria were extremely important in establishing the components of the NATO decision of 12 December 1979. *

THE 1979 POLITICAL SITUATION

At the time of the NATO decision, the government was composed of a coalition formed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) **. In developing the Government's position, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was instrumental in blending into the final decision with equal emphasis the requirements of military security and détente. This was a political necessity, since a significant section of the SPD tended to emphasise the need for negotiations more than the need for modernisation, while other elements of the SPD and the junior partner of the coalition, the FDP, emphasised the need for modernisation to offset a growing imbalance and threat. The Chancellor's success in achieving widespread support for the dual-track proposal lay in recognising the strong feeling within the SPD that every effort be made to safeguard relations with the East and that arms control efforts be at least equally emphasised. At the 1979 SPD Congress, the Chancellor received a clear mandate for the government's position, and his resounding personal success was demonstrated in the vote by which he was elected Party Deputy Chairman - 360 in favour, 24 opposed and 16 abstentions.

In terms of specific aspects of the 1979 decision, the Schmidt government insisted on the principle of non-singularity, that is, other continental Allies were required to accept deployment alongside the Federal Republic. A second element important to the government was that the missiles be American operated and controlled, that is, the Federal Republic rejected the notion of dual-control. Finally, when the weapons "mix" of cruise and P-II missiles was determined, it was widely thought that because the Pershing II was viewed by experts as a modernisation of the Pershing I, it would be so viewed by the public and meet less opposition than the cruise, if indeed opposition developed.

* For Chancellor Schmidt's role in calling public attention to the LRINF issues, see above, p. 7.

** The composition of the Bundestag 1976-1980 was as follows : SPD : 224 members (including 10 members from Berlin); FDP : 40 members (including 1 member from Berlin); CDU/CSU : 253 members (including 11 members from Berlin); Independent : 1 member.

The Free Democratic Party (FDP), particularly through Foreign Minister Genscher, tended to place a higher priority than did the SPD on the necessity to modernise in order to offset the growing INF imbalance. In Genscher's view, the Soviet Union bore responsibility for any INF arms build-up.

The opposition parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU), supported the government's position on the NATO proposal, but, more strongly than the governing coalition, emphasised the need for NATO to modernise in response to the Soviet build-up. The official CDU/CSU position maintained that it would be ideal if all European Allies accepted direct participation in the modernisation programme, but it still considered the programme sound if only several Allies accepted. Further, at the time the CDU did not accept Chancellor Schmidt's position that the Federal Republic could never be the only Ally to accept deployment and viewed with some concern the tendency in the left wing of the SPD to accent arms control over modernisation.

THE 1980 ELECTIONS

The October 1980 elections in the Federal Republic of Germany returned the SPD/FDP coalition to government.* After those elections and the November 1980 election of President Reagan in the United States, opposition to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on German territory grew in the early months of 1981. Opposition appeared to be fuelled in part by a perception that the Reagan Administration was attempting to downgrade the negotiating track in the months immediately following the President's election. The fact that it would be months before the Reagan administration completed its policy review of the SALT process and its strategic requirements; that key policy-making positions in the Department of Defence and in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were filled slowly; that American spokesmen at meetings of the SCG in Brussels and at the Nuclear Planning Group April meeting in Bonn were at first reluctant to suggest a date, in terms however vague, for an opening of negotiation on LRINF; that the Reagan Administration was linking arms control negotiations to Soviet behaviour toward Poland in a manner more direct than European governments felt they could support — all these developments began eroding the confidence that the negotiating track of the NATO 1979 two-track decision would be treated with equal emphasis.

* After the October 1980 elections, the Bundestag composition was the following : SPD : 228 members (including 10 members from Berlin); FDP : 54 members (including 1 member from Berlin); CDU/CSU : 237 members (including 11 members from Berlin).

THE ANTI-NUCLEAR OPPOSITION GROWS

While, on the one hand, there was a widespread sense that the negotiating track was being underemphasised by the United States administration, there was, on the other, a sense that the military-security aspects were becoming overemphasised. The sometimes strident anti-Soviet rhetoric of the new administration, including the reference to Kremlin leaders as "liars and cheats"; the assertion that limited nuclear war in Europe was possible; the assertive manner in which Secretary of State Alexander Haig revealed the possibility of launching a nuclear warning shot, the decision to produce Enhanced Radiation Warheads (ERW) and, in general, the continuous references made to the Soviet threat, as well as the enlarged defence budget required to meet that threat adequately -- all these fuelled latent fears within sectors of the West German public. The 1979 dual-track decision, consequently, became a focal point of opposition and discontent.

Chancellor Schmidt worked assiduously to keep the support of the SPD left wing for the 1979 decision, but it was a difficult and apparently not always successful effort. In the early months of 1981, when the possibility even for opening LRINF negotiations appeared remote, the SPD left wing was increasingly vocal, with several voices raising demands for a review of the dual-track decision.

Adding to this growing restiveness was the proposal by President Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981 for a moratorium on nuclear weapons deployment -- a proposal NATO quickly rejected as propagandist, designed to freeze Soviet superiority and to drive a wedge into the Alliance. In a Bundestag speech in early April 1981, the Chancellor used unusually harsh language to criticise the Soviet Union, referring to the Soviet weapons programmes in this way: "This massive military disproportion represents a massive political danger". In the very important vote following the Bundestag debate on the dual-track decision in late May, the Chancellor received a comfortable majority, including a large majority of the left wing SPD, yet it was thought highly significant that five SPD deputies voted against the motion, six abstained, and four expressed reservations.

THE EFFECT OF NEW ALLIED INITIATIVES

For those who, in early 1981, were doubting the credibility of the American commitment to negotiate, greater balance was restored through a series of developments. Perhaps the most important development was the May 1981 NATO ministerial meeting in Rome and its final communiqué, in which the importance attached to both tracks of the NATO decision was reiterated and it was announced that LRINF negotiations with the Soviet Union would open before the end of the year. Other statements by American officials, including a letter in July from President Reagan to Chancellor Schmidt expressing American commitment to open negotiations before the end of the year, and Secretary of State Haig's announced meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in New York in September, as well as the successive meetings during the summer of the HLG and the SCG, served to reinforce the credibility of the American commitment.

The Chancellor's position and the decision of NATO received a powerful thrust of support when the newly-elected French President, François Mitterrand, solidly endorsed the German position at the Franco-German summit in Bonn in early July 1981, emphasising the need to negotiate from a position of strength. The debate between the two tendencies within the SPD received an additional stimulus following the trip of Willy Brandt to Moscow in July. After carefully examining Mr. Brandt's claims that the Soviets were taking slightly newer positions on the LRINF negotiations, the 'zero option', and the proposed moratorium, Government spokesmen concluded that in fact these statements differed in no significant way from earlier Soviet positions.

The CDU/CSU cited other sources for the growth of nuclear opposition in the first months of 1981. According to an influential spokesman, it was Moscow's propaganda, supported by the German Communist Party and its affiliates, that became more influential during this period by exploiting "misperceptions of President Reagan's policy and the illusions on détente still persisting, despite Afghanistan and Poland". Furthermore, the CDU/CSU maintained that doubts about the credibility of the Reagan administration's commitment to the LRINF negotiations were also stirred up by leaders of the SPD left wing and by SPD/FDP youth organisations. The CDU/CSU, the strongest parliamentary group, supported the 1979 NATO dual-track decision and adherence to the Alliance unanimously. The CDU/CSU maintained that FRG opponents of the 1979 decision constituted a small minority - albeit vociferous and with easy access to the mass media - and that the huge majority in the Federal Republic was still confident of American credibility.

OPPOSITION CONTINUES TO GROW

Whatever fuelled the growing opposition, there was no doubt about its increasing political importance. Not only did a grass roots anti-nuclear opposition emerge, but within the main coalition partners, the left wing of the SPD became increasingly vocal with some again demanding a review of the dual-track decision. The motions tabled by the SPD left wing at the party's April 1982 convention in Munich included a call for an outright rejection of the NATO decision as well as a call for a moratorium on deployment of U.S. weapons as long as the United States-Soviet INF talks in Geneva continued. Both motions were resoundingly rejected and the Congress instead voted overwhelmingly to endorse the government's position.

Outside the circle of established political parties, the anti-nuclear opposition grew in size and in intensity, particularly in the period 1980 to June 1982, and its political influence increased accordingly. The anti-nuclear movement in the Federal Republic of Germany took the form of a loosely knit federation of various political and religious groups unified by opposition to the modernisation decision. Parts of the movement were religiously inspired pacifists and anti-nuclear groups who shared none of the political aims of a small pro-Soviet minority. Other parts were composed of pro-defence minded sectors of the public seeking to halt the deployment of more nuclear weapons on German soil, viewing such deployment as destabilising without increasing deterrence; the point of some groups was to strengthen

non-nuclear defences. The German Peace Society - United War Resisters, a strong pacifist group within the anti-nuclear movement, was described by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution as having Communists in leading positions. The increasingly important Green Movement -- itself a coalition of ecologists, feminists, nuclear pacifists, and anti-nuclear power adherents -- supported the pacifist and some neutralist sectors of the movement. The credibility of the Greens underwent a sharp, temporary set-back, however, following reports of a meeting attended by some of its members, among them a member of the Greens' party executive, with Libyan leader Col. Moamar Qadhafi. Col. Qadhafi reportedly urged his interlocutors to seek peaceful means to ensure the removal of U.S. bases and, if peaceful means failed, to resort to military efforts.

The amalgamation of different groupings within the anti-nuclear movement was reflected in a diversity of political aims and activities. Moral opposition to nuclear weapons or to nuclear power combined with fears of war and with strains of pacifism, neutralism, nationalism, and anti-Americanism to produce a wide array of opinions and goals. The unity in this diversity was opposition to new deployment, and mass action was not a demonstration for particular programmes, but expression of opposition to LRINF. Although police estimates and those of rally organisers often diverged widely with regard to the number of participants in demonstrations, the fact that large numbers of people were involved in demonstrations was not contested. Between 350,000 and 480,000 people demonstrated at various sites during the Easter weekend in 1982. Again during President Reagan's visit to Bonn in June, 1982, some 350,000 marched to oppose the deployment of LRINF in Europe, far exceeding the expected 150,000.

The Krefeld Appeal*, which called for opposition to the deployment of LRINF on German territory, lost momentum during 1982-83, but it must be recalled that in the Autumn of 1981, more than one million had signed it.

While the anti-nuclear movement was organising mass action against the modernisation decision, supporters of the 1979 decision were engaged in action in favour of it. In June, 1982, the Christian Democratic Party organised a pro-American rally, which attracted about 150,000 people. The rally was intended to raise questions about reports in the mass media about a growing anti-American sentiment or an increasingly anti-NATO Federal Republic.

* The Krefeld Appeal was announced on 16th November, 1980, during a peace forum in the city of Krefeld. According to a CDU/CSU spokesman, this appeal was evidently inspired during the meeting of a delegation of the German Peace Union (DFU) with the Soviet Committee of the World Peace Council, held in Moscow between 29th January and 4th February 1980, and then manipulated by the German Communist Party and what he called its "fellow travellers", "especially the German Peace Union, Socialist German Workers Youth (SDAJ) (the youth organisation of the Communist Party), the Marxist Student Union Spartakus (MSB), and other organisations".

THE BRESHNEV-SCHMIDT MEETING: FEBRUARY 1982

The Federal Republic's continuing insistence on the dual-track character of the modernisation decision and on the importance to global stability as well as to public confidence of strategic negotiations undoubtedly carried a certain weight with the Reagan Administration while it was conducting its strategic review. Another important contribution was the Chancellor's meeting in February 1982 with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. During the meetings, President Brezhnev did, in fact, repeat his offer for a moratorium on deployment of new systems in Europe, as was expected, and added another offer: the Soviet Union would reduce unilaterally (by an unspecified number of unspecified weapons systems) Soviet intermediate range systems if the moratorium was accepted and NATO did not deploy. By all accounts of their meetings, Chancellor Schmidt performed valuable services for the Alliance by his firmness in support of the zero proposal and, conversely, his firmness that the NATO weapons would be deployed if the Geneva negotiations did not succeed in reaching the zero proposal; by his insistence that the United States was serious about the negotiations; by his admonitions to the Soviet leader about the destabilising effects of the Soviet military build-up; by his statements on the increase in international tensions caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He also reportedly warned President Brezhnev against trying to influence public opinion against the positions taken by Alliance governments. The Schmidt-Brezhnev meetings were obviously very useful in reinforcing Alliance view-points on many issues.

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION POLICY

Convinced that the course of action which it took with NATO to ensure continued Western security by negotiating as low a limit as possible on LRINF would strengthen deterrence, the Schmidt government and the major political parties launched a public information programme. They took issue with the criticism of opponents. Chancellor Schmidt stated that he could not take the Krefeld Appeal seriously since it did not mention the Soviet SS-20's. "Peace is not created", Chancellor Schmidt said, "when one renders oneself defenceless against the armament or threat of another". He also stated that several supporters of the Krefeld Appeal were members of the Communist Party and the Appeal was a 'tool' of Soviet policy. "There is no word of criticism for the Soviet Union", he said. "This is very clearly a tool very pleasing to the Soviet leadership, very suited to them and treated by them in a friendly way". Referring to proposals for a nuclear freeze, Chancellor Schmidt argued at the SPD Conference in Munich in 1982 that its acceptance would be equivalent to accepting the "unbelievable Soviet armada that is aimed at us". Countering voices calling for neutralism and those treating the United States and the Soviet Union as moral equals, he said that "German policy may not and can never be made for a position equidistant between Washington and Moscow. We stand on this side, on the side of free and equal people".

While the government's information programme was not entirely successful, in combination with the various arms control initiatives undertaken by the Reagan administration it produced an apparent reduction, by the latter half of 1982, in publicly expressed opposition to the 1979 decision. The Reagan proposals of November, 1981, on INF talks and the

subsequent initiation of negotiations shifted public attention to Soviet actions, proposals, and reactions. The zero proposal fulfilled the anti-nuclear movement's desires, in that it offered the possibility for not deploying LRINF should the Soviet Union so wish. Also of importance were the arms reduction proposals for strategic systems and the commencement of the START negotiations in June 1982. With the new initiatives, the Reagan Administration somewhat redressed the balance of emphasis on military security and negotiations, and it became clear that arms control, alongside modernisation, had re-established its place in U.S. nuclear policy. In that sense, several factors which fuelled earlier opposition in the Federal Republic had been removed.

THE COALITION COLLAPSES

In September 1982, the ruling coalition in the Federal Republic split over a series of issues primarily economic in nature. The new coalition partners, the CDU/CSU and the FDP, agreed on Mr. Helmut Kohl as Chancellor, and Mr. Kohl was elected Chancellor through parliamentary procedures. In matters of foreign policy, Chancellor Kohl soon emphasised the basic continuity with past policy which his government would follow. He stated to a visiting high Soviet official that the Federal Republic of Germany would work for "genuine détente", for example, and that if the Soviet Union did not agree in the Geneva negotiations to reduce its missiles, the Federal Republic of Germany was determined to go forward with deployments in 1983.

THE ELECTIONS: MARCH 1983

General elections for the Bundestag were called for 6 March 1983. While it was viewed widely outside the Federal Republic as a "missile referendum", the crucial vote-determining issues were actually economic and social in nature. The then current 10% rate of unemployment and programmes for economic recovery were widely considered more important by the electorate than nuclear missiles, in spite of the extensive publicity and media coverage given to nuclear issues.

Yet nuclear issues prompted sharp, acrimonious debate between the competing parties. The tenor of the exchanges was sometimes extremely harsh, and some analysts concluded that the strong emotions and fears raised during the campaign might leave lasting scars on West German society.

The divergent attitudes of the political parties towards the INF deployment also provoked an unprecedented degree of outside involvement. The Soviet Union was notable in this respect, conducting an active 'carrot and stick' campaign to encourage those opposing deployment and intimidate those favouring it. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited the Federal Republic of Germany in January 1983 and figured prominently in the partisan domestic campaigning. Painting a picture of the Soviet Union as benevolent and

committed to a reasonable arms agreement in the Geneva INF talks, he characterised the Reagan administration as "gamblers and con men" insensitive to European problems and uncommitted to a successful outcome at Geneva. Other aspects of the Soviet attempt to woo the German electorate included meetings in Moscow between Yuri Andropov and various party leaders, and the proffering of several plans to reduce SS-20 deployment if the West Germans would forego the Pershing II's and cruise missiles. The converse side of the Soviet "peace offensive" was the dire warning against West German involvement in a nuclear confrontation, and the threat to match any NATO INF deployment with new Soviet systems. At several stages during the campaign, Soviet comment became sharp enough to evoke protest from the German government against overt outside intervention in its domestic affairs.

The election itself was widely considered as the most significant re-alignment in German politics of the past quarter century. The conservative parties -- the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU) -- polled their best results since 1957, while the Social Democratic Party (SPD), after sixteen continuous years in government, achieved its worst election results since 1961. The election returns also gave parliamentary seats to two smaller parties -- the Free Democratic Party, whose continued survival was in doubt after its defection from the SPD coalition government in 1982, and the 'Green Party', a self-styled 'anti-party' making its first entry into politics at the federal level.

THE KOHL GOVERNMENT POLICY : NATO SOLIDARITY

The Christian Democratic Union of Chancellor Kohl, together with the Bavarian CSU, emerged from the elections as the largest group in the Bundestag. This position of predominance allowed the Chancellor to remain firm on his commitment to deploy the missiles as planned if no result was achieved in the Geneva negotiations. At the same time Mr. Kohl was known to be working actively to encourage flexibility in the INF talks, thereby maximising the chances of reaching an agreement. The Kohl government strongly endorsed President Reagan's proposal that the United States would accept temporary deployment of a reduced number of systems if the Soviets in turn would dismantle some SS-20's. Chancellor Kohl was cautious about Mr. Andropov's offer of 3 May. He said it confirmed his view that "the Soviet leadership has not yet spoken its last word on the American proposal for an interim agreement" at the Geneva talks.

THE KOHL VISIT TO MOSCOW: JULY 1983

Chancellor Kohl visited Moscow in July 1983 to meet with Soviet leaders, including Mr. Andropov. During the Moscow visit there was apparently no indication of Soviet interest in dismantling any SS-20's. Mr. Kohl reasserted the FRG commitment to deploy U.S. missiles if there were no breakthrough in the Geneva negotiations. While Moscow reportedly indicated that it still felt that agreement in Geneva was possible, Mr. Andropov repeated the Soviet counter-threat to deploy additional SS-20's and to deploy

a new medium-range missile, the SS-21, in Eastern Europe, including East Germany. The Chancellor also explored with Mr. Andropov the topic of a possible U.S.-Soviet summit.

Upon his return to West Germany, Mr. Kohl suggested reconsideration of the so-called 'walk in the woods' understanding. The plan called for limiting U.S. cruise missile launchers and Soviet triple-warhead SS-20's to a total of 75 each, while cancelling the deployment of U.S. Pershing II missiles. Both Washington and Moscow had rejected the understanding in this precise form, with Washington willing to explore other variations. The Soviet rejection of the understanding was final. Mr. Kohl had raised the informal compromise formula in Moscow but had received from the Soviets only a non-committal response (though Egon Bahr of the SPD reported "strong interest" in the proposal during his Kremlin visit of 14-15 July). Mr. Kohl refrained from giving his full endorsement to the plan, but stressed that "all possible solutions" must be explored. In fact, the Allies continued to support the search for an interim solution on a different basis : during a Brussels meeting of NATO's Special Consultative Group in late July, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt stated that no European delegation was in support of the 'walk in the woods' proposal.

Among the other parties of the ruling coalition there existed both more conservative and more liberal attitudes towards the deployment issue. The staunchly conservative CSU party, led by Franz-Joseph Strauss, fully supported deployment, advocated anti-demonstration laws to control the 'peace movement', and traditionally favoured a tougher policy towards the Eastern bloc. The liberal Free Democratic Party, led by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on the other hand, broke ranks with the coalition during the campaign to advocate an interim solution more flexible than the zero option tabled by the United States as its opening official position at Geneva. Mr. Genscher also openly endorsed the 'walk in the woods' formula.

THE SPD POSITION

The former governing party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), opposed the zero option during the election campaign because they considered it unrealistic, and took the position that it would not accept the missiles if they felt the United States was at fault for any failure to reach an accord at Geneva. In the wake of the party's poor electoral performance, the right wing blamed the defeat on an attempt to court the anti-deployment and pro-environmentalist movements, while the party's left wing became more vociferous in its role as an opposition party. An SPD commission, the Working Group on New Strategies, issued a report in late June. The report recommended the elimination of all short-and medium-range nuclear systems from Europe with a simultaneous achievement of conventional parity. The report also argued against expanding the geographical scope of NATO activities and endorsed the Palme Commission proposal for a nuclear weapons-free corridor as a confidence-building measure in Central Europe. These recommendations to the SPD's Executive Committee reflected the party's movement toward a posture of public rejection of deployment. It was widely anticipated that at the November party conference the SPD would either reject deployment outright or,

at least, urge a postponement pending further United States-Soviet negotiations. During late August, SPD leader Willy Brandt publicly endorsed the Greek government's proposal for a six-month delay in cruise missile deployment.

THE POSITION OF THE GREENS

The Green Party's 28 delegates in the Bundestag represented a coalition opposing nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, the industrialisation of society and espousing women's rights, morality in foreign policy, and environmental causes. The party remained a strong political voice of the 'peace' movement; in the words of its co-founder Petra Kelly "We cannot be less militant than those who elected us -- we may stage a hunger strike in parliament, for instance, if the new American missiles are deployed".

THE POLLS

Anti-Reagan and a more general anti-American sentiment appeared to be on the increase within the 'peace' movement, though many observers felt this trend could be reversed by greater flexibility and sensitivity in Washington. Disillusionment was not confined, however, to views about the United States. Opinion polls are widely and generally suspect. Even so, the German opinion polls provided cold comfort to the government. According to the political weekly Der Spiegel, a pre-election study commissioned by the Kohl government showed 55% of the electorate doubted that either the Americans or the Soviets were negotiating seriously in Geneva. The same study further showed that 61% of the German people felt deployment of the missiles should be postponed or cancelled, even if the Geneva talks failed to achieve an agreement. In August 1983, in a poll of 1,000 people, 75.5% were in favour of a delay in deployments if the Geneva negotiations failed, while only 21% supported the government policy.

TOWARDS A 'HOT AUTUMN'

The West German 'peace' movement announced in mid-June that a massive programme of demonstrations, blockades, and civil disobedience would take place in October 1983 as part of a co-ordinated European-wide effort to prevent the siting of U.S. missiles. A co-ordinating committee representing 26 leftist, pacifist, religious and ecological organisations planned to mobilise one million supporters for what was expected to be the largest demonstrations in West Germany's history. The plans included blockades of U.S. nuclear bases; demonstrations at the embassies and consulates of nuclear powers; action by trade unions, women's groups, and schools; and three 'peoples' assemblies'. The demonstrations were to culminate in three huge protests on 22 October in Bonn, Hamburg, and the Neu-Ulm missile site outside Stuttgart.

Although only non-violent actions were planned, there was some fear that a tense situation could rapidly escalate, particularly if more violent groups took advantage of the demonstrations. Consequently, Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU) attempted to tighten severely West Germany's laws on demonstrations and the right of assembly. Thought was given, for example, to laws by which a participant in a political rally that turned violent would be open to criminal prosecution unless the individual could prove an attempt to prevent the violence. It would no longer suffice to have merely refrained from violence or to have no connection with the perpetrators of violence. The proposed legislation was the subject of serious dispute, and leaders of the promised "hot autumn" of October insisted that they would not be deterred even if the restrictive laws were passed.

A 'hot autumn' was widely expected for Europe, and particularly for the Federal Republic, because of the programme of demonstrations announced by the 'peace' movement for Germany; the division in the SPD, which was expected to reach a decision at its November special conference; and the overt Soviet propaganda and pressure aimed at influencing the crucial decision the government would make in November about deployment. The autumn months were viewed with a certain apprehension related to the possibility of violence. There had been a public discussion in the 'peace' movement about the use of violent and/or non-violent means to stop deployment. Local branches of the 'peace' movement had been organised throughout the country and some 50 'peace camps' were held. It was thought that autonomous or anarchist groups outside the movement would take advantage of demonstrations to express violent opposition, and terrorist violence was considered possible. The embarrassing event of the stoning of U.S. Vice-President George Bush's car during a visit to Krefeld on 25 June was not forgotten. Newspapers reported that both policemen and 'peace' demonstrators were undergoing training to avoid or minimise violence. The demonstrations that eventually took place were almost entirely peaceful and rarely marked by violence.

The demonstrations in the Federal Republic launching the 'hot autumn' began on a small scale on 1 September at the American base Mutlangen, where it was thought the first Pershing II's would be based. A scattering of demonstrations took place during September in a public atmosphere dominated by discussion of the INF issues. The media focussed sharply on these demonstrations and on developments within the SPD as it moved closer to its November conference and to formal opposition toward deployments. In Baden-Württemberg, where most of the 108 P-II's might eventually be deployed, the local SPD branch became the fourth to reject deployments. While the vote of the local branches was not binding on the SPD Executive Committee, the grass-roots movement gave clear indications of where the party was heading. The position of Willy Brandt, former Chancellor and SPD Chairman, was already relatively clear, though an element of uncertainty remained about what influence he would carry in the party councils and what influence former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt would bear. Mr. Brandt was taking a firm position of opposition to deployment and was of the opinion that the party could regain power only by appealing more strongly to youth, to its labor union constituency, and to elements of the 'peace' movements. Under his chairmanship, the SPD began taking part officially in demonstrations with the hope, some reported, of taking over the leadership of the 'peace movement' still led primarily by the Green Party. Mr. Brandt agreed to address what was expected to be the major FRG demonstration, that scheduled for Bonn on 22 October.

The October 22 demonstrations in the Federal Republic were preceded by 10 days of smaller organised anti-nuclear demonstrations in various places. The demonstrations for this 'action week' were generally peaceful, and the turnout was reportedly smaller than expected. On 22 October, simultaneous demonstrations were held in several European capitals and in some U.S. cities. In the Federal Republic of Germany, there were major demonstrations in Bonn, West-Berlin, Hamburg, and elsewhere, drawing in total an estimated 1 million people. Perhaps the most dramatic was the 'human chain' stretching from the NATO military base at Stuttgart to the Pershing II base at New Ulm 70 miles away. A recognised high-point of the Bonn demonstration, which drew about a half-million people, was the address by Willy Brandt. The SPD Chairman expressed his "bitter disappointment" that the United States and the Soviet Union had not shown greater political will to reach an agreement in the Geneva negotiations. He criticised severely those who found it more important to install Pershing II's than to remove SS-20s. He charged that the Soviet Union had, with its SS-20 programme, admittedly overarmed and destroyed the balance, but stated that the Federal Republic of Germany needed no new nuclear weapons in any case. He opposed deployment, therefore, called for extended negotiations and a freeze, to be followed by reductions. Despite his opposition to deployment, he left no doubt that he supported German membership in the Atlantic Alliance. Mr. Brandt was later followed by Petra Kelly, a leader of the Green Party, who denounced deployment and urged German withdrawal from the Alliance. Journalists reported that a major theme of the Bonn demonstration was the early destruction of Germany in any nuclear conflict. Numerous accounts also spoke of explicit and implicit anti-Americanism at the demonstration.

THE POSITION OF THE KOHL GOVERNMENT

In the face of this vociferous opposition, the Kohl government conducted a campaign with both international and domestic aspects. The government continued its solid support for both tracks of the 1979 decision at the same time that it attempted to persuade the dissenting public of the reasonableness of that decision. It urged the greatest possible flexibility in the Geneva negotiations, at the same time that it worked to convince the Soviet Union of its firm commitment to the Alliance. It sought to limit any potential damage by strengthening other dimensions of its relations with the East-Germany and the Soviet Union, at the same time that it pursued significant public gestures as newsworthy as demonstrations.

In mid-October, shortly before the 'action week' of demonstrations, it was announced that Foreign Minister Genscher would meet Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko for a weekend of talks in Vienna. The meeting was arranged at the request of Mr. Gromyko, who in the wake of the Soviet September destruction of the KAL plane, chose not to go to the United Nations meeting where he would have met Mr. Genscher. Mr. Genscher reported that during the 11 hours of discussion, he rejected a delay in deployment and urged the Soviet Union to continue negotiations after deployment had begun. For Mr. Gromyko, agreement was only possible if deployment did not begin. Mr. Gromyko could not be moved from his total opposition to any deployment, he noted, and no break in the Geneva statemate was perceivable.

SOVIET PRESSURES

The Federal Republic was the object of frequent Soviet pressure during the later half of 1983. On one occasion in October it was warned that its relations with the Soviet Union would suffer if the Bundestag voted in favour of deployment. A month later, the Soviet Union through deputy Prime Minister Tikanov told a German official that the Soviet Union would not retaliate against Bonn if the U.S. missiles were deployed. However, it was stated repeatedly to officials of the Kohl government that the Bundestag vote held the key to the fate of the Geneva negotiations: the Geneva negotiations would collapse if the Bundestag voted in favour of deployments. Meanwhile, the Kohl government worked carefully to insulate its relations with the East German government growing East-West tensions.

Shortly before the Bundestag debate on November 21-22, it was announced in Bonn that the Soviet Union was informally proposing to reduce its SS-20s to 120 and to omit the French and U.K. nuclear weapons from the LRINF negotiations if those weapons were included in another forum. This informal proposal, originating from an informal conversation of the chief U.S. and Soviet negotiators at the Geneva talks, reportedly depended on a NATO decision to deploy no cruise or Pershing missiles. The Kohl government made public this proposal, it was said, to put greater pressure on the Soviet Union to reach a negotiated settlement at Geneva. As it turned out, the informal proposal remained only that. In subsequent sessions of the negotiations, the proposal was not formally tabled by the Soviet delegation, and within a few days Soviet Defence Minister Marshall Dmitri Ustinov reasserted in forceful language the need to include French and U.K. nuclear weapons and the likely collapse of negotiations if new missiles were deployed.

THE SPD CONFERENCE: NOVEMBER 1983

That the SPD at its special conference on 18-19 November would come out in opposition to deployment and in favor of extended Geneva negotiations was widely anticipated. The SPD Executive Committee had already voted 27-5 against deployment, leaving Helmut Schmidt almost isolated in the party. The uncertainty that existed concerned the position Helmut Schmidt would take, the arguments for and against, and the size of the majority opposed. At the conference itself there was an acrimonious, lengthy debate on the INF issues. SPD chairman Willy Brandt argued the case against deployment and urged that Europe increase its influence in the Alliance in political and security matters. Helmut Schmidt, one of the chief architects of the 1979 dual-track decision, delivered a wide-ranging impassioned address. The former chancellor charged the Soviet Union with creating the actual INF imbalance with its "unprovoked" and unreasonable build-up of the SS-20s. The Soviets still did not realise that their paranoia and their quest for absolute security created greater insecurity among others. While blaming the Soviet Union for the creation of the problem, Mr. Schmidt also expressed his deep dissatisfaction with aspects of American policy. He reproached President Carter for having excluded the Pershing II from the SALT II negotiations. He reproached the Reagan administration for requiring two years to produce viable negotiating

positions and termed the lack of consultations over the 'walk-in-the-woods' informal proposal "inexcusable". The Kohl government, he further charged, had been ineffective. Despite his conviction that efforts to attain an agreement in the Geneva negotiations had been insufficient, he saw no alternative to the full implementation of the 1979 decision and strongly urged the delegates to support deployment. The resolution before the SPD conference urged no deployment of the missiles and, if deployed, their removal as slow as possible; and called on the Soviet Union to reduce its SS 20s. The vote was 380 in favour of the resolution and 14 opposed, with three abstentions. With the passage of the resolution, the earlier SPD balance achieved with some difficulty by Helmut Schmidt to support equally both tracks of the 1979 decision fell apart. The passage of the resolution also marked clearly the ascendancy in the SPD of Willy Brandt over Helmut Schmidt.

During the same November week-end, the FDP, the Greens, and the CSU all had special conventions to consider the INF issues. Both the FDP and the CSU conferences strongly endorsed deployment. The Green conference rejected any new missiles and called for a withdrawal from the Alliance.

THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE: NOVEMBER 1983

The decisive debate in the Bundestag took place on 21-22 November. With a 58-seat majority in the Bundestag, the Kohl coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP was assured of victory. Still, public attention was rivetted on the debate because of its historic importance. Three resolutions were before the Bundestag : the government proposal in favour of deployment, and two resolutions opposed to deployment, one offered by the SPD, the second tabled by the Greens. The debate took place in an atmosphere of tension caused in part by the momentous importance of the subject itself, and in part by uncertainty about the activities of demonstrators. On the first day, demonstrators attempted to block access roads to the parliament. They were peacefully removed, and thereafter a relatively small number of demonstrators remained outside the Bundestag protesting deployment.

In the debate itself, Chancellor Kohl was firm in his support for both tracks of the 1979 decision. He argued that the balance of power in Europe was at stake. At stake, too, he said, was how reliable an ally the Federal Republic was and, ultimately, whether or not NATO would continue to guarantee peace and freedom in Europe. Defence Minister Manfred Wörner argued that without the NATO deployments the Soviet Union would retain a monopoly of INF missiles and would be in a position to apply political pressure to Europe. Moreover, the Alliance would be plunged into havoc if the Federal Republic did not fulfill its commitment to deploy in the absence of successful results at the Geneva negotiations. Willy Brandt, the chief opposition spokesman, made the SPD case against deployment. Mr. Brandt emphasised the point -- reportedly a matter of concern in some circles -- that opposition to deployment should not be construed as opposition to the Alliance or to the United States; the SPD continued strongly to support membership in the Alliance and appreciated the leading role of the United States. Nevertheless, he considered the new deployments destabilising without enhancing security and

suggested the Alliance search for a new concept to replace nuclear deterrence. Moreover, he called for a "security partnership" between East and West and for a continuation of detente policy and of NATO's defensive strategy. Many in the SPD, he reiterated, had concluded that insufficient efforts had been made at the Geneva negotiations. Hans Joachim Vogel, the SPD parliamentary leader, attacked the Kohl government for ineffectiveness. He, too, made the point that opposition to deployment did not diminish the SPD commitment to NATO. Helmut Schmidt explained why he was opposed to the SPD position and why he could not support the Kohl resolution, though he favoured deployment. The failure to deploy, according to Schmidt, would allow a dangerous nuclear imbalance to continue at the same time that it would raise questions among the Allies about the reliability of the Federal Republic. Failure to deploy would, in short, be disastrous for the Federal Republic and for the Allies. While the Soviet Union was responsible for creating the nuclear imbalance, he faulted both the Soviet Union and the United States for failure to reach an agreement in Geneva.

The vote on the three resolutions followed party lines and expectations. The Greens' resolution urging rejection of the NATO missiles and withdrawal from NATO was overwhelmingly defeated, gaining only the 28 Green votes. The SPD resolution opposing deployment was defeated, with 25 SPD MPs and 14 Greens abstaining. The government resolution favoring deployment and continuation of negotiations was passed with 286 in favor, 226 opposed, and one (FDP) abstention. The parliamentary debate was over, and the position of the Federal Republic on deployment was unequivocal. The following day, 23 November, it was announced that the first Pershing II missile components were arriving and that the Soviet Union walked out of the Geneva INF negotiations without agreement on a date for resumption, charging that the United States had created a crisis in East-West relations.

A NATIONAL CONSENSUS SHATTERED?

The parliamentary debate was indeed concluded, but it was extremely doubtful that the larger public debate on the issues had reached a satisfactory conclusion. Numerous German and international commentators called attention to the fact that the 25-year bi-partisan consensus on security policy had been shattered. While the Bundestag debate revealed that the Federal Republic was divided, it also demonstrated that contrary to exaggerated reports of neutralism or a neutralist drift, the Federal Republic was still deeply committed to the West and to the Alliance. Certainly the major political leaders were not unaware of the Louis Harris - Atlantic Institute poll of October 1983 that registered a sharp loss of confidence (as compared to 1982) in trans-atlantic co-operation as the key to Western security. Whether the Bundestag debate merely reflected that loss or helped clarify issues and rebuild confidence was yet to be seen. In any event, the political leaders in general and the Kohl government in particular were left with the enormous problem of rebuilding the security consensus.

RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (GDR)

Following the Bundestag vote and the Soviet walk-out in Geneva, the Kohl government maintained its programme of public and private diplomacy in support of the dual-track decision and watched carefully for signs of changes in overall East-West relations. When President Mitterrand of France visited Bonn in late November for the bi-annual talks that are part of the Franco-German bilateral Friendship Treaty, the two leaders expressed the hope that the INF talks would resume and found the retaliatory measures taken by the Soviet Union -- i.e., the installation of new missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia -- in the interest of neither Eastern nor Western Europe. About the same time, Erich Honecker, leader of the German Democratic Republic, made an address in which he stated that the possibility for arms control results would not be excluded. The speech was widely interpreted in the Federal Republic as conciliatory and a sign that Soviet retaliatory steps would be limited. In fact, the installation of new Soviet missiles in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia was downplayed as a specific retaliatory measure. Numerous commentators indicated that the Soviet Union had planned for a long time to install these missiles and indeed has installed some earlier. What was new about the Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe was Soviet public admission of their installation and perhaps an accelerated rate of installation. Another indication that Soviet reprisals against the Federal Republic would be limited was found in the letter from Soviet President Yuri Andropov to Chancellor Kohl in November. The Federal Chancellor made public a passage from the letter that read, "The Soviet Union does not wish to regard the existing situation as irreversible". Chancellor Kohl understood this to mean that the negotiations might be reopened at some indefinite time in the future and that the East-West dialogue would continue in bilateral and multilateral channels.

TOWARD BROADENED AND IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS

One basic thrust of the Kohl government became a renewed emphasis on the improvement of East-West relations while maintaining full support for the implementation of both tracks of the 1979 decision. This policy was reflected in the "Brussels Declaration" the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council -- widely thought to be a German initiative and known to have full German backing -- and the Federal Republic's support for a new Harmel exercise to examine East-West relations, another initiative of the same meeting. In anticipation of a possible difficult period in East-West relations if there were no agreement in Geneva, the Federal Republic had worked vigorously in 1983 to achieve alliance-wide agreement on holding a conference on European disarmament (CDE) within a CSCE context. That had been agreed at the Madrid CSCE review conference, and, if the Soviet Union was cutting off other normal channels of East-West dialogue, the dialogue would nevertheless be resumed in January at the Stockholm conference. In another step aimed at reducing East-West tensions and keeping the dialogue open, Chancellor Kohl announced in mid-December an invitation to Soviet President Andropov to visit Bonn. He further suggested that the Federal Republic would seek out other areas for East-West co-operation. The Chancellor stated he would welcome an early U.S.-Soviet summit and, in the interests of reducing tension, announced a 1984 visit to Hungary and his intention to improve relations with Poland.

DEPLOYMENTS: DECEMBER 1983

The Bundestag vote and the arrival of the first Pershing II missiles constituted a singular but not unexpected set-back to the anti-nuclear forces. The groups were widely reported to be in disarray and increasingly divided over tactics and the future direction of the movement. Anti-nuclear demonstrations continued in December, some more violent in nature, feeding the fear in some circles that the tactics of non-violence would give way to violence. In late December, the Supreme Court reached a decision on the constitutionality of deployment of P-IIs and cruise missiles in the Federal Republic. A legal suit had been lodged on the grounds that new missiles constituted an infringement on the right to life and safety of the people. The court judged that because the deployments were motivated by the desire for deterrence, they were, in fact, constitutional. Very early in January, 1984, it was announced that the P-II's installed in the Federal Republic were operational. It was also announced, though given little publicity, that for each P-II installed, a Pershing IA was being withdrawn.

THE AFTERMATH: RE-EXAMINING NATO STRATEGY

The breakdown of the FRG consensus on security policy reflected in the Bundestag November debate was considered a matter of considerable importance by the German political leadership and throughout the Alliance. The mainstream SPD leadership, committed to NATO and concerned about charges in some Atlanticist circles of growing German neutralism, was careful to specify the particulars where the consensus still held. Most importantly, it included membership in the Alliance, though a left-wing minority contested that. There was also a new element in the security consensus among the major political parties: that the nuclear threshold should be raised; the consensus fell apart on how this goal could be achieved. The government parties supported the idea of raising the nuclear threshold by raising the quality of conventional forces. In the SPD, there was a search for a different strategy with far less reliance on nuclear weapons. At its conference in May, where questions of NATO strategy dominated the discussion, the SPD affirmed its commitment to the Alliance and to the EEC and supported a strategy that renounced first-use of nuclear weapons. It also voiced its opposition to any build-up of conventional forces, affirming that defense expenditures be limited to 1983 levels and supporting the reduction of conventional forces through arms control negotiations. While the SPD voiced its continued opposition to deployments, it did not take any further action to organise public opposition. The strategic debate in the FRG was expected to continue and probably to broaden.

THE 'PEACE' MOVEMENT

In the months following the deployment of the first P-II's, the anti-nuclear movement fell into disarray, in part because of the failure to stop deployments, in part because of disagreement over future strategy and tactics. The political party most radically anti-nuclear and most vociferously opposed to deployments — the Greens — became itself seriously fragmented on questions of principle and changed the party leadership completely in early

April. The loss of confidence and popular support for the 'peace' movement was evident at the time of the Easter week-end, when demonstrations were organised in several major cities. The estimates varied wildly for these demonstrations, with organisers claiming 70,000 in several cities, and police estimating 15 - 18,000. In any case, it was conceded that far fewer turned out than was expected and the crowds were far smaller than in 1983.

PUBLIC OPINION: 1984

The most recent poll taken by the International Herald Tribune and the Atlantic Institute, published in June 1984, showed a dramatic change in German public opinion on several key security issues. Fear of war dropped to 14% among those polled -- it was at 28% six months earlier -- and concern with nuclear weapons declined sharply to 15%. It was 38% 6 months earlier and 42% a year earlier. The well known German political analyst Dr. Karl Kaiser commented on these figures that the "unexpected, even surprising results, suggest a degree of psychological consolidation going further than the political leadership is publicly claiming." He suggested that a political consensus might be emerging. That the U.S. had not yet fully regained the confidence of the public in the Federal Republic of Germany was evident from other statistics. Those polled ranked Soviet threats as their primary concern, but U.S. political and economic policy, especially towards developing countries, was rated second as the cause of international tension.

CHAPTER IV - THE UNITED KINGDOM

THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT: NUCLEAR POLICY

The Conservative Government of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, first elected in 1979, has consistently adopted a firm position towards the Soviet Union, with government actions often running closely parallel to American policy. Mrs. Thatcher's government fully supported the NATO proposal to respond to the Soviet build-up: in the work of the High Level Group and in the evolution of the NATO modernisation proposal, the United Kingdom, both under the preceding Labour government and under the Thatcher government, played an extremely active role. British officials were prominent in emphasising the importance of the NATO 1979 decision and in stressing the dangers of a failure by the Alliance to act decisively.

A second important aspect of the Thatcher government's nuclear policy has been the commitment to modernise the independent British nuclear deterrent. In June 1980 the government announced plans to modernise the aging nuclear forces, (then composed of four nuclear-powered Polaris submarines, each equipped with 16 triple-headed nuclear missiles) with Trident missiles. The missiles would be constructed in the U.S., then fitted with warheads built in the United Kingdom and installed on British sub-marines.

The nuclear policy of the Thatcher government began to meet firm resistance from the political parties of the left and, during the next few years, increasingly strong opposition from a grass-roots anti-nuclear movement organised primarily by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).

THE LABOUR PARTY: INTENSIFYING OPPOSITION

The Labour Party was split between unilateralists, who wanted Britain to take the lead in nuclear disarmament, and multilateralists, who held that disarmament must be promoted by multilateral negotiations. At the 1981 Labour Party Conference in Brighton, the party voted to endorse an "unambiguous commitment to unilateral disarmament" and to declare its unconditional opposition to the deployment of cruise missiles and all other nuclear weapons in Britain. Multilateralists pointed out, however, that the acceptance of the motion did not mean that it had become party policy, since a 2/3 majority on a card vote rather than voice vote would have been needed. However, at the 1982 conference, the unilateralists won decisively on this point. The Labour Party rejected deployment of any U.S. nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom and voted to eliminate eventually the United Kingdom nuclear forces. Since a vote of more than 2/3 was gained on these issues, the vote was binding on the Party and became the official party position. As such, these positions had to be considered for inclusion in the next campaign manifesto. The Labour Party made it as clear as it possibly could in 1982 that the party position was anti-nuclear, not anti-NATO: members voted overwhelmingly not to withdraw from NATO.

THE POSITION OF THE ALLIANCE

The Alliance, composed of the Liberal Party and the newly formed Social Democratic Party (SDP), was split on the LRINF issue. The SDP fully supported the dual-track decision, whereas the Liberals in their 1981 conference voted to oppose "the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe and ... as a first step, to reject and campaign against the siting of cruise missiles in Britain". The Liberal Party was itself divided on LRINF and on NATO, with some arguing that the party was not bound by a conference decisions, including the decision on LRINF, and that the United Kingdom must remain in NATO; and others arguing against all nuclear weapons and for unilateral withdrawal from NATO. Both parties of the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance rejected the Trident nuclear modernisation programme.

THE TRIDENT PROGRAMME

In March, 1982, Secretary of Defence John Nott announced that instead of opting for the Trident C-4 missile, the government had decided to buy Trident D-5, an even more advanced version. The decision to purchase the Trident D-5 re-opened the debate on the British nuclear deterrent. The Labour Party pledged that the "next Labour Government will cancel the Trident project". The debate intensified in the wake of the Falklands conflict, when a number of voices, including government backbenchers, called for a reversal of the previously announced navy cuts and for an enlargement of the Royal navy. The government stood by its decision.

OPPOSITION GROWS

The decision to accept cruise missiles and the announcement of the purchase of the Trident D-5 missile to replace the Polaris deterrent force sparked off a new wave of anti-nuclear feeling in the United Kingdom. Opposition to the possession of nuclear arms and the location of American nuclear bases on British soil was running higher than in the heyday of the CND in the 1950s. In a major rally in October 1981, about 150,000 people joined the CND-sponsored demonstration opposing nuclear weapons, the largest of its kind ever in Britain. The movement produced a spate of literature and articles arguing for and against the government's position. Much of the argument was evoked by the publication of a government handbook on civil defence, "Protect and Survive", which provoked a critical review of government policy by Oxford historian E.P. Thompson called "Protest and Survive".

In regard to the INF negotiations, the Thatcher government staunchly supported the 'zero-option' advanced by President Reagan, and in January 1983 the government indicated its willingness to consider an interim solution for the mutual reduction of INF missiles by the Soviets and NATO. However, the Prime Minister reasserted the government's preference for the 'zero option'.

DUAL CONTROL

Prior to the 9 June 1983 elections, dual control of cruise missiles became a contentious issue in the United Kingdom. Control of U.S. nuclear weapons based in the United Kingdom has been governed by successive, bilateral understandings on consultation procedures : the Attlee-Truman, and Churchill-Truman letters, only parts of which have ever been published, but which are scrutinised by each successive Prime Minister and President taking office, as well as by the Athens guidelines of 1964. The Thatcher government reaffirmed its confidence in existing arrangements as satisfactory and maintained that dual control, in the sense of 'dual-key' (that is, physical control of the launch mechanism), was therefore, unnecessary. The Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Heseltine, estimated the cost of acquiring dual-key systems at 1000 million pounds, an obviously prohibitive figure.

THE SYNOD DECISION

Another development considered to be of extreme importance by supporters of the 1979 decision was the decision taken in February 1983 by the general Synod of the Church of England. The Synod, the Church's governing body consisting of both clergy and laity, rejected a proposal for unilateral nuclear disarmament. The decision came after a five-hour debate of nuclear issues based on a report prepared by a working group. The Synod supported in principle the British independent nuclear deterrent, but also supported a policy of 'no first-use' of nuclear weapons.

THE 1983 ELECTIONS

The election of 9 June 1983 saw Mrs. Thatcher's Conservative party inflict a major defeat on the opposition. The Tories gained 397 seats in the 650-seat House of Commons with a margin of 144 seats over the combined opposition parties. Defence and nuclear policy were major issues during the election campaign. However, the government was more successful in turning the issue around to its advantage. A Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) survey in January showed 54% of those polled to be opposed to cruise missiles. A MORI poll in late May showed 52% in favor of deployment, 34% opposed, and 14% with no opinion. In addition, the government benefited from a radicalised and divided opposition.

The Labour Party campaign document, "New Hope for Britain", outlined what the party expected to accomplish during the lifetime of one parliament. This included commitments to cancel the Trident programme and to reject the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles. In addition, Labour promised to pursue a "non-nuclear defence policy", including the removal from the United Kingdom of all existing U.S. and U.K. nuclear bases and weapons. The document included a qualifying proviso that the intended nuclear disarmament would be undertaken with the consultation and co-operation of the NATO Allies.

Relations between the Labour Party and the key element of the "peace movement", the CND, were strained during the election campaign, since unilateralists in both groups had to contend with an influential multilateralist contingent in the Labour Party. The CND advocacy of complete withdrawal from NATO, for example, had been rejected by Labour. The CND, in turn, was somewhat sceptical that Labour would fully implement the defense policy of its election campaign platform if elected. Consequently, some nuclear disarmament candidates opposed prominent multilateralist Labour MPs.

The Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance was, as earlier, in disagreement on the INF issue, though the two parties agreed in their election manifesto to await the outcome of the Geneva negotiations before taking any decision on deployment. Both parties of the Alliance rejected the Trident nuclear modernisation programme. The SDP strongly favoured 'dual-key' control of cruise missiles deployed in the United Kingdom.

THE INCLUSION OF U.K. NUCLEAR FORCES? A FIRM "NO"

Before and since the elections, the Thatcher government has repeatedly rejected the Soviet demand that the United Kingdom's independent nuclear forces be included in the INF negotiations at Geneva. The government has taken the position, shared by the NATO Allies, that the Soviet demand is an attempt to decouple the United States from Europe by excluding U.S. nuclear weapons systems from Europe. United Kingdom officials have argued that British (and French) independent nuclear systems should not be included for several reasons: they are by definition and nature strategic and not theatre forces; they are minimal deterrent forces vis-à-vis the vast Soviet nuclear arsenal; and the INF negotiations are strictly bilateral. As a result, officials of the Thatcher government as well as the Prime Minister herself have repeatedly rejected inclusion of the U.K. nuclear forces in the INF talks. As Minister Heseltine once stated, "We had our Polaris long before INF was thought of." The March 1982 United Kingdom White Paper did indicate, however, that if "circumstances were to change significantly, e.g., if Soviet military capabilities and the threat they pose to the United Kingdom were to be reduced substantially, we would of course be prepared to review our position in relation to arms control". In its plans to modernise U.K. strategic forces by replacing the aging Polaris fleet with the Trident D-5, the Thatcher government has been unwavering.

DEMONSTRATIONS

Immediately after the June 9 elections, the overwhelming rejection of the Labour Party's policies appeared to have removed whatever momentum that CND had managed to accumulate. Earlier in the year, CND had organised several large anti-nuclear demonstrations. An estimated 30,000 women demonstrated at Greenham Common in December 1982. Over the Easter weekend 1-4 April 1983, several CND demonstrations, attracting tens of thousands, were held. An estimated 40,000 held hands to form a 'chain' that stretched 17 miles (22.5 kilometres) from Greenham Common, via the nuclear weapons plant at Aldermaston

to another nuclear plant in Burghfield. When in mid-July 1983 CND, staged an anti-nuclear protest in London, it attracted only 6,000 supporters. The demonstration, was, however, unusual in two respects. First, the rally was directed equally again the United States and the Soviet Union. Secondly, it was not specifically aimed at cruise deployment.

THE 'HOT AUTUMN' OF 1983

As the anticipated 'hot autumn' arrived, the controversy surrounding the INF issues in the U.K. again sharpened, though it was now clear that the government's policy had slowed the momentum of the opposition and had gained greater support. According to the Louis Harris poll conducted in October 1983, 62% of the U.K. population favoured an East-West nuclear balance. (In a breakdown of these figures, the poll indicated that as high as 50% of the Labour Party favored this approach.) The firmness of government policy -- flexibility in negotiations, but deployment if no agreement -- was frequently reiterated, as when France's President François Mitterrand came to London in October 1983 for a two-day bilateral annual meeting. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, took the opportunity to comment at the end of the meeting, "We both resolved that should the arms talks not result in zero option at the end of this year, the cruise and Pershings must be deployed". President Mitterrand stated, "France is opposed to any Euromissiles. But since they [Soviet missiles] are already there, there must be equivalence or balance at the lowest possible level". Both leaders rejected the inclusion of their independent strategic nuclear forces in the INF negotiations.

From the government's viewpoint, the timing of the Mitterrand-Thatcher meeting was opportune, for it occurred the very week-end of the largest demonstration planned by CND for London. It was disputed how many people actually turned out for the demonstration, timed by the international organisers to coincide with demonstrations in many European cities -- The Hague, Paris, Rome, Copenhagen, Brussels, and several German cities. Police estimates of 135,000 were later raised to 200,000. CND estimated the crowd at 400,000, but an analysis of aerial photographs following the demonstration put the number at 100,000. The demonstration remained non-violent.

In late October, it was leaked to the British press that the launch vehicles for the cruise missiles would be arriving on November 1, and the warheads would be arriving later in the month with the first missiles. With this information, the protesters at the Greenham Common missile site -- protesters had established a constant presence there for more than two years -- began to intensify their activities. The anti-nuclear movement in the United Kingdom received a new stimulus with the U.S. invasion of Grenada on 25 October, which, for many British people, raised questions about the willingness of the United States to consult on issues affecting Allies' interests. These questions had, for some, an immediate relevance to the nuclear issues and, in particular, to the question of dual-key control. In an opinion poll in November 1983, 94% of those who replied favored dual-key control, and a poll commissioned by CND later in November showed 50% opposing cruise missiles with 38% favouring installation.

THE DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT

The dual-key control issue, also surfaced in a debate in the House of Commons on 31 October. According to reports, the parliamentary debate was purposely sought by Secretary of State for Defence Michael Heseltine so that the issues and deliberations would be as open and public as possible. Mr. Heseltine emphasised the installation of 16 cruise missiles as an "initial, limited step in a five-year NATO programme". He stated that the necessary equipment had been arriving for some time and that the missiles themselves would be arriving within three weeks, so they could be operational by 31 December. Grenada, he averred, did not in any way alter the basis of the U.S.-U.K. understanding on control of nuclear weapons based in the United Kingdom; dual-key arrangements had not been further explored, and he repeated the Prime Minister's comment, "No nuclear weapon could be fired or launched from British territory without the agreement of the British Prime Minister". Denis Healey, the Labour shadow foreign secretary, argued that the cruise missiles were devoid of military value, would make disarmament negotiations more difficult, and, in any East-West conflict, would make the U.K. a prime Soviet target. His argument was the more remarkable for his firm insistence that he was a multilateralist, not a unilateralist, and for his emphasis on NATO's retention of nuclear weapons as long as the Soviet Union possessed them. He favoured dual-key control, as did the spokesman for the SDP-Liberal Alliance, David Steele. Mr. Heseltine moved the government motion for support of the 1979 NATO decision, providing for deployment if the Geneva negotiations produced no agreement. Mr. Steele tabled an amendment calling for dual-control. With the large majority the Conservative Party held in the House of Commons, the amendment supported by Labour and the Alliance was easily defeated and the motion easily passed.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CRUISE MISSILES: NOVEMBER 1983

The early weeks of November in the United Kingdom were marked by expectation that the missiles would soon be arriving and by heightened agitation at Greenham Common. Incidents of conflict between demonstrators and the police at Greenham Common and elsewhere were reported almost daily. Security was tightened at Greenham Common. On one day, 187 women were reported arrested for cutting the wire fence and entering the base; the following day, 16 more were arrested. The arrival of the cruise missiles at an untimely hour a day earlier than expected took demonstrators by surprise: newspapers printed a picture of the missiles being unloaded from the U.S. transport plane and reported the dismay of a small number of surprised demonstrators. The demonstrations continued after the arrival of the missiles, and while the protests were spirited and arrests were made, the demonstrations were generally non-violent, or the violence was at a low, easily controlled level. When the Secretary of State for Defence was sprayed with red paint as he passed through a crowd to deliver an address, the violence was decried by CND spokesmen and blamed on Communist organisers. The General Secretary of CND, Monsignor Bruce Kent, came under sharp attack by members of the Conservative Party for an address to the Communist Party of Great Britain in which he praised the Communists for their support of nuclear disarmament. The controversial Roman Catholic priest declared that he was not a Communist, but refused to withdraw any of his remarks. Nor was he censured by Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Basil Hume.

THE POSITION OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS

The Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom was, in November 1983, in the process of working out a position on nuclear weapons. The position of Cardinal Hume reported in the press was that nuclear deterrence was "morally ambiguous" and therefore morally defensible, and while the Roman Catholic bishops' conference expressed grave concern with the deployment of cruise missiles without condemning or approving their deployment, the episcopate favoured dual-control.

A TURN IN EAST-WEST POLICY

Following the actual arrival of the cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, the British Prime Minister began to give indications that the government was interested in constructing positive relations with the Soviet Union and with the Warsaw Pact countries. "Britain is ready to pursue", she stated, "a sensible dialogue with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe..." and she announced a visit to Hungary in 1984, her first visit to an Eastern European country since she was elected in 1979. When the Soviet Union walked out of the Geneva INF negotiations on 23 November, Mrs Thatcher, in India for the Commonwealth Conference, expressed regret at the same time that she noted the West could not be blamed for the failure: it was not "lack of effort" on the part of NATO that brought the walkout. A government spokesman in London commented that the walkout was unjustified: the West had remained at the conference table while the Soviet Union continued to deploy its SS-20s. He stated that the Alliance was prepared to halt or to reverse its deployments if an equitable agreement could be reached.

On 1 January 1984, it was announced that the 16 cruise missiles deployed at Greenham Common in the United Kingdom were operational.

THE AFTERMATH

The nuclear debate in the United Kingdom left the country deeply divided, and in the early part of 1984 the opposition political parties were in the process of reconsidering their security policies.

At the SDP Council meeting in mid-January 1984, the party leadership agreed on a ten-point security programme. Taking a position sharply opposed to its Alliance partner, the Liberals, the SDP supported deployment of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom. The SPD programme called for a freeze on further deployments, supported the 'walk-in-the-woods' formula for an agreement, and voiced strong opposition to Trident. SDP party leader Dr. David Owen expressed his personal opinion that an agreement with the Soviet Union on no further deployments could be reached by 1986 if not earlier.

The division in the Labour party between unilateralist and multilateralist remained, and while it was unclear in the early months which tendency would prevail, the leadership of the party appeared gradually to be moving toward complete rejection of all nuclear weapons. By late June 1984 it became obvious that those completely opposed to nuclear weapons were over the party. A Labour policy paper was circulated that committed the party to a non-nuclear policy for the United Kingdom. The document expressed strong support for NATO but only in terms of conventional defence. Nuclear deterrence was considered "dangerous or suicidal", and the document committed the Labour Party to removing all nuclear weapons from the U.K. and proposed no first-use of nuclear weapons as NATO policy.

THE BRITISH ATLANTIC COMMITTEE STUDY

The strategic debate initiated in the U.K. by the cruise missile deployments was reflected as well in the study published by the British Atlantic Committee on "NATO's Defence and New Technology". The authors, well known in U.K. circles and considered close to NATO military strategists, argued that NATO should keep a nuclear option in case of a Soviet attack and breakthrough, but that NATO needed to strengthen its conventional forces to prevent an early use of nuclear weapons. "This concept of controlled, step-by-step escalation", according to the writers, "is impractical nonsense" in battlefield conditions. NATO, they urged, should return to its original emphasis on deterring war, an emphasis that has been fogged over by the strategy of flexible response. The study puts great stress on the value to conventional defence of the new technologies.

THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT: 1984

As of early 1984, the anti-nuclear movement in the United Kingdom appeared demoralised but far from defunct. CND was planning a national campaign of civil disobedience to prevent the movement of the cruise missiles on roads, a programme that, if effective, would make it extremely difficult if not impossible to conduct the exercises required to ensure missile mobility and crew efficiency. On a broader strategic front, as expressed at its conference in December 1983, CND was organising a campaign to stop the Trident programme and fashioning an argument for U.K. withdrawal from NATO, leading the way for a dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances. In addition, the leadership expressed interest in re-enforcing the unilateralist wing of the Labour party and working more closely with the trade unions.

Not all these plans materialised. Despite the adverse publicity generated by a spate of articles on the use of drugs by American troops stationed at U.K. bases -- articles apparently intended to accent the possibility of a nuclear accident -- the anti-nuclear movement never reached the levels of 1983, as evidenced, for example, by the Easter demonstrations in April 1984. More cruise missiles arrived in the U.K. with greatly diminished opposition, and on at least two occasions there were off-base training exercises of cruise missiles. These were reportedly conducted on a reduced basis by night, but the fact that the government authorities could exercise

at all without interference was a victory of sorts. Government authorities also took action to evict from the 'peace camps' outside of Greenham Common the women who had been camping there since September 1981.

A NEW PRO-NATO MOVEMENT?

A new organisation, Peace Through Nato, was established in 1983 to counter the CND movement and present the Alliance argument from a positive viewpoint. The Peace Through NATO group emphasised educational and activist projects and strove to be non-partisan. In 1984, it appeared to be having some success.

OPINION POLLS

While the anti-nuclear movement could rally less support for public demonstrations than in 1983, it appeared from the poll taken by the International Herald Tribune and the Atlantic Institute that U.K. public opinion remained profoundly divided on security issues. According to the poll results, published in June 1984, the U.K. was the only country in the Alliance showing in the six months since the previous poll a sharp rise in worry both about war and nuclear arms. It was also the country where criticism of the U.S. was highest. Some results may well have been due to adverse effects of the U.S. invasion of Granada. A similar division on security policy was shown by the results of a poll taken by the Guardian newspaper in May. The only conclusion to be drawn was that the country was far from a national consensus on defence issues.

CHAPTER V - ITALY

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

When NATO adopted the dual-track decision in 1979, the Christian Democratic Government of Francesco Cossiga was in power. The Cossiga government adopted a favourable position on the LRINF modernisation proposal and on the deployment of cruise missile launchers on Italian territory. The government position was endorsed by the Italian parliament when it approved the plan by 328 votes to 230.

The powerful Italian Communist Party (PCI) found itself in a predicament, since the other political parties suggested that its position on the LRINF issue would be an appropriate test of its independence from Moscow and its support for NATO. The PCI adopted a position which, while opposed to the NATO proposal, acknowledged the existence of a problem concerning the military balance and suggested certain courses of action. The party directorate issued a statement on 28th November 1980 in which the PCI proposed to suspend any decision on the manufacture and deployment of new missiles, or at least postpone the question for six months or more; to call on the Soviet Union to suspend the manufacture and deployment of its SS-20 missiles; immediately to open negotiations aimed at reaching reduced and balanced levels.

A NEW GOVERNMENT: JUNE 1981

Following the Italian governmental crisis in May 1981, connected with the secret Masonic lodge known as P2, and the resignation of the Christian Democratic Government headed by Arnaldo Forlani, Giovanni Spadolini of the Republican Party formed a new coalition composed of Republicans, Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats and Liberals. In presenting his programme to the Senate in his initial speech in early June, 1981, Prime Minister Spadolini came out strongly in favour of the NATO dual-track decision, favouring arms control negotiations, rejecting the Soviet moratorium proposal as "unacceptable in its present form", and stating that Italy's position was similar to that of Chancellor Schmidt in approaching LRINF modernisation as a deterrent to the SS-20.

THE CRUISE MISSILE SITE ANNOUNCED: AUGUST 1981

In August 1981, the Spadolini government announced that the site for the installation of the cruise missile had been chosen -- Comiso, on the southern tip of Sicily. Because the government's announcement of the site choice almost coincided with the American announcement to continue production of the enhanced radiation weapon, it caused some disturbance among parliamentarians of the left. The special two-day session of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee convoked to discuss the two issues confirmed the government position with strong support.

When a new coalition government took office in December, 1982, Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani included in the speech introducing the government programme a passage reaffirming the government's commitment to the dual-track decision of 1979. The four-party coalition, composed of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social-Democrats and Liberals, lasted only 5 months, collapsing in April 1983, when the Socialists could no longer support the central economic policies of the Christian Democrats. President Sandro Pertini called for elections on 26 June.

ELECTIONS: JUNE 1983

The election results proved to be a startling setback for the Christian Democrats, who have dominated all Italian governments since 1945. With the loss of 37 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 18 seats in the Senate, the Christian Democrats were left with their smallest lead over the Communists since World War II. Significantly, however, Christian Democrat losses did not translate into gains for the Communists, who lost three seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Instead, slight gains were recorded by the smaller parties, including the Socialists, whose leader, Bettino Craxi, was eventually asked to form a government.

THE CRAXI GOVERNMENT

The Italian Socialist Party was known generally to support the security policies of recent Italian governments. The Defence Minister in the previous government, the Socialist Lelio Lagorio, had vigorously supported the dual-track decision and reportedly rejected a suggestion by the German Social Democrats to abandon NATO deployment plans in return for Soviet missile reductions as a "West zero, East plus" approach. Other top Socialist officials, however, endorsed the Soviet demand that independent British and French nuclear forces be included in the Geneva discussions. Soon after his appointment as Prime Minister, Mr. Craxi reaffirmed Italy's strong and constant commitment to cruise missile deployment and also expressed interest in the 'walk-in-the-woods' proposal.

On 29 August 1983, Prime Minister Craxi received a letter from Soviet President Andropov which warned that if deployment of U.S. missiles begins, the "negotiations now under way will lose their meaning". Mr. Andropov's letter reiterated the proposal of 26 August in which the Soviet Union offered to reduce its SS-20 missile levels targetted at Western Europe to 162, the same number of missiles held by Great Britain and France, and to dismantle SS-20's above this number. The Andropov letter also warned of the "necessary countermeasures" that would be taken by Moscow if deployment began. Mr. Craxi reportedly found the new Andropov proposal "interesting", but declined to endorse it.

THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE : NOVEMBER 1983

On 16 November, after debate, the Italian parliament voted 351 to 219 to support the government's intention to deploy cruise missiles in Comiso if no agreement in Geneva was forthcoming. A few days after the vote, Prime Minister Craxi received another letter from the Soviet President. Mr. Andropov expressed his regret at the Italian vote, said that Italy was deliberately aggravating East-West relations by accepting the cruise missiles and thereby increasing the military threat to the Soviet Union, and suggested that Italy was not interested in maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union. In his reply, the Italian Prime Minister affirmed Italian interest in good relations with the Soviet Union, then reportedly went on to say, "Good relations should not be confused with acquiescence in the face of any form of intimidation. Peace cannot be confused with a pacific state of subjugation." The Soviet Union, he stated, had exacerbated a nuclear imbalance by continuing to deploy SS-20s.

In late November, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that missile components were arriving at Sigonella, a U.S. naval base in eastern Sicily about 100 kms from Comiso; that the launchers would be arriving before the end of the year; and that the first 16 of the 112 cruise missiles designated for deployment in Italy would be operational at Comiso in March 1984. This official confirmation brought to an end a certain confusion about whether the Comiso base would be ready on time. The full deployment of 112 missiles is scheduled for completion in 1988.

PUBLIC OPINION

Public opposition to successive governments' commitment to support fully the dual-track, including possible deployment of cruise missiles, was initially notable by its absence. This resulted in part from the cautious position the Roman Catholic Church adopted and from the fact that the 1979 decision did not become a contentious issue among the political parties. The Communist Party, while officially opposed to the missiles, favoured a restrained approach that condemned new deployments in East and West. Paolo Buffalini, a Central Committee member, stated that deployment was "theoretically possible" based upon the "necessity for a balance of forces and equal security". Giancarlo Pajetta, the chief of the Party's International Affairs Department, asserted that the Italian Communists favour a freeze on nuclear weapons and some form of balance between United States and Soviet forces. Whether the Italian Communist Party will continue to sustain this position is not yet certain. When the Italian Communist Party held its 16th general congress in Milan during March 1983, party leader Enrico Berlinguer reaffirmed his party's opposition to Euromissile deployment while U.S.-Soviet negotiations were underway in Geneva and urged party members to demonstrate in Geneva against United States deployments. When Soviet President Yuri Andropov offered in August 1983 to destroy Soviet SS-20s above the combined total of French and U.K. independent strategic nuclear warheads, Mr. Berlinguer considered it irrational that French and U.K. nuclear forces not be included. It can be said in general that the CPI has not supported unilateral nuclear disarmament, and there is no strong support in the party for withdrawal from NATO.

Though opposition to deployments in Italy was initially limited, several large demonstrations were organised. In early June 1982, some 30,000 people demonstrated in Rome in opposition to the LRINF deployments both by the Soviet Union and NATO. In December 1982, some 5,000 protesters gathered in Rome to support a 'peace march' to Comiso, where in January 1983 an international group of 500 again demonstrated. Another demonstration in Rome during mid-March 1983 attracted 15,000 anti-missile supporters. At the time of the October 1983 demonstrations in other European cities, a crowd estimated between 300,000 and 500,000 gathered in Rome. While the organizers of the demonstration, including the CPI, urged an evenhandedness in insisting on non-deployment by both the Soviet Union and the United States, reports indicated that the demonstration was finally more critical of the United States.

With the growth of other European anti-nuclear movements, a more active opposition also began to assert itself in Italy. The Italian Communist Party was the only major political party opposing deployment, but rather than inspiring the opposition, most commentators maintained that the Italian Communists gave their support to the movement only after it had gained a certain momentum, and then without great enthusiasm. In fact, one notable aspect of the Italian anti-nuclear movement, besides its relatively late arrival, was its continuous emphasis on the dismantling of the Soviet SS-20s as well as on the non-deployment of NATO LRINF. This equal emphasis on non-deployment by both East and West was noteworthy because it was often lacking in other European movements.

POLICY CONTINUITY

In 1984 the Craxi government continued to maintain firm support for deployments while continuing to urge a resumption of talks. The government coalition was sufficiently powerful and cohesive on security issues to promote its policies without risk of failure. In the parliamentary debate that took place in the Chamber of Deputies in late March 1984 immediately after Defence Minister Spadolini announced that the cruise missiles at Comiso would be operational on schedule at the end of the month, a motion to remove the missiles was overwhelmingly defeated. The Communist Party boycotted the vote. The April visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Andreotti brought no new initiatives toward resumption; Mr. Gromyko told him the basis of negotiations had been destroyed by deployment.

OPINION POLLS

It is difficult to say whether opposition to deployment in Italy will grow or diminish. The fact that it is not a major party political issue favors its diminution, if that situation obtains in the future. The opinion polls, often considered of suspicious validity, indicate a certain level of public opposition. According to a poll conducted in early July 1983 by Panorama Mese, 59% of Italians opposed cruise missile deployment. In the

Louis Harris polls conducted for the Atlantic Institute and the International Herald Tribune in October 1983, 35% of those polled favored unilateral nuclear disarmament, 10% supported an immediate freeze, and 30% favored a nuclear balance. The results of a similar poll released in June 1984 showed Italy with the highest percentages of those concerned about the threat of war (56%, up 9% in six months) and about nuclear weapons (39%, up 9% in six months). These percentages have certainly not been reflected in the positions adopted by the political parties, the management of security issues by the parties and the high degree of intra-party consensus on security issues has guaranteed the continuity of government policy and governmental commitment to the support of both elements of the 1979 NATO decision.

CHAPTER VI - THE NETHERLANDS

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

At the time of the NATO 1979 decision, the Dutch government was composed of a coalition of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) -- itself a fusion of three former parties (the Anti-Revolutionary, Catholic People's and Protestant parties) - and the Liberal Party (VVD). In the 150-member Second Chamber, the coalition had a slim majority of two votes. The issue of new nuclear deployments had already been the subject of intense public and parliamentary debate in the Netherlands, the result of a broadly based opposition to nuclear weapons. The opposition represented a force the government could not ignore. The Liberal Party, the junior party in the coalition, strongly favoured deployment, as did the majority of the CDA. However, the number of CDA members strongly opposed to deployment was sufficient to ensure defeat if it came to a vote favouring deployment, since the main opposition party, Labour (PVDA), was almost unanimously opposed to the decision.

SUPPORT FOR THE 1979 NATO DECISION

After difficult political negotiations, the government took the decision to support the NATO final Communiqué in December 1979, announcing the agreement of all members for the double-track decision. However, the Dutch government stated it was not then able to decide on deployment of cruise missiles on its territory and would decide by December 1981.

THE MAY 1981 ELECTIONS

The nuclear issues were considered central to the outcome of the May 1981 elections. Among the major political parties, the Labour Party was unanimously opposed to deployment of LRINF in the Netherlands, and the smaller Democrats '66 (D'66) was opposed "under the present circumstances", whereas the Liberals strongly supported the NATO decision. The CDA took a nuanced position, stating that it would not yet take a decision on deployment and arguing that progress in the Geneva INF negotiations would be central to its decision.

The Labour Party, the largest of the opposition parties, had as a central plank in its platform for the May elections the rejection of NATO's modernisation plan and a radical reduction of Holland's six nuclear tasks. The central division in the Labour Party came over how many nuclear tasks should be eliminated. A proposal to abolish all nuclear tasks - a proposal supported by the majority of the Party - was only averted by the threatened resignation of the party leader, Joop den Uyl. The American failure to ratify SALT II was strongly criticised by the Party.

The results of the May 1981 election left the nuclear issues unresolved. The Christian Democratic Appeal lost one seat, the Liberals lost two seats, leaving the coalition a total of 74 - two short of a majority. The Labour Party lost 9 seats, and smaller parties opposed to deployment gained.

A NEW GOVERNMENT

Following the elections, a centre-left coalition was formed, composed of the CDA, PVDA, and D'66. Concerning the full implementation of the NATO 1979 dual-track decision, this coalition "agreed to disagree". In his investiture address before parliament, CDA Prime Minister van Agt made the following points with regard to the LRINF modernisation question: the dual-track decision must not be altered and must remain the basis for negotiations; the government was still unable to lift earlier reservations with regard to stationing LRINF on Dutch territory because negotiations would only be starting in the future; the government would refrain from taking any unilateral measures since any move to reduce nuclear weapons must be coordinated within the Alliance. One month after its investiture, the government was faced with a cabinet crisis. It was during this period that the government was faced with its self-imposed December 1981 deadline for a decision on deployment. The government took the decision to postpone deployment, both because of the cabinet crisis and because of the lack of INF negotiations. The coalition fell apart in May 1982, following disagreement on how to finance the budget deficit. An interim minority cabinet of CDA and D'66 was formed until the 8 September 1982 elections.

NEW ELECTIONS: SEPTEMBER 1982

In the September 1982 elections, the central importance of the nuclear issue was replaced by concerns over the economy, though nuclear issues played an important role. Party positions changed little. The Liberals still favoured deployment, while the Labour Party (PVDA) was as strongly opposed as earlier. The PVDA continued to hold the position that a reduction in Holland's six nuclear tasks to two was desirable; D'66 was ambiguous on the issue, possibly willing to endorse deployment should the Geneva talks fail. CDA leader van Agt appeared to have moved towards accepting deployment, and the number of Christian Democrats unalterably opposed to the decision was decreasing. Again, the CDA made its final position contingent on progress in the Geneva talks. Before the elections Mr. van Agt announced that, should his party join a new coalition, whatever its composition, such a coalition should not take a specific position on the nuclear issues. Instead, he urged that the issues should be debated and voted in parliament. Thus, even if the coalition partners split on the deployment issue, it would not bring down the government, he said.

The results of the 8 September elections made the Labour Party the largest in the Dutch parliament. Labour gained three seats in the election, bringing its total to 47 seats in the 150 member Second Chamber. The Christian Democratic Appeal lost 3 seats and now held 45 seats. The largest gains were won by the Liberal Party, which added 10 seats, for a total of 36. Democrats '66 lost 11 seats, and the remaining 16 seats were held by 8 smaller

political parties. Following Dutch constitutional procedures, which require that the largest political party first be asked to form a government, Queen Beatrix asked PVDA leader Joop den Uyl to do so. When that attempt failed, the Christian Democratic Appeal and the Liberals organized a coalition government in December 1982.

The September elections, then, again left the nuclear issue in Holland unresolved. Regarding the full implementation of the 1979 NATO decision, the only conclusion that could be drawn with certainty from the election results was that the Dutch people remained deeply divided and no consensus had been achieved on the deployment issue.

GOVERNMENT POLICY

The new Netherlands government, like its predecessors, accepted the 1979 decision with the same reservations as earlier and acknowledged the decision as the basis for negotiations. The coalition agreed to await the outcome of the Geneva negotiations, doing nothing in the meantime to undermine the negotiations and leaving open the final decision on deployment. The openness to a decision included preparation for site selection, as well as the possibility for a negative decision. While there was thought to be a small parliamentary majority in favour of deployment, the parliamentary margin was so small that, with strong anti-nuclear opposition from the Labour Party and well-organized 'peace' groups, the margin was shaky and uncertain. In addition, few were willing to anticipate events which by their very nature might intensify the divisions.

In a recommendation addressed to the Dutch government, the Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, an advisory body to the Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister, proposed in June 1983 that the government strive to implement the decision to deploy cruise missiles by the end of 1983. The Committee concluded that it is "improbable" that an agreement will be reached in Geneva and that, as a result, the cohesion of the Alliance would be tested. The Committee suggested that the government should not allow itself to be influenced by extra-parliamentary pressures in its final declaration, as this would be a display of defeatism which would constitute a long-term threat to the credibility of the Dutch political system.

THE CRUISE MISSILE BASE DESIGNATED: JUNE 1983

The Dutch Minister of Defence, Mr. Job de Ruiter, announced in late June 1983 that Woensdrecht air base had been selected as the site for possible deployment for the 48 missiles designated for Holland. (The site is currently a co-located base for United States Air Force overseas deployment and a storage and service base for Dutch fighters.) The Dutch government confirmed that it would not make a decision on deployment until after thorough discussion on the Defence White Paper scheduled for publication in late 1983.

and after site preparation required a decision. That opposition to the government's even-handed policy of doing nothing to undermine negotiations on deployment was still strong at the grass-roots level was evidenced by the Woensdrecht city council decision not to change the city ordinances in a way that would allow the construction of new military facility. The government could over-ride the decision, of course, in the interest of national security.

When the government's Defence White Paper was published in October 1983, the publication of key sections related to nuclear issues was delayed until early 1984. In the passages of the White Paper related to nuclear issues, the tone was balanced. The White Paper stated that it was a "dangerous illusion to think that peace can be established when nuclear weapons are removed", and went on to say, "The danger of conventional war in Europe will not decrease, but increase". Discussing the morality of nuclear weapons, a theme of some importance in the Netherlands, it took the position, "Nuclear weapons are not good or bad, but as a means to deter, they are the lesser of two evils." Finally, the White Paper concluded there were "no useful alternatives" to the current strategy for defence based on the nuclear deterrence of NATO.

The progress of the Geneva negotiations was closely followed by the major political parties in Holland. When in September 1983 it appeared to many that Soviet insistence on the inclusion of French and U.K. nuclear forces was a reasonable demand and that the failure to include them was blocking progress in the INF negotiations, the parliament, in a motion addressed to the government, called on NATO to include those nuclear forces in one of the two Geneva nuclear arms negotiations. The resolution was supported by the CDA and PVDA, with the Liberals opposing it. Another motion calling on the government to support initiatives aimed at delaying deployment was defeated in the parliament.

DIVISIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT: SPRING 1984

The 48 cruise missiles designated for deployment in the Netherlands were not scheduled to be installed until late 1986. However, because the Woensdrecht base needed preparation, construction contracts were pushing the Dutch government toward a decision in Spring 1984, and Parliamentary debate was scheduled for early May. It was thought the debate would center on a cabinet decision in favor of deployment, to be submitted then to parliament for approval. In the early months of 1984, the coalition government, led by CDA Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers was reportedly under some pressure from the junior partners in the coalition, the Liberals, to be unequivocal in support of the NATO deployments or face dissolution of the coalition. The Labour party, with backing from the unions and the 'peace' movement, remained strenuously opposed to deployment. If the government approved deployments in spring 1984, the Labor party said that it would reverse the deployment decision if re-elected. In addition, the Labour party remained committed to a reduction of Holland's six current nuclear tasks, namely, the Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles; Lance surface-to-air missiles; Orion anti-submarine nuclear depth charges; dual-capable F-16 aircraft; atomic demolition mines (ADMs); and nuclear artillery. Under current arrangements, the United States control the warheads, and the Dutch armed forces control the launch vehicles, giving the Dutch government effective dual-key control.

In early 1984, then, Holland remained divided on the INF issues, with the larger partner of the government coalition, the Christian Democratic Appeal, under considerable pressure from the right and the left. Moreover, the government required passive if not active support from the Labour Party and the Liberals if its austerity programme was to be fully implemented. The deployment question was further complicated because negotiations had been broken off and because CDA perspectives about a reasonable course of action were divergent. The CDA party position had consistently emphasized the desirability of eliminating new nuclear weapons -- if possible, through negotiations. With the negotiations in Geneva broken off, a significant number in the CDA supported deployment in 1986. A minority was opposed or still undecided. The combined number of those opposed to deployment with those still undecided left it uncertain what support the parliament would provide, since the CDA-Liberal coalition commanded a slight majority (79 seats) in the 150-member Second Chamber.

THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT

Anti-nuclear sentiment in the political parties has been supported and stimulated in Holland by several institutions and broader movements that help account for the strong anti-nuclear sentiment at the grass-roots level. Among these, religious institutions and polemological institutes play a key role. Perhaps the most important of these has been the Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (IKV), or the Interchurch Peace Council. With a membership of 15,000 - 20,000 and a grass-roots organisation, the IKV has as its aim to stop the arms race by "unilateral initiatives leading to multilateral disarmament" and to exert influence on the political parties to move towards that objective. The basis of the IKV argument is that nuclear weapons are immoral and, by unilateral disarmament, the Netherlands could provide a revolutionary example that other countries might follow. In November 1980, the synod of the Dutch Reformed Church publicly endorsed unilateral nuclear disarmament. The Dutch chapter of Pax Christi, an international Roman Catholic organisation, also has a strong anti-nuclear element, but is far less powerful than the IKV. Another organisation, relatively insignificant in members but remarkable, is the Army Peace and Security Council (Het Vredes en Veiligheid Beraad Krijgsmacht) which, among its other activities, has conducted surveys of the attitudes of the military services toward deployment of nuclear weapons. Other anti-nuclear groups include the Communist-inclined 'Stop the Neutron Bomb', the Humanist Peace Council, Women for Peace and Women against Nuclear Weapons. There is also an 'umbrella' organisation known as the Consulting Committee Against Nuclear Weapons, where political party and 'peace' activists meet to plan activities and exchange ideas. A smaller movement aiming to rally support at the grass-roots level for NATO's 1979 decision has also been organized in Holland. An interdenominational group, the Inter-Church Committee for Bilateral Disarmament, was established in 1979 as an alternative to the IKV. However, it was never able to attract support on a scale equal to that of the IKV.

The Dutch anti-nuclear movement and the IKV in particular has played an extremely important role in co-ordinating international opposition to nuclear weapons and has co-sponsored and participated in demonstrations in Germany and the United Kingdom. An IKV-sponsored peace demonstration in Amsterdam in November 1981 attracted 400,000 people -- the largest demonstration of its kind in Western Europe at that time. The IKV, however,

declined to participate in the Bonn rally in June 1982 at the time of the NATO Summit. Its spokesmen argued that it could not support the general anti-NATO tone, what it considered German nationalistic overtones, or the one-sidedness of the demonstrations -- the last being exemplified by the lack of any mention of the Soviet SS-20 in rally literature. The official IKV position was not as one-sided in its opposition as it perceived the organizers of the Bonn demonstrations to be, but instead saw itself as attempting to provide logical, well-informed arguments against nuclear weapons.

In late August 1982, during the course of the political campaign, Pax Christi and the IKV both became involved in a major political controversy. Both groups recommended that their followers and sympathisers vote for Labour or for the smaller left-wing parties in the September 1982 elections to ensure non-deployment of LRINF. Their action was widely condemned by the main political parties as interference in politics by religious, single-issue groups. The head of Pax Christi, the Bishop of Breda, publicly dissociated himself from the initiative and condemned the recommendation.

Dutch anti-nuclear groups have also been active in the movement to declare nuclear-free cities. Rotterdam, the largest port in the world, is the main Dutch nuclear-free city. In November 1982, the Rotterdam city council, believing that it would be a target in a nuclear war, prohibited any eventual shipment of nuclear weapons through the port. The Dutch Defence and Interior Ministries announced that such declarations would be nullified if national interests were at stake.

It was the IKV, supported by the Labour Party and the large trade unions, that acted as the chief organizer of the 29 October 1983 demonstrations in The Hague. Peaceful in nature, the demonstration attracted an estimated half-million people. An unexpected speaker, Princess Irene of the Dutch royal family, proved to be a high point of the meeting. The Princess stressed the inhumane elements of social systems which threaten each other with nuclear weapons.

SOVIET PRESSURE, PUBLIC OPINION, AND ALLIANCE PRESSURE

As the time for the November 1983 deployment decision by the Bundestag drew near, the Dutch population was not entirely spared the Soviet tactic of implied intimidation, used with some frequency toward the Federal Republic. In November 1983, shortly before the Bundestag debate, Leonid Zamyatin, Director of the Soviet Union's International Information Department and member of the Central Committee, paid another visit to The Hague. Among other comments reported by the press, he stated that if any Pershing IIs were installed in the Federal Republic, "the negotiations make no more sense and will be broken off". He also said that any Europeans who chose to deploy nuclear weapons were putting their fate in the hands of the United States and of the Pentagon, and that in any conflict the Soviet Union would retaliate against missile sites.

As the Dutch government neared a decision in June 1984, opposition to the installation of 48 cruise missiles was extremely strong. A poll taken in mid-March 1984 found 63% opposed to deployments, including 80 % of the Labour Party, 45% of the Christian Democratic Appeal, and 34% of the Liberals. In late March, the Netherlands Council of Churches, which purports to represent millions of Dutch Christians, publicly opposed the deployment of cruise missiles.

The implications of the Dutch decision for the solidarity of the Alliance were the subject of sharp debate in Holland and throughout the Alliance. The Dutch rejected the contention by a senior American official that a Dutch refusal to accept 48 cruise missiles would deliver a fatal blow to the resumption of negotiations in Geneva. When Secretary of Defence Weinberger visited The Hague in March 1984, he did not use that type of argument. That the Alliance was deeply concerned, however, was clear from reports of the meeting in early April of the Nuclear Planning Group. The Dutch Defence Minister Job de Ruiter came under great pressure from the U.S. and other Ministers of Defence to accept deployments. Reportedly there was some resentment as well that the Dutch should continue to be undecided. The Defence Minister again came under pressure at the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in mid-May 1984, when he was warned that the Dutch decision could have grave consequence for NATO solidarity.

The Soviet Union was also pressing the Dutch not to deploy. The Soviet Ambassador to The Hague told an audience that if the Netherlands refused deployment the Soviet Union would guarantee that Holland would not suffer a nuclear attack.

Rumours about various solutions to the Dutch dilemma were circulating -- rumours that the Dutch would take fewer than 48 or that they would take 48 cruises and store them outside the Netherlands, to be rapidly reintroduced in times of East-West crisis; rumours that the decision would be permanently postponed.

THE GOVERNMENT DECISION: CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE

On 1 June 1984, in a letter addressed to the parliament and in a press conference, Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers announced the compromise reached by the Dutch cabinet. The final Dutch decision on deployment would be made on 1 November 1985 on the basis of two conditions : first, whether the Soviet Union expanded its SS-20 nuclear arsenal after 1 June 1984; second, whether an arms control agreement eliminated the need for Dutch deployments. If a positive decision was taken on 1 November 1985, deployment would proceed as quickly as possible. In the meantime, there would be no construction at Woensdrecht. The cabinet decision marked the first time a Netherlands government had agreed to accept the missiles and committed itself to deployment, albeit conditionally. The Prime Minister presented the decision as an example of Dutch commitment to NATO and also as a message to the Soviet Union: "Today's decision is primarily an invitation to the Soviet Union to put a radical stop to the deployment of SS-20 missiles."

On 14 June 1984, after two days of intense debate, including an attempt to introduce new criteria for acceptance of the missiles, the parliament voted 79 - 71 not to reject the cabinet decision.

While the Dutch decision was the first delay in the scheduled NATO deployments, the fact that it was also the first substantive Dutch commitment to conditional deployment and that a categorical refusal was rejected made the decision welcome in NATO circles. Moreover, the compromise formula agreed by the Dutch government was also found acceptable by the IKV leadership.

TOWARD A RENEWED NATIONAL CONSENSUS?

Whether or not the compromise decision reached in mid-June by the Dutch political parties will serve to heal the divisions over security policy raised by the debate is yet to be seen. Later in June there were indications by the IKV leadership that it was retreating from absolute rejection toward conditional approval of deployment as an instrument for strengthening efforts for arms control. IKV leader Mient Jan Faber stated in a television broadcast, "The Netherlands must be prepared to help the NATO allies if necessary and deploy some of these weapons temporarily within the framework of an agreement to remove nuclear weapons from Western and Eastern Europe altogether." He expressed concern that the IKV and the Labour Party would lose influence by unconditional opposition.

CHAPTER VII - BELGIUM

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

For the past several years, Belgium has been preoccupied with several internal problems directly related to the friction between the Flemish and Walloon communities. The cultural and linguistic tensions have exacerbated economic conditions, which already were difficult. Though the Belgian position regarding implementation of the 1979 decision is sometimes considered identical to that of the Netherlands, there were significant differences from the beginning.

THE 1979 DECISION

As part of the 1979 decision, 48 cruise missiles were planned for Belgium, to become operational in early 1985. During the period of preparation and consultation that preceded the NATO 12 December 1979 decision, it was confidently thought that the Belgian coalition government would endorse the proposal and accept the deployment of cruise missiles. Opposition to deployment had manifested itself, particularly among the Flemish Socialists, but prior to the decision, the issue of cruise missiles had scarcely been debated in the government, then consisting of the Flemish and Walloon sections of the Christian Democrat and Socialist Parties, and the Francophone Front. The cabinet met on the morning of 12 December to take a decision. The decision was presented to the NATO ministers by Foreign Minister Henri Simonet who, noting the consensus of the meeting and confident of the future Belgian decision, endorsed the dual-track decision, saying that the Belgian government would confirm the application of the decision for Belgian territory in six months in the light of progress on arms control. The Foreign Minister's interpretation of the cabinet decision, however, was disputed by other cabinet ministers, who argued that the Belgian cabinet had endorsed the double-track proposal saying it would take its decision on the application to Belgian territory in six months in the light of progress on arms control.

NEW ELECTIONS: 1980

Following a government crisis in April 1980, the coalition government collapsed. After month-long negotiations, a new coalition government of six political groups was formed and immediately became preoccupied with the linguistic-cultural issues and the deteriorating Belgian economy. Consensus had not yet been reached by the coalition partners on deployment. Consequently, during the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers in Ankara in June 1980, the Belgian Government suggested an extension of its original proposal to review its decision in six months time.

A SIX-MONTH REVIEW

In September 1980, the government issued a declaration regarding the deployment of cruise missiles on Belgian territory. The wording of the declaration allowed both supporters and opponents of deployment to support it. The operative paragraphs of this declaration read :

The government hopes that the talks will lead to positive results and that, more especially, the balance of theatre nuclear weapons will be maintained at the lowest possible level. Belgium will spare no effort to make the maximum contribution to this end.

In order to facilitate the conduct of the negotiations, the government declares that Belgium is here and now prepared to accept the outcome of the negotiations with the Soviet Union and to execute its role within the context of the Alliance.

Should the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union not succeed, Belgium, in concert with its Allies, will take all the measures agreed upon by the NATO partners.

For this purpose, the government will examine the state and progress of the negotiations every six months in conjunction with its Allies and draw the necessary conclusions in the context of the Alliance. Parliament will be kept informed regularly.

GOVERNMENT POLICY

The present government, formed in December 1981, endorsed the six-month review option formulated in September 1980 and, within the self-imposed restrictions of the compromise, supported both tracks of the 1979 decision. During a press conference in March 1982, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Vreven, indicated that Belgium was actively studying the infrastructure requirements in the event that deployment became necessary, and in June 1982 Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans announced that the United States and Belgium had signed an accord for the appropriate technical measures to be taken in preparation for possible missile deployment. The memorandum represented the legal instrument required to initiate technical studies (for example, the study of soil, site selection, methods of transport and infrastructure) of a potential missile site. The agreement also allowed for the transport of materials for missile deployment in West Germany over Belgian territory. The air base at Florennes in southern Belgium was selected as the site for cruise missile deployment.

POLITICAL OPPOSITION

The Flemish Socialist party has most consistently and strongly opposed deployment. In the past, the party made opposition to deployment one of the points on which it could participate in the government, and the party's political leaders have a political commitment to the issue. The leader of the Flemish Socialist Party, Karl Van Miert, argued that the NATO decision was an example of overwhelming American pressure on the Europeans and stressed that deployment in Belgium should be linked to a possible agreement with the Soviet Union. Since serious negotiations began only in November 1981, he maintained Belgium was not obliged to accept the missiles. The French Socialists were not as strongly opposed to deployment, but would find it difficult to participate in a government if the Flemish Socialists maintained their adamant opposition.

The Flemish Socialists, joined by Belgian ecologists, took the opportunity of a visit to Belgium by President François Mitterrand in October 1983 to reiterate their opposition to deployment. The French President was reported to have said at a dinner offered by King Baudoin that he sympathized with the notion of no additional nuclear weapons in Europe. He then reportedly added, "Pacifism is in the West and the missiles are in the East. Peace can only be found in the balance of force". The following day, Flemish Socialist leader Karl Van Miert objected to these statements, saying that the French should let their missiles be included in the INF negotiations and should not be putting pressure on Belgium to accept deployment. The French Socialists and an ecologist group also protested against French-Belgian co-operation on nuclear power.

THE POSITION OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS

The Belgian Catholic Bishops issued a statement in July 1983 defending Belgium's right to deploy cruise missiles, if negotiations failed, as legitimate self-defense. The bishops also strongly supported greater efforts toward a negotiated agreement. Since Belgium is a predominantly Roman Catholic country, the Bishops' statement was considered of far-reaching significance.

GOVERNMENT POLICY

The Belgian coalition government, led by Prime Minister Wilfred Martens, was, in fact, taking a more firm position on the deployment question. In mid October 1983 shortly before the major demonstrations of the 'hot autumn' planned for many European capitals, including Brussels, the Prime Minister announced that Belgium would adhere to the two-track decision even if the government had to resign. The Prime Minister stated, "Any deployment decision will be communicated by the government to parliament, where it will be put to a vote of confidence. If it is turned down, the government will resign. But the decision on the missiles will stand".

THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE

These constitutional procedures -- whether the government or the parliament would decide on deployment -- were one aspect of a major debate on nuclear issues in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies on 8-9 November 1983. The government won the constitutional case that the decision to deploy was a cabinet, not a parliamentary, decision. After debate the Chamber rejected resolutions, tabled by Socialist groups, aimed at prohibiting and at delaying deployment. Henri Simonet, Foreign Minister at the time of the 1979 decision and a leading Francophone Socialist, separated himself from party opposition to the missiles without leaving the party and argued strongly in favor of adhering to both tracks of the 1979 decision. A few weeks later, in early December 1983, the Belgian Senate rejected a bill calling for government authorization by the parliament prior to deployment and a resolution calling for a denuclearization of Belgian territory.

On December 30, the Belgian government announced that the programme for deployment would, in the absence of a negotiated agreement at Geneva, proceed according to schedule. The decision, it was said, was not irreversible, but without an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces the missiles were considered essential to Belgian security.

PUBLIC OPPOSITION

As one of the five basing countries and the location of NATO headquarters, Belgium had been the rallying point for numerous anti-nuclear demonstrations. Among these, a demonstration in April 1983 protesting the deployment of nuclear weapons throughout Europe attracted several thousand people to the town of Florennes near the deployment site. Florennes is one of about 300 Belgian towns which have declared themselves to be nuclear weapons free zones. A demonstration in October 1983 attracted an estimated 400,000 people.

CHAPTER VIII - FRANCE

Since the French government withdrew from the NATO integrated military command in 1966, it has insisted on the independence of its military forces. The unique position of France within the Alliance -- as a member of the Alliance but not a participating member of NATO's integrated military command structure -- has had profound implications for the nuclear doctrine of France and, consequently, for the French attitude to the two-track decision taken by NATO in 1979.

FRENCH NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

It was General Charles de Gaulle and his government that established the major policy lines that have guided French nuclear doctrine, in fact or in name, and have become the basis of traditional French nuclear doctrine. According to these traditions, French nuclear forces are officially described as independent, strategic, credible, and sufficient. Independent: they are subject solely to French control, to serve France's vital national interests, which are not necessarily identical to French territory. Strategic: they are considered not as intermediate-range nuclear forces, but are forces capable of striking a potential aggressor's homeland and are, therefore, strategic forces. With a second strike capability, they are considered credible to protect France's vital interests and they are sufficient to implement France's nuclear doctrine.

Traditional French nuclear doctrine differs significantly from that of the United States and NATO. France has never accepted the doctrine of flexible response, though its nuclear weapons systems are sufficiently flexible to allow something less than immediate massive retaliation. The French notion of deterrence differs as well. Its nuclear forces are not of the same order of magnitude as those of the United States or the Soviet Union. France views itself as contributing to overall Western deterrence. It contributes in two ways: first, by making its defence of French national interest undeniably clear; secondly, as the 1974 Ottawa Declaration acknowledged, by multiplying the risks and uncertainties for a potential aggressor, since French vital interests are subjected only to the President's appreciation.

Since the French Communist Party endorsed the force de frappe in 1977, French nuclear doctrine and policy have enjoyed a high degree of consensus among the political parties.

FRENCH SECURITY POLICY AND ALLIANCE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

The independence of French military policy has also had implications for arms control negotiations, requiring the French government in power to take an independent position about negotiations for which other Allies may be integral parts of the consultation processes, such as those of MBFR. It is admittedly in French interests that the East-West forces be balanced at as low a level as possible, and it was precisely because of concern with arms control issues that the French government of President Valéry Giscard D'Estaing advanced in 1978 a proposal for a Conference on European Disarmament (CDE) within the context of the CSCE. Regarding nuclear arms control negotiations, President Giscard D'Estaing, along with FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and U.K. Prime Minister James Callaghan, publicly supported after the Guadaloupe conference in January 1979 the SALT II Treaty, and the four Western leaders included in their discussion of Western security at Guadaloupe aspects of the LRINF situation.

Because of its unique position in the Alliance, the government of France was not represented in the Alliance consultative groups that laid the groundwork for the 1979 two-track decision -- the High Level Group and the Consultative Group. Nor was it party to the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers convened in Brussels on 12 December 1979 to take the two-track decision and it was not a signatory to the final communique. However, not long after the decision was taken, the Giscard government endorsed it.

THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

With a firm multi-party consensus on nuclear policy, it was not surprising that French security policy played little role in the national elections of 1981. As expected, the new French Socialist government, led by President François Mitterrand, supported the main lines of traditional French nuclear policy. Unexpected was the support by the Mitterrand government, noticeably stronger than that of the previous government, for the 1979 dual-track decision. The central reason for this appeared to lie in a reassessment of the balance of forces assuring European security. The Mitterrand government viewed the balance as deteriorating in favour of the East, with the consequence that a significant number of European political leaders were beginning to worry about security. While France could defend itself well, alone it could not hope to rectify the growing East-West imbalance. Hence the dual-track decision of December 1979 was perceived as an "equalisation of risks" necessary to counter the Soviet modernisation programme.

From the earliest days it was in power, the Mitterrand government strongly supported the 1979 decision. President Mitterrand himself took the lead in explaining the urgency of implementing both tracks. Without the firm commitment of NATO to deploy in the absence of successful negotiations, the Soviet Union, with its rapid increase in intermediate-range nuclear forces,

might conclude it could hold Europe hostage, while an ensured global balance of forces at reduced levels was evidently in French national interests. The major themes became the necessity for a balance of forces, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, resistance to neutralism and to any potential political intimidation by the Soviet Union.

The frequent return to these themes by President Mitterrand and high French officials between 1981 and 1984 -- in press and television interviews, before parliaments, on the occasion of the bi-annual French-German summits and of other bilateral discussions -- as well as the urgent manner employed in discussing the issues made it clear beyond cavil that the French President considered full implementation of the NATO two-track decision a foreign policy issue of the highest priority. To note a few examples selected from many occasions:

- On 8 July 1981 when the Prime Minister Mauroy announced the government's general programme in the National Assembly, he noted that the uninterrupted increase in Soviet military power as demonstrated in medium range missiles was a matter of concern. He went on, "The defence of peace does not proceed through neutralism but through the balance of forces. If that balance is broken, additional effort must be made to re-establish it. As a matter of fact, it is only in a situation of a balance of forces that negotiations can succeed".
- In an interview in Stern magazine on 9 July 1981, President Mitterrand said, "If I condemn neutralism, it is because I believe peace is due to a balance of forces in the world. The installation of SS-20s and the Soviet Backfire bomber disrupt this balance in Europe. I do not accept it and I admit the necessity to arm in order to re-establish the balance. After that one will have to negotiate".
- On 16 April 1982, during a visit to Japan, President Mitterrand told a group of Japanese journalists, "Our point of view is that peace is based on a balance of forces. As a result, when there is an imbalance, such as there now is in Europe, we think peace is in danger."
- In his address to the Bundestag on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Franco-German Co-operation Treaty (20 February 1983), President Mitterrand stated, "Quiconque ferait le pari sur le "découplage" entre le continent européen et le continent américain mettrait, selon nous, en cause l'équilibre des forces et donc le maintien de la paix. Je pense, et je le dis, que le "découplage" est en soi dangereux, et je souhaite ardemment que les négociations de Genève permettent d'écarter un danger qui pèse singulièrement sur les partenaires européens non détenteurs de l'arme nucléaire. C'est pourquoi la détermination commune des membres de l'Alliance atlantique et leur solidarité doivent être clairement confirmées pour que la négociation aboutisse. Condition nécessaire à la non-installation des armes prévues par la "double décision" de décembre 1979."

- At the dinner for the North Atlantic Council in Paris on 9 June 1983, the French President affirmed "...it is clear that a Soviet monopoly in Europe of this kind of weapon would be unacceptable. Therefore, for the protection of peace and security I can only affirm once more the utter necessity for a balance of American and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, and I still hope that despite everything the negotiations (in Geneva) will be able to establish this balance at the lowest possible level, in the interests of everyone."
- In Brussels on 13 October 1983, during the "hot Autumn" in Europe before the arrival of any cruise or Pershing II missiles and a few days before the German SPD convention, President Mitterrand was quoted as saying, "A balance alone is the guarantee of peace. I, too, am against the euromissiles, only I note a few very simple things about the current debate: in the West, there is pacifism; in the East, euromissiles. I think this is an unequal arrangement."
- In a television programme about French foreign policy on 16 November 1983, President Mitterrand stated "Today, one can say that the only power in possession of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which do not cross the Atlantic and cannot strike the United States, is the Soviet Union. Other powers do not have these weapons. I quite simply reject this monopoly...I do not accuse the Soviet Union of wanting to start a war... but of putting itself in a position sufficiently strong that merely by threatening it obtains the same results as are normally attained by winning a war."

French expressions of regret at the Soviet walkout from the negotiations in November may well have been tempered by this consistent insistence on the need to redress the balance of forces. The Soviet refusal to recognize the imbalance led, in the French view, a partial redressing the balance by new NATO deployments.

This was certainly the view the French President reiterated during his official visit to Moscow in June 1984. The Soviet leadership told the French President that the Geneva LRINF negotiations would not be resumed until the cruise and Pershing II missiles had been dismantled. In reply, Mr. Mitterrand said that the new U.S./NATO missiles were both a reply to the Soviet SS-20 missiles and a modernization of existing nuclear systems. He sharply rejected any notion of including French nuclear forces in either START or the LRINF negotiations.

THE INCLUSION OF FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES? A FIRM "NO"

Since 1981, when the Soviet Union first began to demand the inclusion in the Geneva LRINF negotiations of the French and U.K. nuclear forces -- it is one way, among others, that the Soviet Union arrives at what it calls an existing balance of LRINF forces -- the French have adamantly refused the proposal. French officials and security experts maintain that French nuclear forces are non-negotiable, and, unless the situation changes,* they find no imaginable scenario in which French nuclear forces could be brought into U.S.-Soviet strategic arms negotiations for two basic reasons. First, it would be a reversal of the Ottawa declaration, since French forces would be considered auxiliary to or dependent upon United States nuclear forces, thus reducing the centres of uncertainty; French forces are independent and national. Secondly, French nuclear forces are considered so small in comparison to those of the United States and the Soviet Union that any reduction would damage their credibility.

Because French nuclear forces are national, independent, and strategic, it is also inconceivable that they be brought into INF negotiations, such as those that were taking place in Geneva. French officials are adamant in rejecting any suggestion that in any bilateral INF negotiations any compensation, direct or indirect, be given to the Soviet Union to balance French nuclear forces. They consider the rationale for compensation a Soviet tactic.

* The exception was indicated by Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson on 11 June 1982 in his address to the UN Special Conference on Disarmament. The Foreign Minister stated, "In this context, France cannot contemplate participating, directly or indirectly, in negotiations which must remain bilateral ... It is worth repeating the reason for this ... A fully independent France can only escape the threat of vastly superior forces through unclear deterrence ... France herself cannot fall below the credibility threshold without risking her security and her independence.

"This would certainly be different if three conditions were met: firstly, a reduction of the superpowers' arsenals to such levels that one could consider that the gap between their potentials has changed in nature; secondly, quantitative and qualitative limitation of defensive strategic systems capable of one day neutralising nuclear deterrence; thirdly, significant progress in the reduction of the conventional imbalance in Europe, and the disappearance of all chemical threats."

FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES

Procurement of new nuclear systems has been increased by the government of President Mitterrand. Allocations have already been made for a seventh nuclear submarine, the first of a new generation, and there is some discussion about the need for an eighth. "Inflexible", the sixth nuclear submarine, will enter service in 1985. Of the five nuclear submarines now in operation, three are always at sea, giving the French force de frappe a second-strike capability of 48 missiles. With the exception of the first submarine, all submarines are fitted or will be refitted with the new M4 multiple warhead missiles, extending the range from 3,000 to 4,500 kilometres. The French strategic forces include as well 18 missiles stationed at the plateau d'Albion, and 33 Mirage IV.

French tactical nuclear forces are comprised of 75 Mirage III E and Jaguars, 36 carrier-based Super-Etendard, and 100 Pluto tactical nuclear missiles. Beginning in 1986, the Jaguar and Mirage III E will be replaced by the Mirage 2000 N. Between 70 and 90 Mirage 2000 N are being planned. During the 1990s a new tactical nuclear missile with a longer range, the Hades, will gradually replace the Pluto. Although the government has not yet decided whether to build and produce neutron warheads, research will continue. The total nuclear force is estimated by French officials at 77 megatons. French officials stated that the government planned to maintain the sufficiency of the French force de frappe at a level corresponding to criteria of sufficiency, primarily through modernisation.

A BROAD NATIONAL CONSENSUS

France's nuclear policy enjoys widespread political, public, and budgetary support. There have been anti-nuclear demonstrations in Paris, but in comparison with those in many other European capitals, they were very small. In fact, there has been no significant anti-nuclear movement in France. Rather, French political leadership has become strongly opposed to what it views as increasing pacifism and neutralism in Europe. Analysts attribute this to the strong and effective stance taken by the Mitterrand government; to the traditional French nationalism associated with an independent force de frappe; and to the association in France of pacifism with the French Communist Party, making it inherently suspicious. When the French Catholic Bishops issued a statement in November 1983 on nuclear weapons, it contained measured arguments in favor of nuclear deterrence. Unilateral abandonment of nuclear deterrence, according to the Bishops, could expose a country to permanent blackmail by an aggressor. The statement said, "In a world where man is still a wolf to other men, turning oneself into a lamb may perhaps provoke a wolf". The statement issued by the French protestants a few days later in November 1983 came to the opposite conclusion. The resolution adopted at the end of the protestant conference read, "We cannot accept engaging ourselves in nuclear deterrence...We therefore ask our country to have the courage to work toward a nuclear freeze as a first step in a de-escalation of the arms race, even if it is unilateral. "French Protestants represent only about 3% of the French population, which is still, at least nominally, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. According to the Poll taken by the International Herald Tribune and the Atlantic Institute in mid 1984, concern about nuclear weapons in France is among the lowest in Europe.

A RECENT DISSIDENT CAUSE CELEBRE

One minor disturbance in this relatively unruffled French consensus on nuclear policy occurred in March 1984 when General Etienne Copel, Deputy to the Chief of Air Force operational Staff, resigned from the armed forces, reportedly because of profound disagreement with French deterrent strategy. In a book entitled Vanquish War published immediately after his resignation, General Copel argued that France's nuclear deterrent was anti-city in nature and useful only to deter nuclear attack, an eventuality he considered far less probable than a conventional attack with chemical weapons. He advocated a change in French nuclear strategy, emphasizing the military utility of the neutron bomb. General Copel's arguments were disputed by experts and many in the French military establishment and to date have only had a limited impact.

COMMUNIQUE

ISSUED AT A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE NATO FOREIGN AND DEFENCE
MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS ON 12 DECEMBER, 1979.

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12 December, 1979:
2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.
3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programmes modernising and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long range theatre nuclear missile systems.
4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernisation and expansion of their shorter range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet intercontinental capabilities and achievement of parity in intercontinental capability with the United States.
5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in intercontinental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.
6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernisation and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernise NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The programme will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connexion, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernisation, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRNTF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustment resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armory as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of détente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980's. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes toward achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NAO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems. This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT II framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semiannual meetings.

11. The ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernisation decision, including a commitment to deployments is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defense needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

C O M M U N I Q U E

NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP
28 OCTOBER 1983

THE MONTEBELLO DECISION

At Montebello, Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Ministers declared that the policy of the Alliance is to preserve the peace through the maintenance of forces at the lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact threat.

Consistent with this policy the Alliance since 1977 has been conducting analyses aimed at assuring that nuclear weapons in NATO's armoury are held to the minimum number necessary for deterrence, taking account of developments in conventional as well as nuclear forces.

On the basis of the initial results of these analyses, the Alliance decided in December 1979 that, unless obviated by successful negotiation with the Soviet Union, the development of longer-range weapons (Pershing II and cruise missiles) was essential to restoring the balance and maintaining the integrity of NATO's deterrent posture. The Alliance remains committed to the dual-track decision and its implementation. At the same time Ministers decided to reduce the NATO stockpile by 1,000 warheads. This withdrawal has been completed. Moreover, Ministers mandated further analysis to determine whether the withdrawal of weapons beyond the 1,000 then decided could be accomplished safely, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of deterrence at the lowest possible level of weapons.

With the Alliance analysis now complete, the Nuclear Planning Group has decided on 27 October 1983 to withdraw 1,400 warheads during the next several years. The Ministerial decision, taken together with the already accomplished withdrawal of 1,000 warheads will bring to 2,400 the total number of warheads to be removed from Europe since 1979. Moreover, this reducing will not be affected by any deployment of Longer-Range INF (LRINF) since one warhead will be removed for each Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) warhead deployed.

The detailed implementation of this decision as to the precise composition of the stockpile is a matter for the responsible military authorities to determine and a programme to effect this will be worked out and implemented over the next five to six years. In this context, appropriate consideration will be given to short-range systems. NATO's military authorities should report their findings at a future NPG meeting.

Recognising that for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective. Ministers accordingly identified a range of possible improvements. Ministers established broad criteria which will remain valid for the next decade, including the continuing importance of strengthening conventional forces. The Alliance must, however, take account at all times of changes to Soviet capabilities during this period.

Contrary to the impression that NATO has been fuelling an arms build-up by adding to its nuclear armoury, this sustained programme of reductions will have reduced NATO's nuclear stockpile to the lowest level in over 20 years. Ministers urged the Soviet Union to follow the example set by the Alliance, to halt and reverse its build-up of nuclear forces, and to join NATO in the search for a safer future.

R E S O L U T I O N 1 2 0

on nuclear weapons in Europe *

The Assembly,

Recognising the far-reaching significance of the NATO 12 December 1979 dual-track decision in several respects :

- to enhance NATO's strategy of flexible response by producing a visible "coupling" of the American strategic deterrent and European defence;
- to provide a much-needed response to modernised and expanded Soviet long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF);
- to facilitate permanent limitations on LRTNF through arms control negotiations;
- to demonstrate Alliance political cohesion and solidarity in risk sharing;

Welcoming the determination of member governments to sustain the consensus behind the 12 December dual-track decision;

Noting that the deployment of the SS-20 is continuing beyond the levels predicted in 1979, while stressing that the number of LRTNF required by NATO should not be directly tied to Soviet force levels;

Noting the recent threat assessment by the High Level Group on the extent and pace of Soviet SS-20 deployment and of Soviet modernisation at all levels of theatre nuclear forces;

Welcoming the announcement that negotiations on LRTNF between the United States and the Soviet Union will commence on 30 November 1981;

Noting that a continued commitment to modernisation is essential if real progress in arms control is to be achieved;

Stressing that limitations on LRTNF will not provide stability unless achieved within a framework of limitations on central strategic systems;

Recognising that a 'zero outcome', the mutual elimination of the land-based missile component of LRTNF -- however difficult to achieve -- represents the ideal objective of negotiations;

* Presented by the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe and approved by the Plenary Assembly, in Munich, October 1981.

Concerned that confusion exists about (a) the relationship between modernisation and arms control; (b) the precise objective of the LRTNF negotiations; and (c) the extent to which NATO deployments depend upon Soviet actions and the results of arms control negotiations;

Concerned that the growth of opposition in several European countries to the NATO dual-track decision could undermine NATO's negotiating position and Alliance cohesion and could inadvertently serve Soviet purposes;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to maintain an equal emphasis on the twin objectives of modernisation and arms control;
2. to develop and maintain a unified Allied negotiating position on LRTNF arms control;
3. to undertake concerted efforts to persuade their publics that the dual-track decision constitutes a strategy for achieving military stability and sustaining peace in Europe;

URGES the United States Administration:

1. to continue consultations with its Alliance partners on LRTNF arms control and also on future theatre nuclear force modernisation requirements;
 2. to proceed as now planned to undertake early negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms.
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RESOLUTION 134

on Nuclear Weapons in Europe *

The Assembly,

Recalling its 1981 Resolution on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, which stressed the far-reaching significance of NATO's 1979 decision to achieve a modernisation of its theatre nuclear forces while seeking negotiated East-West limits on such forces;

Re-emphasising the importance of sustaining a public consensus behind this dual-track decision;

Expressing concern about ongoing Soviet deployments of the SS-20 and and other Soviet improvements in theatre nuclear forces;

Welcoming the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations and Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva;

Convinced that NATO's firm determination to modernise is essential to progress in such negotiations;

Aware that public opposition to scheduled theatre nuclear force deployments may increase in the absence of progress in the INF negotiations;

Supporting strongly a "zero-zero" outcome of these negotiations, as proposed by President Reagan, as the best possible outcome; but

Concerned that this or another acceptable outcome of the INF talks may not be forthcoming prior to the first NATO deployments scheduled for late 1983;

Noting the need for NATO to promote public understanding of and support for its nuclear strategy of deterrence through flexible response and, in this respect;

Welcoming the review of short-range nuclear systems by NATO's High Level Group aimed at rationalising and, if possible reducing, NATO's reliance on short-range nuclear weapons;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance :

1. to maintain firm adherence to both elements of the 1979 decision with equal emphasis;
2. to continue efforts to explain clearly and persuasively the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy, and, more specifically, to promote public understanding of current negotiations by

* Presented by the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe and approved by the Plenary Assembly, in London, November 1982.

calling attention to the 'zero-zero' proposal adopted by the Alliance as sound and reasonable, while emphasising NATO's willingness to consider other mutually acceptable outcomes;

explaining more clearly the complexities involved in such negotiations and the realistic prospects for early agreement;

3. to encourage appropriate High Level Group Studies and implement the conclusions thereof, directed towards reducing the Alliance's reliance on short-range nuclear weapons in order both

to strengthen the credibility of Alliance military policy, and

to fortify public confidence in the rational basis of NATO's deterrent posture.

R E S O L U T I O N 1 4 7

on Short-range Nuclear Weapons in Europe *

The Assembly,

Convinced that many of the short-range nuclear weapons currently deployed in Europe are obsolete and no longer contribute significantly to deterrence;

Aware that the High Level Group is soon to complete a review of the number, type and distribution of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe;

Noting that collateral constraints on nuclear weapons of a range of less than 1000 km are under discussion at the INF negotiations in Geneva;

Welcoming US Congressional proposals which call for a mutual 'guaranteed build-down' in nuclear arms by requiring the dismantlement of two existing nuclear warheads for every new nuclear warhead deployed;

Recalling the 1979 decision whereby 1000 short-range nuclear warheads were unilaterally withdrawn;

Convinced that a reduction in the stockpile of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe compatible with the requirements of deterrence would strengthen public confidence in Alliance nuclear strategy;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance :

1. to support a unilateral reduction in the total number of short-range nuclear warheads deployed in Europe as a militarily prudent and politically sensible measure;
2. to pursue subsequently negotiated and verifiable reductions of short-range nuclear weapons taking into consideration the mutual 'guaranteed build-down' concept.

* Presented by the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe and approved by the Plenary Assembly, in The Hague, October 1983.

RESOLUTION 148

on the Implementation of NATO's 1979 Dual-Track Decision *

The Assembly,

Recalling its 1982 Resolution on Nuclear Weapons in Europe which urged member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance to adhere firmly, with equals emphasis, to both the modernisation and arms control elements of the 1979 Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) decision;

Noting that if the Geneva INF negotiations do not result in an agreement which would render NATO deployment unnecessary, initial deployments of cruise and Pershing II missiles are scheduled to take place in Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy by the end of 1983;

Recalling that the differences in the negotiating positions of the two sides concern the nature of the INF balance itself; the application of global as opposed to regional limitations; the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces; and the manner in which nuclear-capable aircraft may be addressed and at what stage;

Noting with interest the informal understanding arrived at by Messrs. Nitze and Kvitsinsky in mid-1982;

Convinced that demonstrated Western flexibility in the Geneva INF negotiations will increase public support for implementation of both tracks of the 1979 decision;

Welcoming US initiatives to achieve an agreement in Geneva, and specifically President Reagan's proposals of 26 September, which represent greater negotiating flexibility on the issues of global limitations and inclusion of aircraft;

Recognising that full implementation of NATO's INF modernisation programme is to take place over a five-year period if negotiations fail completely;

Aware, however, that negotiations may proceed while deployment takes place;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to adhere to both tracks of the 1979 decision by:

- remaining firm in their commitment to begin deployment in December 1983 failing an agreement in Geneva, and
- combining firmness with flexibility in continuing negotiations with the aim of achieving an early, equitable and verifiable agreement at the lowest possible level of deployment.

* Presented by the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe and approved by the Plenary Assembly, in The Hague, October 1983.

RESOLUTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

The Assembly,

Regretting the Soviet decision to walk-out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in December 1983;

Noting the continued willingness of the North Atlantic Alliance to resume INF negotiations with the Soviet Union at any time and to "reverse halt or modify deployments" should a negotiated outcome be achieved;

Hopeful that recent statements by Soviet leaders indicate a genuine willingness on their part to return to the INF and START negotiations under certain conditions;

Stressing that withdrawal of NATO missiles already deployed as a precondition for resumption of negotiations is implausible and undesirable;

Noting that the 1982 "walk in the woods" formula represented the most equitable and reasonable basis for agreement during the three years of INF negotiations;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to pursue all reasonable negotiating possibilities in an attempt to re-engage the Soviet Union in meaningful arms control negotiations.
2. to reconsider within the appropriate negotiating forum the "walk in the woods" formula as a basis for further negotiations.

* Presented by the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe and approved by the Plenary Session, in Brussels, November 1984.

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

Prior to 1981, the most common term of reference for U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe was "theatre nuclear forces" (TNF) or "theatre nuclear weapons" (TNW). This distinguished intercontinental or strategic weapons and those stationed in Europe on the basis of geographic deployment, not range. During the SALT process, range became accepted as the determinative factor in assessing what category a particular weapon would fall under : any system with a range of 5500 km or more would be considered strategic. The independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France are considered to be strategic insofar as their vital role in national defence is a strategic one.

President Reagan on 18 November 1981 introduced the term "intermediate-range nuclear forces" (INF) into the lexicon which subsequently has become the official term for the class of weapons as well as the negotiations in Geneva. The term 'theatre' was judged to be inadvisable by the Reagan Administration on two counts : it suggested the possibility of a limited nuclear war "in the theatre"; and negotiations on theatre systems would imply a limited geographic scope of negotiations, whereas the Reagan Administration insisted on global limits on INF. INF thereby replaced TNF, and LRINF replaced LRTNF. The lower range limit of INF is considered to be 150 km, with all weapons of a range less than 150 km now being officially referred to as short-range nuclear forces (SNF).

Current terminology for non-strategic nuclear systems is based on three categories of range :

- 1) Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (LRINF) -- range greater than 1000 km but less than 5500 km;
- 2) Shorter-range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (SRINF) -- range greater than 150 km but less than 1000 km; and
- 3) Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF) -- range less than 150 km.

SNF are also often referred to as "tactical" or battlefield systems.

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G L O S S A R Y

ACDA	- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (U.S.)
ACM	- Advanced Cruise Missile
ADM	- Atomic Demolition Munition
ALCM	- Air-launched Cruise Missile
C3	- Command, Control and Communications
ERW	- Enhanced Radiation Warhead
FBS	- Forward Based Systems
GLCM	- Ground-launched Cruise Missile
HLG	- High Level Group
ICBM	- Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF	- Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
IRBM	- Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile
LRINF	- Longer-range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
LRINF	- Long-range Theatre Nuclear Forces
MBFR	- Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MIRV	- Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle
MLF	- Multi-lateral Force
MRBM	- Medium-range Ballistic Missile
MRV	- Multiple Re-entry Vehicle
NATO	- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPG	- Nuclear Planning Group
NWFZ	- Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
SACEUR	- Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SALT	- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCG	- Special Consultative Group
SG	- Special Group
SLBM	- Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM	- Sea-launched Cruise Missile
SNF	- Short-range Nuclear Forces
SSM	- Surface-to-Surface Missile
START	- Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TNF	- Theatre Nuclear Forces

ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

1981

13 January -- Organisational meeting in London

Washington DC, 28-29 April. Discussions with members of the House and Senate, officials from the Departments of State and Defence, and independent security experts.

Bonn, 22-24 June. Discussions with experts from the political parties, officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, peace researchers and representatives of the 'peace' movement, and independent security experts.

London, 25 June. Discussions with representatives from the political parties, officials from the Ministry of Defence and from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and representatives of the 'peace' movement.

Brussels and Mons, 14-16 September. Discussions with party representatives, officials from the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, NATO and SHAPE officials, representatives from the 'peace' movement, US officials, and representatives from private industry.

1982

The Hague, 8-10 March. Discussions with representatives from the political parties, officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, representatives from the anti-nuclear groups, and SHAPE officials.

Paris, 11-12 March. Discussions with representatives from the political parties, officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and independent security experts.

Washington DC 20-22 September. Discussions with members of the Senate and House, officials from the Departments of State and Defence and from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and independent security experts.

Rome, 25-26 October. Discussions with political party representatives, officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and independent security experts.

1983

London, 24-25 February. Discussions with political party representatives, officials from the Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and from the Ministry of Defence and independent security experts.

Washington DC, 11-13 April. Discussions with members of the Senate and House, officials from the Departments of State and Defence, and independent security experts.

Bonn, 14-15 December. Discussions with representatives from the political parties, officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and independent security experts.

1984

Brussels and Mons, 1-2 March 1984. Discussions with NATO and SHAPE officials, with NATO ambassadors, and Belgian officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

Washington DC 14-16 May. Discussions with members of the Senate and House, officials from the Departments of State and Defence, and independent security experts.
